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Rapid change and significant uncertainty are the most 
noteworthy features of the legal environment for participation by 
faith-based organizations (“FBOs”) in government-financed social 
services.  Developments in federal constitutional law, statutorily-
based federal programs, and the administrative environment have 
altered the legal circumstances in which such opportunities may 
appear.  In addition, the body of law (federal, state, and local) 
concerning the employment relation, an emerging focus on state 
constitutional law, and the existing pattern of contractual relations 
between government entities and FBOs, contribute to an 
atmosphere of legal complexity surrounding this field.  These 
patterns of change and uncertainty play a crucial role in the 
decisions of FBOs on the value and risks involved in participating 
in such programs, as well as in decisions by government agencies 
concerning whether and how to undertake such programs. 
 
The topics included are 1) the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment to the U.S. constitution, including recent cases 
involving the application of that Clause to FBOs in service 
partnerships with government; 2) state constitutional law as a 
source of impediments to state relationships with FBOs, and 
federal constitutional challenges to such impediments; 3) the law 
of employment discrimination – federal, state, and local – as it 
applies to FBOs in such partnerships; 4) federal programs that 
explicitly invite participation by FBOs; and 5) state social service 
contracts with FBOs, and the presence or absence of religion-
specific provisions in such contracts. 
 
MAJOR FINDINGS: 
 
• Direct financial support to FBOs is now permitted by 
federal constitutional law, but that support must be limited 
to secular activity.  FBOs may not be favored or disfavored 
as compared with their secular counterparts.  Government 
must improve its ability and willingness to define with 
precision the scope of religious activity that the state may 
not subsidize, and government must monitor the conduct of 
FBOs to ensure that these limits are observed. 
 
• Indirect financial support to FBOs (e.g., beneficiary choice 
programs, such as school or child care vouchers) is also 
permitted by federal constitutional law, so long as 
beneficiaries have genuine, independent choices among 
religious and secular options.  Indirect support may 
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Existing contracts 
between states and 
FBOs are 
conspicuously silent 
about the particular 
rights and 
responsibilities that 
attach to FBOs in such 
contracts, and the 
absence of contractual 
guidance to FBOs 
about constitutional 
and statutory limits on 
their use of 
government funds 
invites confusion and 
legal controversy. 
function to subsidize religious as well as secular activity, so 
long as the activity satisfies the secular purpose for which 
the government financed it.  In such programs, government 
may not favor or disfavor FBOs as compared to their 
secular counterparts. 
 
• Many state constitutions restrict financial support to FBOs, 
although state courts have sometimes interpreted those 
restrictions in permissive ways. Such restrictions may be 
vulnerable to challenge on federal constitutional grounds. 
 
• FBOs are frequently exempt from the federal prohibition on 
religious discrimination in employment, but they are not so 
exempt in every federal program.  States and cities vary in 
their laws on the subject, and a considerable number of 
states and cities do NOT extend that exemption to FBOs 
that are receiving state or city funds.  Congress may pre-
empt state and local law on this subject as it applies to 
federally funded programs, but has not done so thus far. 
 
• Charitable choice provisions appear in a variety of federal 
programs, though far from all, and permit FBOs to retain 
their religious identity while participating in government 
social welfare programs. Important variations appear 
among federal programs.  The White House and five 
federal agency offices of the Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives have taken significant steps over the past year to 
increase the participation of FBOs in federal programs. 
 
• With a few notable exceptions, the existing contracts 
between states and FBOs are conspicuously silent on the 
subject of the particular rights and responsibilities that 
attach to FBOs in such contracts. This contractual silence 
invites confusion and legal controversy, because FBOs are 
not provided contractual guidance with respect to 
constitutional and statutory limits on their use of 
government funds. 
 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, U.S. CONSTITUTION 
 
Text: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .” 
 
A. Separationist Period (late 1940s through the 1970s): 
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• Total prohibition of direct financial relationships between 
government and “pervasively sectarian institutions” (that 
usually meant sectarian elementary and secondary schools; 
Lemon, 1971). 
 
• Partial acceptance of indirect financial relationships 
(transportation subsidies, schoolbook loans to families with 
children at sectarian schools). 
 
• Severe doubt about the validity of school voucher programs 
that include religious schools (Nyquist, 1973). 
 
• Strong prohibition on official religious speech in public 
schools. 
 
B. The Incomplete Move Toward Neutrality (1980-date): 
 
• Equal access of private religious speech to government 
supplied speech fora. 
 
• Widening prohibition on official religious speech, both in 
and out of public schools. 
 
• Erosion of total exclusion of pervasively sectarian entities 
from direct financial support (Agostini, 1997; Mitchell, 
2000) (the decisions dealt only with in-kind benefits, and 
leave unanswered the questions raised by cash payments). 
 
• Direct financial support permissible for secular activities, 
but not for specifically religious activities (e.g., worship, 
proselytizing, religious instruction, faith-intensive social 
service) (Mitchell, 2000) – Key concepts: Segregation of 
private support for religious activity from government 
support for secular activity; concerns about government 
monitoring (entanglement). 
 
• Indirect financial support, through beneficiary choice – 
Upheld in the Cleveland voucher decision (Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 2002), without restrictions on use of the 
funds – Key concepts: Neutrality between religious and 
secular providers; genuine beneficiary choice. 
 
C. The Faith-Based Initiative in the Lower Courts: 
 
• Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum (I), 
179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (WD Wisconsin 2002) (direct state 
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support of faith-intensive, residential treatment center for 
substance abuse held unconstitutional). 
 
• ACLU of Louisiana v. Foster, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13778 (ED Louisiana) (direct support to faith-intensive 
teen abstinence programs, and to pervasively sectarian 
institutions, held unconstitutional; court orders state 
monitoring of expenditures). 
 
• Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum (II), 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14177 (WD Wisconsin) (indirect 
support, through beneficiary choice, of same faith-intensive 
treatment center as in McCallum I – upheld in light of 
Zelman). 
 
• American Jewish Congress v. Bost, U.S. Dist. Ct., SD 
Texas (2002) (in taxpayer suit to enforce the Establishment 
Clause, court will not order FBO to reimburse state for 
public monies improperly spent on religious experience in 
job training program). 
 
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
A. Many states have constitutional provisions that limit transfer of 
funds from the state to FBOs. These provisions fall into a 
number of categories (some state constitutions have more than 
one such provision): 
 
• 10 states have constitutional provisions similar in language 
and effect to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
(Alaska Const. Art. I, § 4: “No law shall be made 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof”). These provisions are frequently 
construed in accord with the Establishment Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
 
• 37 states have constitutional provisions that explicitly 
forbid state financing of religious organizations or places of 
worship (Illinois Const., Art. 10, § 3: “Neither the General 
Assembly nor any county, city, town, township, school 
district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any 
appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, 
anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose...”). 
 
• 29 states have constitutional provisions that explicitly 
forbid state financing of religious schools (Washington 
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Const. Art. I § 11: “All schools maintained or supported 
wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free 
from sectarian control or influence”). 
 
• 10 states have constitutional provisions that extend these 
limitations to both "direct” and "indirect" financing 
(Florida Const., Art. I § 3: “No revenue of the state or any 
political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken 
from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any 
church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any 
sectarian institution.) 
 
B. State courts have at times construed such provisions to be less 
hostile to state financing of FBOs than one might expect from 
the language of the provision.  
 
• Arizona provides a good example. Its constitution seems to 
impose significant limits on state aid to FBOs. Arizona 
Const. Art. 2, § 12: “No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise, or instruction”; Arizona Const. Art. 2 § 12: “No 
tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in 
aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any 
public service corporation.” But the Arizona Supreme 
Court has permitted some forms of aid to religious 
organizations. Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 972 
P.2d 606 (1999) (Upholding tuition tax credit programs); 
Community Council v. Jordan, 102 Ariz. 448, 432 P.2d 460 
(Ariz. 1967) (Upholding a program in which sectarian 
organizations were being reimbursed for aid provided to 
families in need.) 
 
III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
 
Except for clergy, the Constitution neither forbids nor requires 
exemption for FBOs from the statutory prohibition on religious 
discrimination in employment. 
 
A. Employment of clergy – significant constitutional immunity 
from federal, state, and local antidiscrimination law. 
 
B. All non-clergy hiring – Federal Law: 
 
• Broad exemption for FBOs from prohibition on religious 
discrimination (exemption allows discrimination based on 
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religious identity, religious belief, and compliance with 
religious norms). 
 
• Does receipt of government funds result in an automatic 
loss of the federal exemption? (Disputed question, to which 
most courts have said no – raised again in Bellmore v. 
United Methodist Children’s Home, Fulton County, 
Georgia). 
 
• Congress may explicitly provide that participation in 
particular federal funding programs results in loss of the 
exemption (see, e.g., the Child Care and Development Fund 
– FBOs receiving direct grants or contracts under the 
program may not discriminate in employment of 
caregivers). 
 
C. All non-clergy hiring – State and Local Law: 
 
• 43 states recognize some form of exemption for FBOs from 
state law prohibition on religious discrimination. 
 
• Receipt of state or local funds – loss of automatic 
exemption not implied from fact that FBO has received 
public funds (same as IIIB above). 
 
• 18 states explicitly provide that FBOs that enter into 
contracts with the State do NOT retain their exemption 
from state nondiscrimination law. Most major cities that we 
surveyed forbid all entities, including FBOs, that do 
business with the city from engaging in religious 
discrimination in employment decisions. 
 
D. Relationship between State and Federal Law: 
 
• Exemption from federal law does not create exemption 
from state or local law. 
 
• Congress may displace state or local law, but must do so 
explicitly. 
 
• If Congress is silent about state and local law, that law 
remains in effect. 
 
• Congress has not preempted state and local law through 
Charitable Choice provisions. 
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IV. FEDERAL PROGRAMS 
 
FBOs have long been recipients of government grants and 
contracts to provide social services. Through separately-
incorporated affiliates, FBOs participate in a wide variety of public 
programs, ranging from health care and adoption services to 
refugee resettlement and soup kitchens. To the extent that 
legislation or regulations have specifically addressed FBOs, 
however, the purpose has traditionally been to prohibit any 
religious uses of public funds. This has often led to the exclusion 
of those organizations that could not (or would not) completely 
segregate their social services from their religious activities. 
 
A. Charitable Choice 
 
• Over the last decade, legislative and regulatory initiatives 
have shifted governmental attitudes toward FBOs from one 
of wariness to eager engagement. The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), enacted in 1996, effected the most significant 
legislative changes to the relationship between government 
and FBOs. Congress included a “Charitable Choice” 
provision in this welfare reform legislation, which provided 
that: 
 
• Where non-governmental entities participate in a social 
service program funded under the PRWORA, FBOs cannot 
be excluded from participating simply because of their 
religious character. 
 
• FBOs participating in such programs may retain their 
religious identity: 
 
• Unless state law requires otherwise, a religious 
organization need not establish a separate, secularized 
501(c)3 to receive government funding. 
 
• The religious character of the FBO’s governance, including 
its mission statement and selection of officers and directors, 
may be maintained. 
 
• Religious imagery need not be removed from locations 
used to deliver government-financed services. 
 
• FBOs funded through PRWORA may retain their right 
under federal law to prefer co-religionists in employment 
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decisions, though such right may be limited by state law or 
local anti-discrimination rules. 
 
• Participating FBOs may not use public funds to engage in 
religious worship, instruction, or proselytizing. 
 
• Participating FBOs may not require beneficiaries of 
services to attend religious worship or instruction as a 
condition of receiving government-financed services, nor 
may such FBOs discriminate on religious grounds in the 
provision of benefits. Any beneficiary that objects to 
receiving services from an FBO must be provided with a 
secular alternative. 
 
• Charitable Choice provisions apply to the following federal 
programs: Temporary Aid to Needy Families, Welfare-to-
Work, Community Services Block Grants, Substance 
Abuse and Treatment Block Grants, Projects for Assistance 
in Transition from Homelessness, and other discretionary 
grant programs for substance abuse prevention and 
treatment that are administered by SAMHSA. 
 
B. A number of other federal programs specifically invite FBOs to 
participate but do not contain all of the Charitable Choice 
provisions. For example, under the Child Care and 
Development Fund, an FBO financed through a direct 
government grant or contract may not prefer co-religionists in 
hiring caregivers. 
 
C. Over the past year, the Administration has taken important 
steps to implement the President’s Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives (FBCI): 
 
• Through two executive orders, the President created the 
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives, along with FBCI offices in the Departments of 
Justice, Education, Health & Human Services, Housing & 
Urban Development, and Labor. These offices have been 
charged with identifying and, where appropriate, removing 
obstacles to the participation of faith-based and community 
organizations in public social welfare programs. Initial 
reports of these offices were published in the fall of 2001; 
progress reports from the offices are expected later this 
year.  
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• The Department of Labor’s Employment and Training 
Administration has awarded grants to faith-based and 
community organizations to encourage their participation in 
One Stop employment centers. 
 
• The Compassion Capital Fund (CCF), administered by 
HHS, has provided nearly $30 million to support increased 
involvement of faith-based and community organizations in 
providing a broad range of government services, from aid 
to the homeless and at-risk children to substance abuse 
treatment and employment training. While the majority of 
CCF funding is directed to intermediate organizations that 
provide technical assistance to grassroots service providers, 
CCF also permits the intermediate organizations to make 
sub-grants of program funds to faith-based and community 
service providers. 
 
V. STATE SOCIAL SERVICE CONTRACTS 
 
A. We have so far collected current examples of such contracts 
from 36 states. 
 
B. Many of these contracts have employment discrimination 
provisions (sometimes merely requiring compliance with 
existing state and federal law, but frequently going beyond that 
law by failing to provide any FBO exemption for 
discrimination based on religion – see part III above). 
 
C. Very few of these contracts have any FBO-specific provisions. 
The only such provisions we have found thus far appear in 
social service contracts in Oklahoma, Texas, Wisconsin: 
 
• Oklahoma – Specifies that FBOs may compete on an equal 
basis with others; protects the religious character and 
appearance of FBOs; prohibits religious discrimination 
against, and religious coercion of, beneficiaries 
(Department of Human Services, Solicitation for Faith-
Based Intermediary Services, section 6.3.3). 
 
• Texas - This is by far the most elaborate FBO-specific 
provision. It preserves employment discrimination 
exemptions; specifies that FBOs may compete on an equal 
basis with others; protects the religious character and 
appearance of FBOs; suggests segregation of public and 
private funds and limits audits to public funds; disclaims 
state endorsement of religious practices or expression; 
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denies that state objectives include “the funding of 
sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization”; requires 
disclosure to “assisted individuals” of their right to be free 
of religious discrimination, and their right to choose a 
different provider if they object to a provider’s religious 
character (Department of Human Services, Contract for 
Community Care Program, Provider Agreement, Section 
H). 
 
• Wisconsin - In a section of its contract with field agencies 
that supervise workforce development services (welfare-to-
work), a provision governing subcontracts with FBOs 
specifies that FBOs may compete on an equal basis with 
others; forbids discrimination by the prime contractor 
against FBOs; protects the religious character and 
appearance of FBOs; prohibits religious discrimination 
against applicants for assistance; requires the prime 
contractor to provide “an alternate provider of the same 
services, worth the same value,” to participants who object 
to the religious character of a provider; and requires that 
FBO subcontractors be held to the same fiscal and 
accounting standards as any other provider. (Wisconsin 
Works and Related Program Contract, Department of 
Workforce Development, Par. 13.5-13.8). 
 
D. The contractual silence in most states on many matters of 
special concern to FBOs is a problem area. This silence permits 
ambiguity and evasiveness, but also may lead FBOs and state 
agencies into legal trouble (see the McCallum and Foster 
decisions, Part I above). The questions such contracts might 
constructively address include: 
 
• Preserving religious character of the FBO (symbols, icons, 
etc.). 
 
• Selecting beneficiaries (religious discrimination). 
 
• Alerting beneficiaries to secular options. 
 
• Specifying with particularity the religious activities for 
which the state is constitutionally forbidden to pay. 
 
• Segregating private support for religious activity from 
public support for secular service, and accounting properly 
for these segregated activities. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A contains detailed information about state 
constitutional restrictions on funding of FBOs. 
 
Appendix B contains detailed information about state and local 
antidiscrimination law as it applies to FBOs. 
 
Appendix C contains model provisions for government contracts 
with FBOs, along with sample state provisions. 
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So much of the history of 
charitable work in the U.S. 
recounts the activities of 
faith-based organizations 
that we are tempted to say 
that government is doing 
religious work when it helps 
the poor or otherwise tries 
to better the situation of 
those in need. However, our 
constitutional law, at 
varying times and in varying 
degrees, has imposed limits 
on the government’s 
authority to finance the 
delivery of social services by 
sectarian institutions, or the 
delivery of services with a 
sectarian character. 
 
 
 Partnerships between government and faith-based 
organizations in America are hardly new.  In one form or another, 
such partnerships have existed for hundreds of years.  Indeed, so 
much of the history of charitable work in the U.S. recounts the 
activities of faith-based organizations that we are 
tempted to say that government is doing religious work 
when it helps the poor or otherwise tries to better the 
situation of those in need.  There are, of course, secular 
justifications for such efforts, on which the state 
appropriately relies when it undertakes them. 
 
 Tension exists, however, between this pattern of 
partnerships and various aspects of our legal and 
constitutional tradition.  Our constitutional law, at 
varying times and in varying degrees, has imposed 
limits on the government’s authority to finance the 
delivery of social services by sectarian institutions, or 
the delivery of services with a sectarian character.  
Federal employment law ordinarily permits FBOs 
engaged in such services to limit their hiring to co-
religionists, but specific federal programs occasionally 
outlaw such hiring preferences. 
 
 When our view shifts to the states, similar 
questions arise, and they are complicated by the 
phenomena of the division of power in the federal 
system and non-uniformity among the states.  States 
have their own constitutional arrangements respecting 
relations between FBOs and the government, but these 
arrangements are subject to federal constitutional 
limitations.  Likewise, states and units of local 
government may have their own rules on the subject of 
employment discrimination, and these rules frequently are more 
stringent in situations in which government is paying for the 
delivery of service.  These rules of state and local government, 
whether they arise from constitution, statute, or contract, are also 
subject to being preempted by federal authority, especially in 
situations in which states and local government are depending 
upon federal financial support. 
 
 In what follows, we systematically address questions 
identified in this Introduction.  Part I discusses the development of 
federal constitutional law on the relations between religion and the 
state, focusing in particular on government financial support for 
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delivery of services by FBOs.  Part I-A analyzes the evolution of 
Supreme Court precedent in the field.  Part I-B provides an in-
depth look at several very important cases, all involving 
government grants to FBOs, that have been decided in the lower 
federal and state courts in the past 12 months.  Part II focuses on 
state constitutional law, and includes analysis of the impediments 
that various state provisions may create to state or local 
partnerships with FBOs, and of the groundswell of federal 
constitutional objection to this body of state constitutional law.  
Part III focuses on the politically charged subject of employment 
discrimination by FBOs.  The emphasis of Part III-A is federal 
law; Part III-B canvasses state and local law, and Part III-C briefly 
discusses the relationships, actual and potential, between federal 
and state law on the subject. Part IV describes the recent history of 
federal programs that have specifically included FBOs, and then 
provides a close analysis of selected federal social welfare 
programs.  Finally, Part V discusses the oft-overlooked topic of 
government contracts with FBOs, and brings this report full circle 
by connecting these contractual concerns with matters of federal 
constitutional law discussed in Part I. 
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“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” (U.S. 
Constitution, Amendment I). 
 
MAJOR FINDINGS: 
 
• Direct financial support to FBOs is now permitted by 
federal constitutional law, but that support must be limited 
to secular activity.  FBOs may not be favored or disfavored 
as compared with their secular counterparts.  Government 
must improve its ability and willingness to define with 
precision the scope of religious activity that the state may 
not subsidize, and government must monitor the conduct of 
FBOs to ensure that these limits are observed. 
 
• Indirect financial support to FBOs (e.g., beneficiary choice 
programs, such as school or child care vouchers) is also 
permitted by federal constitutional law, so long as 
beneficiaries have genuine, independent choices among 
religious and secular options.  Indirect support may 
function to subsidize religious as well as secular activity, so 
long as the activity satisfies the secular purpose for which 
the government financed it.  In such programs, government 
may not favor or disfavor FBOs as compared to their 
secular counterparts. 
 
A. The Evolution of Establishment Clause Norms. 
 
 Legal principles in all fields change over time, but 
Establishment Clause law has exhibited an unusually rapid rate of 
transformation.  Twenty years ago, informed and disinterested 
commentators would have said that direct financing by government 
of social services delivered by faith-intensive organizations is 
unconstitutional,1 even if the services themselves have a secular 
character (e.g., food or shelter).  The same commentators would 
have said that indirect financing (by way of vouchers, tax credits, 
etc., in which beneficiaries mediate between the state and faith-
intensive organizations) is deeply questionable on constitutional 
grounds. 
 
                                                 
 1 Some major, faith-affiliated charitable organizations, like Catholic Charities, Lutheran Social Services, 
and Jewish Family Services, have received government contracts and grants for many years, but these organizations 
are secularized and professional rather than faith-intensive in their character.  
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Although current law still 
forbids direct government 
support of specifically 
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longer forbids the provision 
of direct aid to religious 
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 By the summer of 2002, disinterested 
commentators would have a different story to tell.  
Although current law still forbids direct government 
support of specifically religious activities, such as 
worship or religious counseling, the law no longer 
forbids the provision of direct aid to religious 
organizations for their secular activities.  In addition, 
and so long as certain key conditions are met, it quite 
clearly permits indirect financing of any of their 
activities. 
 
 This tale of evolution can be told in many ways, 
including elaborate description of relevant Supreme 
Court decisions, recounting of cultural and political 
history, and analysis of key changes in Supreme Court 
personnel.  Our effort will be thematic and brief, emphasizing key 
moments, important doctrines, and, most of all, significant trends.  
The story can best be understood through the prism of education; 
fully three-fourths of all Establishment Clause decisions in the 
Supreme Court have involved either public financing of education 
in religiously affiliated institutions, or religious expression in 
public schools.  Nevertheless, the principles that have been 
articulated and applied in the context of education also apply, 
modified at times by considerations of context, in other service 
settings as well. 
 
1. The Rise of the Separationist Paradigm (1947-1980) 
 
 Prior to the middle of the 20th century, there were very few 
Supreme Court decisions involving the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment.  Beginning in 1947, however, the Court 
became increasingly involved in policing the boundaries of 
government support for religion and religious institutions.  In 
Everson v. Board of Education,2 the Court interpreted the 14th 
Amendment to limit states and localities as well as the federal 
government by the prohibitions of the Clause.  Although Everson 
upheld a program of reimbursement of families for the costs of 
public transportation to schools, public or private (including 
religious schools), the Court announced a strong Separationist 
philosophy.  A bare majority upheld the transportation program, 
saying it went to the verge of state power to support education in 
religious schools; four dissenting Justices took an even stronger 
Separationist line, and would have invalidated the program.  The 
Court opinions explicitly take note of the phenomenon that Roman 
Catholic schools would be the principal beneficiary of programs to 
                                                 
 2 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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Separationism as a 
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treatment of religion, either 
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aid private education, and a number of scholars have argued that 
anti-Catholic sentiment – hardly unheard of in the U.S. in its first 
century and one-half – animated the Separationist content reflected 
in the Everson opinions. 
  
 The themes and tensions reflected in Everson remained on 
the surface for the next thirty years.  Separationism as a philosophy 
entailed the constitutionally distinctive treatment of religion, either 
by conferring special privileges upon it (by way of the Free 
Exercise Clause) or by imposing certain disability from 
government benefits upon it (by way of the 
Establishment Clause).  Nonestablishment themes 
certainly predominated over Free Exercise themes, 
however, in this era.3  In a series of decisions, heavily 
concentrated in the 1970's, the Supreme Court ruled 
that states could not provide any substantial financial 
assistance, in cash or in kind, directly to sectarian 
elementary schools.  The group of schools involved in 
these decisions tended to be Catholic schools, and the 
Court’s rulings followed a predictable pattern. The 
Court characterized such schools as “pervasively 
sectarian” – a label that would thereafter grow in 
importance and may still carry some legal significance 
– and consistently held that aid to these schools was 
unconstitutional.  The judicial formula that grew out of 
these cases crystallized in the oft-cited decision in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman.4  To survive constitutional review, aid programs must 
have a secular purpose and primarily secular effects, and must not 
excessively entangle religious institutions with the state.  In Lemon 
itself, the Court used the formula to invalidate a program of salary 
supplements for teachers of secular subjects (e.g., mathematics, 
modern foreign languages) in private secondary schools.  Such a 
program, the Court concluded, would inevitably have a primary 
effect of advancing religion because of the schools’ heavily 
sectarian character, or would excessively entangle religious 
schools and the state as a result of the need to monitor the 
secularity of the classes taught by the subsidized teachers. 
 
 The Court soon extended the methodology of Lemon to 
virtually all programs of direct assistance to the educational 
programs of sectarian schools.5  There were, however, several 
                                                 
 3 The cases in which courts refused to resolve disputes that arise within religious organizations concerning 
property or personnel, involve both nonestablishment and free exercise themes of Separationism.  See, e.g., Serbian 
E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).  
 4 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 5 See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
  
The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 18 
Government Partnerships with Faith-Based Service Providers 
Decisions limiting religious 
compulsion of children, 
state competition with 
families over religious 
training, and state 
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voice of its own have grown 
in stature and importance 
as the years have gone by. 
important exceptions to this pattern.  First, the Court treated higher 
education in a manner quite distinct from elementary and 
secondary education.  Although the Court continued to insist that 
the state not pay for specifically religious instruction or worship, it 
was willing to presume that religiously affiliated colleges and 
universities did not engage in the sort of systematic indoctrination 
associated with religious education of the young.6  Second, the 
Court occasionally upheld programs of indirect, in-kind assistance 
to families with children in sectarian schools.  The best example of 
this is Board of Education v. Allen,7 in which the Court approved 
of New York’s program of loaning schoolbooks to such families, 
so long as the books were used or approved for use in the public 
schools (i.e., the books were secular in content). 
 
 When, however, New York State attempted to rely on this 
device of indirect transmission of aid to sectarian schools in a 
scheme of cash grants and tax credits for low to middle income 
families with children in private school, the Court, in Committee 
for Public Education v. Nyquist,8 refused to extend the rationale of 
Allen.  Seeing the program as a thinly veiled device to bail out the 
financially troubled Catholic schools in the State, the Court 
concluded that its primary effects included aid to sectarian 
teaching as well as what the Court described as “political 
divisiveness” along sectarian lines, and held it to be 
unconstitutional. 
 
 The other major development in the law of the 
Establishment Clause occurring in this period involved 
religious speech by the government or its agents.  In the 
early 1960's, the Court ruled that public schools could 
not sponsor religious exercises, such as official prayer 
or Bible reading.9  The concerns reflected in these 
decisions – religious compulsion of children, state 
competition with families over religious training, and 
state assumption of a religious voice of its own – have 
grown in stature and importance as the years have gone 
by.  Indeed, they have moved outside of the realm of 
schools to a more general prohibition on state 
expression of religious themes. 
 
                                                 
 6 See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).  Even in institutions of higher learning, the Court 
insisted that state aid finance only secular functions. 
 7 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
 8 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
 9 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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2. The Rise of the Competing Paradigm of Neutrality 
(1980-1999) 
 
 Beginning in the early 1980's, the constitutional law of 
religion began to change.  In a number of contexts, the paradigm of 
Separation – pursuant to which religion received constitutionally 
distinctive treatment – receded, and the paradigm of 
Neutrality – pursuant to which religion is to be treated 
identically with its secular counterparts – expanded.  
The context in which Neutrality arguments have had 
the most influence is that of equal access by private 
speakers to public facilities made available in support 
of speech – access to public property,10 for example, or 
printing subsidies for student groups.11  In decision 
after decision, from the early 1980's to date, the Court 
has ruled that, when government creates a forum for 
speech, it must afford private religious speech the same 
rights of access and support that government is providing to private 
secular speech. 
 
 The second context in which Neutrality made significant 
gains in this period concerns state financing of services provided 
by FBOs.  Several decisions involved government subsidies of 
individuals or families in ways that operated to benefit religious 
institutions or causes.  In Mueller v. Allen,12 the Court upheld an 
income tax deduction for private school tuition in Minnesota’s 
state income tax, despite the fact that the great bulk of the 
deductions arose from tuition payments at sectarian schools.  This 
cast doubt on the Nyquist decision, which had invalidated 
analogous state income tax credits.  A few years later, in Witters v. 
Washington Department of Services for the Blind,13 the Court 
approved, over Establishment Clause objection, the use of a state 
vocational scholarship for the blind by a student at a Bible college 
that specialized in training students for careers at religious 
institutions.  In both Mueller and Witters, the Court emphasized 
the role of intervening beneficiary choice and religious neutrality.  
Both cases involved private, not governmental, decisions, to use 
the services of religious organizations; and both permitted 
beneficiaries to choose freely between religious and secular 
providers. 
 
                                                 
 10 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 
508 U.S. 384 (1993); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 11 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 12 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
 13 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
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 With respect to direct financing, this period did not produce 
dramatic alteration of the law declared during the Separationist 
period, but several important decisions did signal changes on the 
horizon.  The most important of these for the charitable choice 
movement is Bowen v. Kendrick,14 in which the Court 
upheld against facial attack the Adolescent Family Life 
Act (discussed in more detail in Part IV below).  The 
Act was aimed at educating adolescents on matters of 
sexuality and reproduction, and it required prospective 
state and local grantees of funds to include religious 
organizations, among others, as subgrantees in their 
grant proposals.15  In a significant departure from prior 
practice, the Court ruled that such a program, which 
treated religious and secular organizations neutrally, 
could not be challenged on its face for its overall 
tendency to advance religion.  The Court suggested that 
if challengers proved that the implementation of 
specific grants involved distinctively religious 
activities, such as worship or proselytizing, or that 
grants were being distributed to “pervasively sectarian 
organizations,” courts would enjoin those particular 
grants.  By requiring, as a predicate of constitutional 
violation, proof of religious uses of particular grants, 
and by refusing to enjoin the entire program based on 
proof of episodic violations, Bowen rendered constitutional attack 
on federal programs that include FBOs considerably more 
expensive and difficult than prior litigation against state aid to 
sectarian schools. 
 
 The other major development in this period with respect to 
matters of direct financing of aid to FBOs is the Court’s abrupt 
about-face in the litigation over federal support for state and local 
programs of remedial education.  In 1985, in Aguilar v. Felton,16 
the Court upheld an injunction against the provision of public 
employees to sectarian schools (included among a broad class of 
public and private schools in educationally deprived areas) for a 
remedial program in reading and arithmetic.  The Aguilar majority 
asserted that such a program would inevitably and excessively 
entangle these public employees in the religious education of 
                                                 
 14 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
 15 The Court divided 5-4 in Bowen, but every Justice treated the case as if there were absolutely no 
constitutional distinctions between grantees and subgrantees; to the extent they were recipients of federal funds, the 
Establishment Clause applied with full force to the actions of both.  This has important implications for the 
Compassion Capital Fund, see part IV below, and its use of private, intermediary organizations to make grants to 
FBOs.  There is no reason to believe that the structure of grant and subgrant somehow liberates the subgrants from 
constitutional limitations.  
 16 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
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children in sectarian schools.  A dozen years later, however, in 
Agostini v. Felton,17 the Court overruled Aguilar, 
holding that the provision of public employees as 
remedial teachers did not violate the Constitution.  
Agostini communicated a new message about the 
Court’s attitude toward such programs; the key 
question, the majority said, was no longer whether the 
program had a “primary effect” of advancing religion in 
some general way. Instead, the Court focused on the 
more precise question of whether the state was 
responsible for the religious indoctrination of students.  
In answering this question, the Court refused to 
presume that public employees, teaching secular 
subjects, would be co-opted into participation in 
religious education.  Moreover, there was no mention in 
the Agostini opinion about the pervasively sectarian 
character of some of the aided schools, although there 
was every reason to believe that some of the schools 
aided were of the character that had once earned this 
appellation.  This silence about the “character” of the 
schools, and the emphasis on whether the aid itself would lead to 
government-subsidized religious activity, revealed an important 
trend in cases involving direct government support of FBOs. 
 
 The only pro-Separationist developments in this period 
concerned government speech on religious matters.  For the first 
time, the Court extended that concern beyond the walls of public 
schoolhouses.  Although the Court upheld a state legislative 
chaplaincy,18 and upheld government support for a Christmas 
Creche surrounded by other, more secular seasonal symbols,19 it 
ruled unconstitutional the government’s display of an unadorned 
Creche in a county courthouse.20  The requirement that government 
not act to endorse a religious belief emerged from this line of 
decisions, and that requirement has been tremendously influential 
in the lower courts’ efforts to grapple with cases involving the Ten 
Commandments and other state-sponsored display of religious 
symbols or texts.  Within public schools, the Court deepened its 
commitment to excluding publicly sponsored faith messages – 
first, in a case involving Alabama’s moment of silence for “prayer 
or meditation,”21 and then in the widely noticed decision in Lee v. 
                                                 
 17 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 18 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 19 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 20 Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 21 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
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Weisman,22 forbidding officially-sponsored prayers at public 
school commencements. 
 
 The Establishment Clause trends in the last two 
decades of the twentieth century can be succinctly 
summarized: equal access for religious speech to public 
fora in which private speech is welcome; expansion of 
aid possibilities, both direct and indirect, so long as 
recipient institutions are defined in a religion-neutral 
way and the aid is given for a secular purpose; and an 
accelerating concern that government not speak in a 
religious voice.  These trends have helped to foster 
religious pluralism by including non-governmental 
religious views in public debates, permitting religious 
institutions to play a role in public programs, and 
disabling the state from either discriminating against 
religious views or adopting such views as its own. 
 
  3. Dramatic Recent Developments (2000– 
   present) 
 
 The trends previously described have 
crystallized in several major decisions in the last 
several years.  First, in June of 2000, the Supreme 
Court ruled that public school systems may not sponsor 
student-delivered religious messages at high school 
sporting events.  This decision, in Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe,23 sharpened the distinction 
between cases of private speech – in which equal 
access to public fora for religious variants is required – 
and publicly sponsored speech, in which the state 
machinery selects the relevant subject matter and 
speakers to address it.  Because the school system 
sponsored the pre-game prayer, the Constitution 
forbade it. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s most recent decisions 
about state financing of FBOs are path breaking for the 
faith-based initiative.  In Mitchell v. Helms,24 the Court 
upheld a program that provided direct aid to public and 
private schools, both religious and nonreligious.  More 
recently, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,25 the Court 
                                                 
 22 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 23 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 24 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 25 536 U.S. ___ (2002). 
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upheld a school voucher program that permitted students to redeem 
the vouchers at private schools, both religious and nonreligious. 
 
 Mitchell v. Helms overruled several of the decisions from 
the Separationist era in upholding a federal-state cooperative 
program that loaned educational materials, including books, 
computers, software, and video players, to schools in educationally 
disadvantaged neighborhoods.26  The Court in Mitchell splintered 
into three groups.  A plurality of four Justices adopted an explicit 
policy of Neutralism with respect to direct financing of FBOs.  For 
this group, any program that pursues secular ends and treats 
secular and religious organizations equally is consistent with the 
Establishment Clause, even if the program directly subsidizes 
religious activity.  These Justices also emphatically repudiated the 
idea that some entities are so “pervasively sectarian” that they are 
permanently disqualified from partnerships with government.  
Deriding this notion as a product of anti-Catholic animus 
originating in 18th and 19th century America and carrying over 
into the Separationist period, they called for its explicit repudiation 
from our constitutional law. 
  
 Three Justices dissented in Mitchell, and hewed to the 
conventional Separationist line.  They insisted that government 
may not transfer to FBOs anything of value that is 
“reasonably divertible” to religious use, a category that 
would include all instructional material and equipment. 
 
 Mitchell was resolved on the votes and 
concurring opinion of Justices O’Connor and Breyer, 
whose middle-ground position now represents the law 
on direct financing of FBOs.  Although they did not 
join in the explicit rejection of the concept of 
“pervasively sectarian institutions” as forbidden 
beneficiaries, they focused entirely on the content of 
the aid and restrictions on its use, rather than on the 
character of the aid-receiving institutions.  Thus, their 
opinion can only be understood as supporting an activity-based, 
rather than institution-based, limit on direct financing of FBOs.27  
For Justices O’Connor and Breyer, the key question is whether 
government is responsible for religious indoctrination.  Explicitly 
                                                 
 26 The court in Mitchell expressly overruled Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
 27 As the concurring opinion put it, “To establish a First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must prove that 
the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for religious purposes.”  Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857.  Because the 
Court divided 4-2-3 in Mitchell, and the law now rests on the position of the middle two Justices, this position is 
quite unstable.  Changes in Supreme Court personnel in the near future may have considerable impact upon the 
content of Establishment Clause norms. 
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rejecting both the full-fledged Neutralism of the plurality and the 
test of “reasonable divertibility” of the dissent, they concluded that 
the loan of materials at issue in Mitchell was 
constitutionally acceptable, because the government 
had legally restricted those materials to secular uses and 
the challengers had not demonstrated that the recipient 
schools had significantly breached those restrictions.  
Thus, the controlling principle in cases of direct 
assistance to FBOs is that such assistance may not be 
given for, or diverted to, activities that promote 
religious indoctrination. 
 
 As evidenced in lower court decisions 
concerning the Charitable Choice movement, described later in 
Part I-B, the O’Connor-Breyer opinion in Mitchell explains the 
constitutional necessity of excluding religious methods of service 
and instruction from the ambit of government-supported programs.  
It does not, however, purport to answer more subtle questions, 
such as whether programs that distribute funds instead of in-kind 
materials to FBOs are more constitutionally problematic,28 or (a 
related question) whether the combination of government 
monitoring and FBO efforts to account for the secular deployment 
of such funds will create the sort of church-state entanglements 
that might have been viewed as constitutionally troublesome at the 
height of the Separationist period. 
 
 The last and most widely noted development in this field 
occurred in June of 2002, when the Supreme Court upheld the 
Ohio Scholarship plan, which offered education vouchers to some 
3000 students in the Cleveland public schools, in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris.  The Court in Zelman did not splinter into three 
non-majority factions, as it had in Mitchell.  The Court’s opinion 
was joined by five Justices – those from the Mitchell plurality, plus 
Justice O’Connor, who many observers had thought might concur 
separately, or perhaps even join with those who had dissented in 
Mitchell (along with Justice Breyer) to produce a contrary result. 
 
 The Zelman opinion relies heavily on several key decisions 
from the 1980's, in which choice by a private beneficiary severs 
the connection between the state and the religious entities that 
                                                 
 28 Mitchell itself involved in-kind benefits, not cash, and the concurring opinion hints at the possibility of 
greater concern over cash programs, ostensibly on the ground that the problems of diversion and monitoring may be 
greater in such programs. But the concurring opinion nowhere proclaims that cash transfers are prohibited per se.  
Such a per se rule would be inconsistent with the opinion’s overarching principle, which is that First Amendment 
violations depend upon proof “that the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for religious purposes.” 
Presumably, cash transfers require the clearest possible safeguards against diversion, safeguards which must be 
designed to avoid entanglement concerns.  
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receive state benefits as a result of those choices.  In so doing, it 
breaks sharply from the Nyquist precedent, in which the 
substantiality of the aid conferred upon FBOs appeared to be a 
crucial consideration.  In Zelman, the Court’s only concerns appear 
to be 1) whether the state was neutral between secular and 
religious private schools, and 2) whether beneficiaries 
enjoyed “genuine and independent choice” among the 
various educational options available to them.  Because 
the Court majority considers among those choices all of 
the educational options, private and public, open to 
parents of children in the Cleveland public schools, it is 
satisfied that voucher-supported children end up in 
sectarian schools only through the independent choices 
of their parents.  The State, therefore, is not deemed to 
be responsible for any religious indoctrination that 
voucher students might receive in those schools.  
 
 Justice O’Connor’s separate concurring opinion, 
which emphasizes the subjective qualities of the 
choices made by Cleveland parents, suggests the 
possibility that Zelman is not quite as broad a 
validation of voucher programs as it seems.  In contexts other than 
education, for example, publicly provided options may be many 
fewer than was the case in Zelman, and the question of genuine 
private choice may be more difficult.  For now, however, Zelman 
has opened wide the federal constitutional doors for beneficiary-
choice financing of FBOs, as is demonstrated in the discussion of 
the McCallum case, which follows.  Most significantly, the 
restriction on government support of specifically religious 
activities, such as worship or religious instruction, does not operate 
in the universe of beneficiary choice programs. If properly 
designed and implemented, such programs represent an important 
solution to the federal constitutional problems posed by 
government relationships with faith-intensive private entities.29 
 
B. The Application of Current Establishment Clause Norms in 
Cases Involving the Faith-Based Initiative 
 
 The themes and trends highlighted previously in Part I-A., 
have already appeared in sharp relief in a series of decisions in the 
lower courts involving government service partnerships with 
FBOs.  In particular, the continuing prohibition on direct financing 
of religious experience has played a significant part in several 
                                                 
 29 State constitutional law may, however, remain an impediment in a number of states, in which the 
prohibition on church-state financial relationships is broader than that contained in the federal constitution as 
currently construed.  See Part II, below.  
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decisions, and Zelman’s broad approval of beneficiary choice 
plans has led to an important victory for the faith-based initiative.  
Other questions that have arisen include the crucial remedial 
question of whether FBOs may be forced to make restitution of 
funds improperly spent on religious experience; whether the ban 
on direct financing of “pervasively sectarian institutions” retains 
any vitality; and the highly significant question of the extent to 
which government should and may monitor expenditures by FBOs 
to ensure that government is paying for secular experience only. 
 
LEADING CASES:30 
 
1. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum 
(W.D. Wisconsin, 2002). 
 
 This case involves two separate programs (and two discrete 
judicial decisions) involving the State of Wisconsin and Faith 
Works, Inc, a faith-intensive, long-term residential treatment center 
for substance abuse.  Faith Works – which had formerly employed 
Robert Polito, now head of the FBCI Office at HHS, as its 
Executive Director – describes its approach as a “faith-enhanced” 
version of the 12-Step Program (AA), coupled with individual 
counseling.  The organization employs full-time counselors, who 
devote approximately 20% of their 40-hour work weeks to 
addressing matters of faith and spirituality. 
 
 In one of the programs considered in the case, the State’s 
Department of Workforce Development (“DWD”) entered into a 
direct financing arrangement with Faith Works, pursuant to which 
the state would pay the provider a fixed sum per year to deliver 
long-term treatment for substance abuse to a group of men referred 
because of their status as welfare recipients.  In the other, the 
State’s Department of Corrections (“DOC”) offered men in trouble 
under the state’s drug laws the option of drug treatment in lieu of 
incarceration.  Faith Works was among the providers for such 
treatment; indeed, it was the only long-term provider among the 
options offered.  Under the DOC program, Faith Works received 
payment only as a result of offender selection of, and participation 
in, the program. 
 
 The two programs are thus excellent examples of direct 
financing (the DWD program) and indirect financing (the DOC 
program) of FBOs by the government.  In two opinions, issued six 
months apart, the federal district court for the Western District of 
                                                 
 30 More detailed descriptions and analyses of each of these cases, as well as others, are available at the 
Roundtable website (www.religionandsocialpolicy.org, click on “Legal” at the top of the home page). 
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Wisconsin (Crabb, J.) astutely tracked the changing arc of 
Establishment Clause law previously described in this report.  In 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum (McCallum 
I),31 decided in January, 2002, the Court ruled that the 
direct grant from DWD to Faith Works violated the 
Establishment Clause.  The opinion in McCallum I, 
likely to become a model for other cases in this field, 
recognizes that the law that governs direct financing of 
FBOs permits government contracts with such 
organizations, but requires those contractual 
arrangements to be limited to the financially 
segregated, secular activities of such organizations. 
 
 In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed 
the leading Supreme Court decisions in the field of 
direct government assistance to faith-based providers of social 
services.  Synthesizing the decisions in Bowen v. Kendrick, 
Agostini v. Felton, and Mitchell v. Helms (all previously discussed 
in Part I-A), the court concluded that the enterprise of Charitable 
Choice, as reflected in the welfare reform enactments of 1996 
pursuant to which the DWD grant had been made, was 
constitutional on its face.  The court identified the central question 
raised by this grant as whether any religious indoctrination that 
occurred in the DWD-financed program was “attributable to the 
state.”  It then examined closely the details of the program, 
including what the grant paid for and the degree of religious 
experience that was included in the program.  With respect to the 
particulars of the program, the court found that state funds were 
supporting counselor salaries as well as other program expenses.  
Counselors were participating in, among other things, faith-
enhanced AA meetings32 at which attendance by participants was 
mandatory, and counselors were always available “to facilitate 
transformation of mind and soul of participants.”  Accordingly, the 
court found that the state bore responsibility for directly financing 
the religious experience of program participants. 
 
 The court rejected the argument by Faith Works that only 
20% of counselor time was devoted to spiritual counseling, and 
that Faith Works raised non-governmental funds sufficient to 
support that 20%.  Because the organization commingled its public 
                                                 
 31 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (WD Wisc. 2002). 
 32 A mounting series of lower court decisions has repeatedly concluded that 12-Step programs such as 
Alcoholics Anonymous, even without the faith-enhancement added by Faith Works, are religious in content and may 
not be subsidized by the state, see DiStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 2001), or 
made an unavoidable obligation of parole or probation, see Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation, 115 
F.3d 1068 (3d Cir. 1999).  
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and private funds, and expected that spiritual activities would be 
integrated into all of the counselors’ responsibilities, the 
government was effectively paying for religious experience for 
participants.  Although the court noted that the documents 
governing the grant specified that “grant monies may not be used 
to attempt to support either religious or antireligious activities,” the 
court also observed that the DWD’s agents ignored the faith 
components of the program (obvious from the organization’s 
mission statement, employee handbook, and its proposal to DWD) 
and never communicated to Faith Works that state funds should 
not be allocated to religious activities.  The court ruled that the 
state must show that it has an adequate system in place to 
safeguard against direct state financial support for religious 
activity, and that unenforced, boilerplate language in the contract 
would not be sufficient for this purpose.  The court ruled that the 
DWD funding of Faith Works violates the Establishment Clause 
and ordered the state “to cease all funding of Faith Works through 
the [DWD] discretionary grant as it is currently implemented.” 
 
 At the time of its ruling on the DWD grant, the court 
withheld an opinion on the DOC program, which it perceived as 
different because of the beneficiary choice feature.  The Court held 
a hearing focused on the qualities of that choice, and then, in July, 
2002, ruled that the DOC program did not offend the 
Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution.  In Freedom from 
Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum (McCallum 
II),33 the district court drew heavily from the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.  
Judge Crabb said that the chief question to be resolved 
was “whether offenders under the supervision of the 
department who participate in the Faith Works program 
do so of their own independent, private choice.”  To 
resolve this issue, Judge Crabb focused on the DOC’s 
referral  process, and based her decision on two 
considerations. First, she determined that the DOC’s 
policy required its agents to offer a secular treatment 
alternative to offenders, and to inform them that they 
were not required to attend Faith Works if they objected to its 
religious content. DOC was able to document not only its general 
policy, but the specific steps its agents had taken to inform the 
offenders referred to Faith Works of their options, and the fact that 
these offenders had affirmatively selected Faith Works. Second, 
the judge found that “there is no evidence suggesting that offenders 
who reject a particular program are punished in any way.” 
Following Zelman, Judge Crabb declined to presume that the state 
                                                 
 33 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14177 (W.D. Wisc.). 
  
 The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 29
State of the Law
In ACLU v. Foster, the court 
ordered the state 
contracting agency to install 
an oversight program, visit 
funded programs, and 
provide written notification 
of constitutional violations 
to grantees. 
had limited offenders’ choices to religious providers. Instead, she 
placed the burden on plaintiffs to show that the offenders’ apparent 
freedom of choice was illusory, and the plaintiffs did not meet this 
burden.34  The plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
 
2. American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana v. Foster, 
2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13778 (E.D. Louisiana 2002). 
 
 This decision, rendered in June 2002, represents intriguing 
variations on the themes of McCallum I.  The case arose out of the 
Governor’s Program on Abstinence (“GPA”), which made a series 
of grants for the education of teen-age youth on matters of sexual 
abstinence.  The ACLU of Louisiana filed suit, alleging that a 
number of these grants had been used to finance religiously based 
abstinence messages and that some grants had been 
made to “pervasively sectarian” organizations.  The 
ACLU documented its allegations with copies of 
reports, some of which listed highly sectarian 
activities,35 from grantees to the GPA. 
 
 One month after the suit was filed, the Court 
issued a preliminary injunction against the state officers 
in charge of the GPA.  The injunction included several 
elements.  First, the court ordered the GPA to stop 
disbursing funds to organizations that use the funds to 
convey religious messages or advance religion.  This 
part of the order requires the GPA office, which the court 
acknowledged was understaffed, to install an oversight program 
which must include review of program curricula, visits to programs 
by GPA employees, and written notification of constitutional 
violations to grantees.36 
 
 Second, the court ordered the GPA to stop making grants to 
“pervasively sectarian institutions,” which the court defined as 
                                                 
 34 That the choosers may have been both substance-dependent and under the strong influence of DOC 
officers might have given the district court some reason to hesitate before concluding that the choices being made 
here were genuine and independent. But the plaintiffs did not litigate this point aggressively, and we cannot say the 
district court was wrong on the record before it. 
 35 The reports included references to the use of GPA funds to support prayer at pro-life rallies near abortion 
clinics, and to support Christmastime abstinence programs at which the concept of virgin birth was emphasized.  
 36 This portion of the court’s order and opinion matches up almost perfectly with the approach taken in 
McCallum I, above.  The requirement of monitoring seems essential to avoid constitutional violations, but the 
requirement also raises difficult issues of entanglement between state officials and FBO representatives.  To date, no 
court evaluating a program that has arisen as a part of the faith-based initiative has grappled with such issues, which 
once were a mainstay of Supreme Court opinions.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  If monitoring 
programs go into place, as these decisions suggest they must,  courts, administrators, FBOs and others eventually 
will have to confront these questions.  
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“institutions in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial 
portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission.”  
We think that this part of the order is inconsistent with the trend in 
the Supreme Court to cease reliance on the concept of “pervasively 
sectarian organizations,” and to look at the activities financed 
rather than the general character of the entity in which they are 
being financed.  Both Agostini and Mitchell, previously 
discussed in Part I-A, in fact approved programs of aid 
to schools without regard to the degree of sectarian 
atmosphere at the recipient institutions.  The state’s 
lawyers apparently did not advance this argument, 
however, and the breadth of the court’s order may have 
been a product of this omission. 
 
 In mid-November, 2002, the parties in Foster 
announced that they had reached a settlement 
agreement.  The agreement reveals sensitivity to many 
of the concerns we previously noted as well as in our 
Roundtable website comment on the decision 
(www.religionandsocialpolicy.org).  First, the parties 
agreed to have the court vacate that portion of its 
preliminary injunction that ordered the GPA “to cease 
and desist from disbursing funds to institutions in 
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion 
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission.”  
This portion of the injunction, which focused on the religious 
character of FBOs as “pervasively sectarian” rather than more 
precisely on the character of the abstinence program, seemed to us 
legally questionable.  Second, with respect to restrictions on 
religious activities by GPA grantees, the settlement agreement is 
very broad and sweeping in its prohibitions on the authority of 
providers to engage in religious activity with GPA funds.  Among 
the operative provisions is III.B.1., which requires contracts 
between the GPA and providers to include the following language: 
 
 “The contractor understands and agrees that the contractor 
shall not convey religious messages, or promote or advocate 
religion in any way in any activity, event or material sponsored or 
financially supported in whole or in part by the GPA or the GPA’s 
funds.  The contractor further understands that the GPA may 
terminate its contract and cease funding to it should the contractor 
[violate the above restriction].” 
 
 Third, the agreement contemplates a variety of mechanisms 
for monitoring compliance with it.  Included among these are: 1) a 
procedure for receiving outside complaints to the GPA, and 
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prescribed processes for responding to such complaints; 2) 
monthly reports to the GPA from providers, which must include an 
attestation by the provider that it has complied fully with the 
prohibition on religious activity with GPA funds; 3) submission by 
providers to the GPA of all lesson plans and curricula on 
abstinence; and 4) “quarterly in-person interview[s]” of providers 
by GPA personnel.  We note here that the monitoring mechanisms 
seem designed to permit ordinary compliance without elaborate 
and frequent interaction between providers and government 
personnel.  Nevertheless, in the event of issues concerning 
compliance, interaction of that character is inevitable.  If courts are 
to tolerate the inclusion of FBOs in programs such as this, some 
degree of FBO-state interaction over the subject of constitutional 
boundaries must occur.  The only way to avoid such interaction is 
to permit funding of religious activities, or to exclude FBOs 
categorically, neither of which seems consistent with the current 
law. 
 
3. American Jewish Congress v. Bost (S.D. Texas, 2002). 
 
This case involved a small contract, now expired, which gave rise 
to an important dispute over the appropriate remedy in cases in 
which FBOs spend state funds in ways that violate the 
Constitution.  In 1996, a number of churches and businesses in 
Brenham, Texas, came together to form the Jobs Partnership of 
Washington County.  Modeled on a successful program in Raleigh, 
North Carolina, the Jobs Partnership provided training in basic 
employment skills, such as punctuality and appropriate behavior 
on the job, and also helped trainees to prepare for job 
interviews.  The curriculum of the Jobs Partnership 
intertwined these basic employment skills with biblical 
study and teaching; the program’s directors asserted 
that religious and moral transformation is an integral 
component of success in moving participants from 
unemployment to employment. 
 
 In 1999, the Jobs Partnership received an $8000 
contract from the Texas Department of Human Services 
(DHS) to support the program’s mission of preparing 
the unemployed for work.  The contract provided that 
the state’s funds were to be used to pay a portion of the director’s 
salary.  Rev. George Nelson, the program’s director, supervised 
both the religious and non-religious components of the program.  
Although the contract between the Jobs Partnership and DHS 
specified that “no state expenditures can have as their objective the 
funding of sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization,” the 
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Partnership made no effort to segregate religious and secular 
portions of the Program. 
 
 The American Jewish Congress and the Texas Civil Rights 
Project brought suit against the Texas DHS and the Jobs 
Partnership, claiming that the contract violated the Establishment 
Clause.  The plaintiffs asked the court to order a halt to this and all 
similar contracts between the state of Texas and faith-based 
programs, and also asked the court to order reimbursement of the 
$8000 that DHS paid the Jobs Partnership under the contract.  The 
district court dismissed the case as moot because the contract had 
already ended, and DHS did not plan to renew the contract with the 
Jobs Partnership.  The plaintiffs appealed, and in May 2002, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s ruling that injunctive relief was unnecessary, but instructed 
the district court to consider whether the Jobs Partnership should 
be ordered to repay the money it received from DHS under the 
contract.  In July of 2002, the district court ruled that the Jobs 
Partnership was not legally obligated to repay the 
funds.  The plaintiffs appealed, but have since 
dismissed their appeal, and the case is now over. 
 
 AJC v. Bost never produced a reported judicial 
opinion on the questions it presents, and we think the 
remedial issue in particular deserves attention.  As a 
substantive matter, DHS’s relationship with the Jobs 
Partnership seems indistinguishable from the 
arrangement held unconstitutional in the McCallum I 
case, previously described.  The DHS contract involved 
a direct expenditure of state funds in a program in which the 
religious and secular components were inextricably intertwined.  
Because the secular aspects of the Jobs Partnership had not been 
segregated from its religious activities, the arrangement between 
DHS and the Jobs Partnership was unconstitutional. 
 
 The crucial question raised by the case, however, is one of 
remedy rather than substance.  When a court determines that a 
government expenditure or program violates the Establishment 
Clause, the normal remedy is an order to stop the offending 
activity (i.e., an injunction).  A repayment remedy is highly 
unusual in Establishment Clause cases, and if it were to be ordered 
in cases of this sort, the consequences for FBOs would be 
dramatic.  An order to repay some or all of the $8000 it received 
from DHS would imperil the Jobs Partnership’s existence, given 
that its annual operating budget is only $20,000.  Concerned about 
the possibility of having to repay amounts received under 
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government contracts – even after providing the services or goods 
covered by the contract – religious organizations would (indeed, 
should) be reluctant to accept any government financing for social 
services. 
 
 We are unsurprised that the court did not issue such a 
reimbursement order, and we think it highly unlikely that other 
courts will do so, unless the contract specifically outlines 
prohibited religious activity and specifies that engaging in such 
activity with contract proceeds will give rise to an obligation to 
reimburse.  Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia37 presents a rare case 
in which the court ordered reimbursement, but the unique features 
of that case distinguish it from the Jobs Partnership case.  In 
Gilfillan, a taxpayer sued to stop the City of Philadelphia from 
building a platform on which Pope John Paul II was going to 
celebrate Mass during his visit to the city.  The suit was filed 
before construction started, and construction proceeded only after 
the Archdiocese of Philadelphia agreed to repay the city for 
building the platform if the expenditure were later held to violate 
the Establishment Clause.  In addition, the challenged expenditures 
were intended for an unambiguously religious purpose 
– a structure for worship. 
 
 The Jobs Partnership case is easily distinguished 
from Gilfillan.  First, no Establishment Clause 
challenge to DHS programs had been filed at the time 
the Jobs Partnership entered into its contract with DHS, 
or even at the time it performed its services under the 
contract.  Because the law of the Establishment Clause 
is unsettled in the area of aid to faith-based social 
services, it would be unreasonable to say that the Jobs 
Partnership should have known that the grant would 
later be challenged and perhaps found unconstitutional.  
Second, unlike the Archdiocese of Philadelphia in the 
Gilfillan case, the Jobs Partnership did not expressly 
agree to reimburse DHS if the relationship were later 
held to be unconstitutional.  And third, the government funds were 
used not for the direct benefit of the religious organization, but to 
provide employment services.  There was no allegation that the 
Jobs Partnership diverted the state funds for uses other than 
employment training, even if the employment training was faith-
based.  DHS received the benefits contemplated by the contract 
with the Jobs Partnership, and ordinary principles of fairness 
would prohibit the state from receiving those benefits and then 
getting its money back as well. 
                                                 
 37637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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 These equitable considerations have a long history in 
Establishment Clause decisions.  Even at the height of the 
Separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause, under 
which the Supreme Court frequently invalidated government 
assistance to highly sectarian institutions, the Court did not order 
religious organizations to repay state funds that they received in 
good faith.  In perhaps the most famous of these Separationist 
decisions, Lemon v. Kurtzman,38 which involved government 
grants to sectarian schools, the schools were permitted to keep the 
payments that were later deemed to be unconstitutional, and the 
Court even allowed the state to make additional payments to the 
schools to cover services that the schools had provided before the 
decision. 
 
 The remedial issue raised in the Jobs Partnership case 
deserves close attention, because a repayment order would have 
created significant uncertainty in charitable choice programs in 
Texas and across the country.  The court did not enter such an 
order, and for the reasons suggested above, we believe that such an 
order in cases of this character are unlikely.  Moreover, even if the 
contract specifies forbidden activities, and further specifies an 
obligation of reimbursement for FBOs which engage in such 
activities with contract proceeds, it is only the contracting partner – 
some agency of government – and not taxpayer-plaintiffs that 
should be able to recover the funds in an appropriate proceeding.  
                                                 
 38 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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MAJOR FINDING: 
 
• Many state constitutions restrict financial support to FBOs, 
although state courts have sometimes interpreted those 
restrictions in permissive ways. Such restrictions may be 
vulnerable to challenge on federal constitutional grounds. 
 
 The recent relaxation of federal constitutional 
restrictions on government financing of FBOs has lifted 
a veil from the once obscure field of state constitutional 
limits on government transfers to such organizations.  
So long as Separationist principles remained in full 
flower, as they did from the late 1940's to the early 
1980's, state courts were rarely called upon to give 
independent meaning to Separationist provisions in 
their own constitutions.  When state courts did so, they 
frequently construed these provisions in ways that 
mirrored federal non-establishment principles.  Now 
that the Supreme Court has embraced versions of those 
federal law principles that are more hospitable to aid to 
FBOs, opponents of such aid have seized upon state 
constitutions as the latest weapon in the struggles over 
church-state relations.  In response, proponents of such 
aid have counterattacked, claiming that these state 
constitutional provisions themselves offend one or 
more federal constitutional norms.  The stage is well-
set for a lengthy battle over this territory.39 
 
A. The Patterns of State Constitutional Law. 
 
 In our federal system, states enact, implement, 
and interpret their own constitutions, subject only to 
federal constitutional limitations on their content.  And 
there is wide variety among the states, as is revealed by 
examinations of the relevant texts.  In order to facilitate this 
examination, we have attached to this report (see Appendix A) a 
                                                 
 39 We explore this field in greater depth in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, 
Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional battles, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2003).  
The current draft of the article can be downloaded from the Roundtable website (www.religionandsocialpolicy.org), 
or from the Social Science Research Network (www.ssrn.com).  
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compilation of the provisions from the constitutions of all fifty 
states on the subject of government support for religious entities.40 
 
The original thirteen states, and others that entered the 
Union in the first part of the 19th century, tend to have provisions 
on the subject of state aid to religion that track the colonial 
experience which the Supreme Court, in Everson v. Board of 
Education,41 claimed was at the center of original constitutional 
concern.  Such provisions are typified by Article I, section 1 of the 
Delaware Constitution: “[N]o person shall . . . be compelled to . . . 
contribute to the . . . support of any place of worship, or to the 
maintenance of any ministry.”  Such provisions, singling out 
support of houses of worship and clergy, resonate with the still-
vital federal constitutional concern that government remain 
disconnected from the enterprise of religious worship. 
 
 Beginning in the mid-19th century, however, and 
continuing through the admission of Alaska and Hawaii in the mid-
20th century, a different pattern appears.  States coming into the 
Union in that time period (and some older states, by mid-19th 
century amendment) exhibit a pattern of broad and explicit 
prohibition on state transfers of funds to “sectarian institutions.”  
Many of these provisions are education-specific, prohibiting, for 
example, any “appropriation of public money made in aid of any 
church, or private or sectarian school . . .” (Arizona Constitution, 
Art. 2, sec. 12.)  Provisions of this character originated in a 
Nativist political movement, beginning in the 19th century, aimed 
at retaining the Protestant character of America’s common (public) 
schools and forbidding states from appropriating monies for the 
support of Catholic schools.  Such provisions are often called 
“little Blaine Amendments,” after Senator James Blaine who urged 
unsuccessfully, as part of a run for the Presidency in 1876, that the 
federal Constitution be similarly amended to explicitly preclude 
the states from using tax monies or public lands to aid sectarian 
schools. 
 
 As revealed by the details in Appendix A, the current 
breakdown among the states with respect to constitutional 
provisions of these varying characters is as follows (some states 
have more than one such provision, so the total is greater than 50): 
                                                 
 40 Appendix A also includes annotations of relevant decisions from each of the states on the scope of these 
constitutional provisions.  Some of these decisions are relatively recent, but some are quite old, and the landscape of 
church-state relations in America has changed so much in the past 40 years that older decisions may not be a safe 
basis from which to predict what state courts would decide today.  The Appendix is thus a useful starting place for 
research into the law of each state, but it is no substitute for in-depth research into the complex questions of state 
constitutional law that may arise under these provisions. 
 41 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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• Ten states have constitutional provisions similar in 
language and effect to the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution (See, e.g., Alaska Const. Art. I, § 4: “No law 
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof”). 
 
• Thirty-seven states have constitutional provisions that 
explicitly forbid state financing of religious organizations 
(See, e.g., Illinois Const., Art. 10, § 3: “Neither the General 
Assembly nor any county, city, town, township, school 
district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any 
appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, 
anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose...”). 
 
• Twenty-nine states have constitutional provisions that 
explicitly forbid state financing of religious schools (See, 
e.g., Washington Const. Art. I § 11: “All schools 
maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public 
funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or 
influence”). 
 
• Ten states have constitutional provisions that extend these 
limitations to both "direct” and "indirect" financing (See, 
e.g., Florida Const., Art. I § 3: “No revenue of the state or 
any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be 
taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid 
of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of 
any sectarian institution.) 
 
 It is crucial to note that state courts may, and sometimes do, 
construe their state constitutions in ways that appear to depart from 
the literal meaning of the text.  In Arizona, for example, despite the 
strong anti-funding language contained in the state charter, the 
state Supreme Court has upheld programs of reimbursement to 
sectarian organizations for aiding families in financial need,42 and 
tax credits for money contributed to organizations supporting the 
payment of tuition for low-income students at religious schools.43  
And in Ohio, prior to Zelman, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the 
Cleveland school voucher plan as consistent with a clause in the 
state constitution barring religious sects from having “control of 
any part of the school funds of this state.”44  Decisions like these 
                                                 
 42 Community Council v. Jordan, 102 Ariz. 448, 432 P.2d 460 (1967). 
 43 Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 972 P.2d 606 (1999). 
 44 Ohio Constitution, Art. VI, sec. 2.  The decision upholding the Cleveland plan against an attack based on 
this provision is Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1, 711 N.E.2d 203 (1999). 
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State courts may conclude 
that beneficiary choice 
programs involve transfers 
to service beneficiaries, who 
separately and 
independently make the 
transfers to FBO providers.  
But, there is no guarantee 
that state courts will so 
construe such state 
provisions. 
 
Two recent cases, one 
decided by a Florida Circuit 
Court, and the other 
pending in a state court in 
Georgia, illustrate the 
potential roadblocks that 
state constitutional law may 
impose on the faith-based 
initiative. 
from Arizona and Ohio sometimes rest on textual interpretations of 
the language of the state constitution, and sometimes rest on an 
implicit urge by state courts to conform their state’s constitutional 
norms with comparable norms on the federal level.  In cases of 
indirect financing of state FBOs through beneficiary choice plans, 
those interpretive moves and conforming urges may coincide – 
following the lead of the Supreme Court in Zelman, state courts 
may conclude that beneficiary choice programs involve 
transfers to service beneficiaries, who separately and 
independently make the transfers to FBO providers.  
But, as we discuss here later in connection with 
Florida’s school voucher program, there is no guarantee 
that state courts will so construe such state provisions. 
 
B. State Constitutional Law and the Faith-Based 
Initiative 
 
 Two recent cases, one decided by a Florida 
Circuit Court, and the other pending in a state court in 
Georgia, illustrate the potential roadblocks that state 
constitutional law may impose on the faith-based 
initiative.  In Holmes v. Bush,45 Florida’s state-wide 
school voucher program, designed to provide families 
of children in failing public schools a private-school 
option, was challenged on a number of state law 
grounds.  One challenge invoked Article I, section 3 of 
the Florida Constitution, which provides that "No 
revenue of the state or any political subdivision or 
agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public 
treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, 
or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian 
institution."  Rejecting arguments that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Zelman should be viewed, by 
analogy, as settling the state law issues surrounding 
voucher programs, the Circuit Court’s opinion ruled 
that the state voucher program violated this section of 
the Florida Constitution.  The Court reasoned that Florida's 
constitution provided a "clear and unambiguous" directive - no 
public funds may be used to aid a religious institution.  The Court 
found unpersuasive the state's claims that the voucher financing 
method disconnected the government from the money flowing to 
religious schools, describing the argument as "a colossal triumph 
of form over substance."  The court ordered the Opportunity 
                                                 
 45 Holmes v. Bush, Second Judicial Circuit, Leon Cty, Florida, No. CV 99-3370, Aug. 5, 2002.  Earlier 
claims that the program violated other provisions of the state constitution had already been resolved in Bush v. 
Holmes, 767 So. 2d 768 (FL 1st DCA 2000), or had been dismissed voluntarily.  
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Where federal law permits, 
states might contract with 
FBOs using federal money 
only, thereby staying clear 
of the restrictions in state 
constitutions. 
Scholarship program halted for the 2002-2003 school year.46  The 
ruling is under appeal. 
 
 A similar state constitutional attack on direct financing of 
FBOs is now underway in Bellmore v. United Methodist 
Children’s Home and Georgia Department of Human Resources, 
discussed further in Part III, which follows.  Although the 
employment issues in Bellmore have attracted the most attention, 
the complaint also alleges that the contract between the 
Department of Human Resources and the United Methodist 
Children’s Home, providing for foster care of children in state 
custody, transfers state funds in violation of Georgia’s 
Constitution.  Article I, Section. II, paragraph VII of that document 
provides: “No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, 
directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or religious 
denomination or of any sectarian institution.”  The United 
Methodist Children’s Home quite emphatically identifies itself as a 
sectarian institution, one that asserts and exercises the right to hire 
only co-religionists and which involves its wards in religious 
experience.  Prior interpretations of this provision of Georgia’s 
constitution have been quite strict,47but it remains to be seen if 
Georgia state courts will now construe it in a way that 
permits such programs to continue. 
 
 One possibility for states whose constitutions 
prohibit transfer of state funds to FBOs is to function as 
administrative conduits for federal funds that pass 
through the hands of state and local governments on 
their way to providers.  Many federal programs for 
which FBOs are eligible are packaged into block 
grants, administered directly by state and local social 
service offices.  Where federal law permits (as in the Child Care 
Development Fund, described in Part IV), states might contract 
with FBOs under such programs using federal money only, thereby 
staying clear of the restrictions in state constitutions.48 
 
C. Federal Constitutional Attacks on State Constitutional 
Provisions. 
 
                                                 
 46 The court did not explain why the voucher program could not go forward without the participation of the 
religious schools. 
 47 See Bennett v. City of La Grange, 112 S.E. 482 (Ga. 1922) (state may not reimburse Salvation Army for 
services rendered); 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-136 (state funding of YMCA likely to violate state constitution). 
 48 The Charitable Choice provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 specifically acknowledge state constitutional restrictions on government financing of FBOs. 
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Advocates have begun to 
argue that the Little Blaines 
should be invalidated, or 
limited in their scope, by 
reason of federal 
constitutional law. 
 As suggested above, state constitutional provisions 
restricting government transfers to FBOs may create significant 
impediments to state service contracts with, or grants to, FBOs. 
One potential solution to this problem comes in the form of federal 
constitutional attack on the validity of such provisions.  During 
Separationism’s heyday in federal constitutional law, such an 
attack would have been unthinkable.  In that period, state 
constitutional law on this subject typically tracked that of the 
federal law of the Establishment Clause, and it would have been 
odd indeed for courts to rule that state constitutions could not do 
explicitly what the Supreme Court was doing in the name of the 
Establishment Clause. 
 
 Now that the federal barriers to aid to FBOs have fallen to 
some extent, a gap has been created between federal restrictions 
and the apparent restrictions associated with the Little Blaine 
Amendments.  Into this gap have charged litigators and 
commentators eager to eliminate the impediments imposed 
by the Little Blaines.49  Motivated primarily by their 
concern for school voucher programs, these advocates have 
begun to argue that the Little Blaines should be invalidated, 
or limited in their scope, by reason of federal constitutional 
law.  Such an argument proved successful in the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Davey v. Locke,50 and is 
likely to reappear in courts in the near future.  Indeed, in 
the previously discussed Holmes v. Bush case, the 
defenders of the voucher program argued that excluding religious 
schools from the program would violate the federal Constitution.  
The Circuit Court made no mention of this argument, but it 
enjoined the entire voucher program, as applied to both religious 
and secular schools, thereby obviating the inequality complained 
of by program defenders. 
 
 Three sets of federal constitutional arguments are typically 
advanced against the Little Blaine Amendments.  The first, 
accepted by the Ninth Circuit in Davey v. Locke, is that the Free 
                                                 
 49 The Becket Fund, here in Washington, DC,  is leading the litigation attack on the Little Blaines.  For 
commentary arguing that the Little Blaines may violate the federal Constitution, see Toby J. Heytens, School Choice 
and State Constitutions, 86 Va. L. Rev. 117 (2000); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First 
Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 657 (1998); Eric Treene, "The Grand Finale 
is Just the Beginning: School Choice and the Coming Battle Over Blaine Amendments.," available at 
www.becketfund.org. 
 50 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14461 (9th Cir., 2002).  Davey ruled unconstitutional  Washington State’s 
exclusion of students pursuing theology majors at religiously affiliated colleges from eligibility for its state 
scholarship program.  The State’s program apparently covered students taking courses in theology at branches of the  
state university, and the court held that the discrimination against students at religiously affiliated colleges violated 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
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Drawing on the law of 
forbidden discrimination, 
advocates assert that any 
state classifications that 
turn on the religious 
character of a private entity 
are presumptively 
unconstitutional. 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids states, in their 
constitutions or otherwise, from treating religious entities worse 
than secular ones in the distribution of state support.  The second  
set of arguments, closely related to the first, rests on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.  Drawing on the law of 
forbidden discrimination, such as that based on race, advocates of 
this approach assert that any state classifications that 
turn on the religious character of a private entity are 
presumptively unconstitutional.  Both of these lines of 
argument are sweeping, and threaten to undermine 
virtually all attempts by states to maintain church-state 
separation any broader than is currently required by the 
federal constitution. 
 
 The third line of federal constitutional attack on 
the Little Blaines is, in our judgment, the most 
promising.  This set of arguments focuses on the anti-
Catholic animus that surrounded the enactment of the 
Little Blaines, at least in some of the states in whose constitutions 
they appear.  This line of argument may depend, however, on state-
to-state proof of that sort of animus.  One hundred years or more 
after enactment of such provisions, that proof may be hard to 
uncover. 
 
 Moreover, considerations of federalism, toward which a 
narrow majority of the current Supreme Court appears sympathetic 
in other contexts, may operate to limit the force of any of these 
attacks on the Little Blaines.  States will argue that they should be 
free to maintain their own policies of church-state separation, even 
if the Supreme Court has relaxed those policies at the federal level.  
That the Justices who most strenuously reject Separationism are 
the same ones who most warmly embrace the concerns of states in 
the federal system suggests the total unpredictability of Supreme 
Court resolution of the questions addressed here. 
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MAJOR FINDING: 
 
• FBOs are frequently exempt from the federal prohibition on 
religious discrimination in employment, but they are not so 
exempt in every federal program.  States and cities vary in 
their laws on the subject, and a considerable number of 
states and cities do NOT extend that exemption to FBOs 
that are receiving state or city funds.  Congress may pre-
empt state and local law on this subject as it applies to 
federally funded programs, but has not done so thus far. 
 
 Whether FBOs participating in service partnerships with 
government should be permitted in their employment practices to 
favor co-religionists is among the most hotly debated topics in this 
field.  On one side are the proponents of unfettered religious 
association and community.  They argue that religious 
organizations should be free to define their own identity and 
mission, and that service delivery will be strengthened if FBOs are 
free to confine their hiring to like-minded individuals.  Indeed, 
advocates on this side at times go so far as to argue that the 
Constitution forbids any regulation of their hiring practices, at least 
with respect to issues of religious affiliation and belief.  From this 
point of view, even an explicit effort by the government to 
condition contracts with FBOs on surrender of this right would 
violate the associational rights of such organizations.  
 
 In stark opposition to this viewpoint are those who fiercely 
defend norms of nondiscrimination.  Those on this side argue that 
government should not be contracting with service providers who 
would deny equal employment opportunity to those who do not 
share the providers’ religious identity or religious beliefs.51  As a 
matter of national policy, these advocates assert, government 
should not be using its resources to support private entities that fail 
to hire exclusively on merit.  Here, too, some advocates believe 
that the Constitution is on their side, and that government is 
constitutionally forbidden to enter into contracts with those who 
                                                 
 51 When religious identity and racial identity coincide, as they appear to do in the case of the Nation of 
Islam or the World-Wide Church of God, the concern about discrimination extends beyond religious favoritism to 
racial animosity and exclusion.  One can well understand reluctance to have government financing discrimination of 
this character.  
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Neither side in this debate is 
likely to persuade the courts 
that the Constitution 
requires acceptance of its 
position. 
engage in religious discrimination, even if legislatures have not 
outlawed such arrangements. 
 
 This latter, constitutionally based view is reflected in the 
recent lawsuit, Bellmore v. United Methodist Children’s Home and 
the Georgia Department of Human Resources.  The suit alleges 
that the Home, which has a contract with the State to provide foster 
care for children in state custody, has unlawfully refused to hire 
non-Christian employees and has unlawfully dismissed an 
employee who does not share the Home’s religion-based view of 
homosexuality.  The Home is exempt by federal statute from the 
federal ban on religious discrimination in hiring, and no state law 
bans this discrimination, but the proponents of the suit allege that 
state funding of the Home operates to make such hiring practices 
unlawful. 
 
 Our own view, strongly supported in the case 
law to date, is that neither side in this debate is likely to 
persuade the courts that the Constitution requires 
acceptance of its position.  Questions of employment 
discrimination law, as it regulates private entities, are 
rarely controlled by constitutional principles.  With one 
exception, which follows, these matters must be decided as 
legislative policy, rather than be settled in constitutional 
adjudication. 
 
 Thus far, the courts have tended to rule precisely in this 
direction – legislatures have wide discretion to decide these issues 
as judgments of public policy.  Arguments that FBOs have a 
constitutional right of association which renders them immune 
from nondiscrimination law, even when they receive government 
benefits conditioned on compliance with such norms, have been 
systematically rejected by the courts.52  On the other side, all court 
decisions – save one – have rejected arguments that private entities 
that accept government funds waive whatever statutory exemption 
from nondiscrimination laws they otherwise possess.53  Although 
the Supreme Court has not confronted this precise question, the 
                                                 
 52 Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 
(1984). 
 53 Siegel v. Truett-McConnell College,  13 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1994), aff’d 73 F.3d 1108 (11th Cir. 
1995); Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); Arriaga v. Loma Linda Univ., 13 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 619, 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that the exclusion from the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act for religious organizations “does not hinge upon whether the corporation received state funds”); Ward 
v. Hengle, 706 N.E.2d 392, 400 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the Title VII exemption for religious 
organizations cannot be waived). he one decision to the contrary is Dodge v. Salvation Army, 1989 WL 53857 (S.D. 
Miss. 1989) (holding that position that is funded almost entirely by government support cannot be restricted to co-
religionists). 
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The Constitution excludes 
employment practices 
related to clergy selection 
from nondiscrimination laws 
of any kind, although the 
precise boundaries of the 
ministerial exception are 
open to question. 
Court has on several occasions repudiated the contention that 
private actors must behave as if they were the state once they 
accept state funds.54 
 
 The applicability of employment discrimination norms to 
FBOs receiving government grants and contracts is thus to be 
determined not by judicial rulings in the name of the Constitution 
but by close inspection of the relevant statutory law, local 
ordinances, and the terms of government contracts.  Political 
authorities may of course alter these norms, but the current ones 
can be carefully identified.  In what follows, we summarize the 
prevailing law of employment discrimination as it applies to FBOs.  
We begin with a summary description of the federal law, then turn 
to state and local law, and conclude with a brief discussion of the 
relationship between federal and state law. 
 
A. Federal Law 
 
 As a general rule, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
forbids employers with fifteen or more employees from 
discriminating in employment based on religion, race, 
color, sex, or national origin.  This prohibition includes 
discrimination based on religious belief as well as 
religious identity or affiliation.55 
 
 There are two very important ways, however, in 
which federal law immunizes FBOs from the 
application of these nondiscrimination rules.  The first, 
required by the Constitution, excludes employment 
practices related to clergy selection from 
nondiscrimination laws of any kind, including those 
relating to religion, race, sex, age, and disability.  
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on this issue, the 
“ministerial exception,” as it known, has been widely approved in 
the lower courts.56  The precise boundaries of the ministerial 
                                                 
 54 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (private school receiving over 90% of its funding from 
the state is not a state actor when it fires a teacher because of her speech activities); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 
(1982) (private nursing home is not a state actor when it decides to transfer patients supported by Medicaid, a 
government-financed program, from one level of care to another).  
 55 On the inclusion of religious conformity to the employers’ beliefs as a permissible ground of 
discrimination by those entitled to the exemption, see Little v. Weurl, 929 F.2d 944 (3rd Cir. 1991); Cline v. Catholic 
Diocese, 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir.  2000).  The question of religious practice is more complicated.  If a practice, such as 
Sabbath observance or dress codes, interferes with the employer’s ordinary business, employers are under a duty of 
de minimis accommodation, but no more.  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
 56 The leading cases on the ministerial exception include McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 
1972); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. 
Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (DC Cir. 1996). 
  
The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 46 
Government Partnerships with Faith-Based Service Providers 
Religious entities are 
explicitly exempt from Title 
VII’s prohibition on religious 
discrimination.  Unlike the 
ministerial exception, the 
Section 702 exemption 
applies to all positions 
related to carrying on the 
organization’s activities. 
exception are open to question, but ordination is not a prerequisite 
to its application.  As one court described it, “if the employee’s 
primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church 
governance, supervision of a religious order, or 
supervision or participation in religious ritual and 
worship, he . . . should be considered clergy.”57 
 
 Second, religious entities are explicitly exempt 
from Title VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination.  
Section 702 of Title VII “does not apply to . . . religious 
[entities] with respect to the employment of individuals 
of a particular religion to perform work connected with 
the carrying on by such [entity] of its activities.”  
Section 702 is both broader and narrower than the 
ministerial exception.  Unlike the ministerial exception, 
which immunizes clergy hiring from all 
nondiscrimination law, the exemption in Section 702 
immunizes religious entities only with respect to claims of 
discrimination based on religion.  Also unlike the ministerial 
exception, however, which applies only to religious leaders, the 
Section 702 exemption applies to all positions related to carrying 
on the organization’s activities. 
 
 Does the exemption disappear when FBOs receive 
government funds?  As previously noted, courts have generally 
held that the exemption does not disappear by force of the 
Constitution alone.  Nor has Congress ever enacted an umbrella 
rule that requires FBOs to surrender the exemption if they receive 
federal funds.  Indeed, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
requires recipients of federal funds to refrain from discrimination 
based on race, sex, or national origin, but says nothing about 
religion.  Thus, the default rule for FBOs receiving federal funds is 
that they retain their federal right to prefer co-religionists for all 
positions. 
 
 At times, Congress explicitly reaffirms the applicability of 
the exemption for FBOs participating in federally funded 
programs.  This was most prominently the case with respect to the 
pioneering effort in Charitable Choice, the welfare reform 
legislation of 1996, discussed in further detail in Part IV below.  At 
other times, however, Congress may and sometimes does override 
the default rule of exemption for co-religionist hiring by FBOs 
with respect to hiring in particular programs that receive federal 
monies.  We provide a series of examples of such an override of 
the exemption policy in Part IV, which follows.  When Congress 
                                                 
 57 EEOC v. The Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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Federal law of 
nondiscrimination is 
relatively straightforward.  
FBOs are presumptively 
exempt from the ban on 
religious discrimination, but 
they must carefully examine 
the details of federal 
programs, to determine if 
the exemption has been 
overridden in particular 
circumstances. 
 
State and local governments 
may, and usually do, have 
their own employment 
discrimination regimes, and 
FBOs must examine 
carefully the law of the 
jurisdiction(s) in which their 
programs operate. 
has been silent with respect to a particular program, however, the 
basic exemption for FBOs from the federal ban on religious 
discrimination remain in force. 
 
 For FBOs, therefore, the approach to 
understanding the federal law of nondiscrimination is 
relatively straightforward.  The ministerial exception 
insulates from legal control the process of employment 
relations with clergy-type figures.  FBOs are 
presumptively exempt from the ban on religious 
discrimination, but they must carefully examine the 
details of federal programs, canvassed below, to 
determine if the exemption has been overridden in 
particular circumstances. 
 
B. State and Local Law 
 
 Contrary to what some may think, the federal 
government is not necessarily the first and last word 
with respect to employment discrimination norms.  
State and local governments may, and usually do, have 
their own employment discrimination regimes, and 
FBOs must examine carefully the law of the 
jurisdiction(s) in which their programs operate. 
 
 We have attached to this report (see Appendix 
B) a compilation of the relevant employment 
discrimination laws of all 50 states, together with the 
comparable laws of a number of major cities.  The 
compilation is organized around four questions, all of 
which pertain to coverage of FBOs, exemption for 
FBOs from the prohibition on religious discrimination, 
and potential loss or waiver of that exemption for FBOs who enter 
into contractual relationships with state and local government. 
 
 The broad outlines of that survey can be simply stated. 
 
• Forty-six states have enacted a set of their own 
employment discrimination norms. 
 
• Of these, forty-three recognize some form of exemption for 
FBOs from the state law prohibition on religious 
discrimination. 
 
• Of these forty-three, however, eighteen states explicitly 
provide that FBOs that enter into contracts with the state do 
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In about one-third of the 
states, and we expect in 
most major cities and 
counties, FBOs do not have 
or retain any right to prefer 
co-religionists in their hiring 
practices insofar as they 
relate to contracts with the 
government. 
NOT retain their exemption from state nondiscrimination 
law.58  
 
• Moreover, most major cities that we surveyed forbid all 
entities, including FBOs, that do business with the city 
from engaging in religious discrimination in employment 
decisions. 
 
• Several major cities require that entities doing business 
with the city provide employee benefits for domestic 
partners to the same extent as spouses;59 this requirement 
may create particular conflict for some FBOs.  
 
 Thus, in about one-third of the states, and we 
expect in most major cities and counties, FBOs do not 
have or retain any right to prefer co-religionists in their 
hiring practices insofar as they relate to contracts with 
the government.  One major question which we have 
not been able to answer definitively in these 
jurisdictions is whether the loss of the co-religionist 
exemption applies only to positions funded in whole or 
part by the government, or applies umbrella-like to all 
hiring by FBOs that have government contracts.  On 
this question, like all others, we urge FBOs and their 
counsel to make a careful inspection of state and local 
laws, policies, and contract documents. 
 
C. The Relationship between State and Federal Law 
 
 This relationship can be stated simply.  First, exemption 
from any portion of federal law of nondiscrimination does NOT 
create exemption from state or local law.  State or local laws at 
times have their own pattern of exemptions, which must be 
consulted independently.  Second, Congress may displace state or 
local law, but must do so explicitly.  If Congress makes 
displacement of state or local law a condition of receiving federal 
funds, that condition will effectively displace state or local law if 
the funds are accepted.  If, however, Congress is silent about state 
and local law, that law remains in effect. 
 
 On this question of preemption of state and local 
employment laws, we take issue with the view expressed in The 
Implementation Guide to Charitable Choice, published by the 
Center for Public Justice.  The Guide asserts that “State and local 
                                                 
 58 See Appendix B. 
 59 The 1997 Equal Benefits Ordinance in San Francisco is a leading example of this type. 
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Congress has not 
preempted state and local 
employment discrimination 
rules in any Charitable 
Choice legislation. 
nondiscrimination laws that normally attach to government 
funding apply only if they do not compromise a faith-based 
provider’s religious character, which is expressly protected in all 
versions of Charitable Choice” (p.9), and goes on to say that 
“[FBOs] cannot be required to certify that they will not use 
religious criteria in their employment decisions.” 
 
 We do not think that this is a sound reading of the religious 
character provision in current Charitable Choice legislation.  That 
provision, which declares among other things that FBOs retain 
“independence from federal, state, and local governments,” cannot 
be sensibly interpreted to mean that FBOs with government 
contracts are entirely immune from government control, even with 
respect to matters directly governed by the contract (or other legal 
sources, including the remainder of the Charitable Choice 
legislation and the Constitution).  Instead, the “religious character” 
provision should be read to mean that agencies of government 
must not assert leverage or control over the FBO in matters 
extraneous to the contract – for example, by requiring contracting 
parties to remove religious symbols from all of their premises, 
even those not being used for service under the contract.  So 
understood, the “religious character” provision is in harmony with 
the overall purpose of Charitable Choice legislation, which is to 
end categorical discrimination against FBOs in the 
award of such contracts. 
 
 This approach to the “religious character” 
provision would exclude an interpretation that it 
preempts state and local employment law in matters 
governed by the contract.  Our view is buttressed by 
normal preemption principles, which require a clear 
statement of congressional intent to oust state law.  In addition to 
the failure to mention state employment law in the religious 
character provision, the Charitable Choice legislation contains 
separate sections on employment practices (42 USC § 604a(f)) and 
preemption (42 USC § 604a(k)), neither of which mention state 
and local employment discrimination law.60  This lack of explicit 
attention to that body of law in provisions focused on employment 
and preemption, respectively, reinforces our sense that Congress 
has not preempted state and local employment discrimination rules 
in any Charitable Choice legislation. 
                                                 
 60 The employment practices provision of the Charitable Choice legislation preserves the exemption, in 
Section 702 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for FBOs from the federal prohibition on religious discrimination law.  
The preemption provision of the Charitable Choice legislation preserves any state law that “prohibits or restricts the 
expenditure of state funds in or by religious organizations.”  That Congress preserved these policies does not support 
an inference that it pre-empted other, unspecified ones.   
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Over the last two decades, 
the Separationist wariness 
with partnerships between 
government and FBOs has 
gradually shifted to a more 
affirmative attitude. 
 
 
MAJOR FINDING: 
 
• Charitable choice provisions appear in a variety of federal 
programs, though far from all, and permit FBOs to retain their 
religious identity while participating in government social welfare 
programs. Important variations appear among federal programs.  
The White House and five federal agency offices of the Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives have taken significant steps over 
the past year to increase the participation of FBOs in federal 
programs. 
 
A. Overview 
 
 The federal government has a long history of partnerships 
with faith-based organizations in the provision of social services.  
Indeed, one of the U.S. Supreme Court’s first decisions 
interpreting the Establishment Clause, Bradfield v. Roberts,61 
upheld such a partnership.  Government funds have supported 
FBOs across the full range of social welfare programs, from 
orphanages and health care to disaster relief and housing.  These 
partnerships continued – and many even started or 
expanded – during the ascendancy of Separationist 
interpretations of the federal constitution.  To the extent 
that statutes or regulations specifically addressed FBOs, 
however, their purpose has typically been to limit or bar 
participation by FBOs in particular programs.  For 
example, the Community Development Block Grant, 
administered by HUD, provides that “CDBG assistance 
may not be used for religious activities or provided to 
primarily religious entities for any activities, including secular 
activities.”62  In other programs, policies or regulations have 
required FBOs, in order to receive government assistance, to strip 
religious symbols from locations in which services are provided or 
to remove religious statements from their governing documents. 
 
 Over the last two decades, the Separationist wariness with 
partnerships between government and FBOs has gradually shifted 
to a more affirmative attitude.  An early example of this shift can 
be found in the Emergency Food and Shelter Program, started in 
1983.  Funded by a grant from Congress, the program is 
administered by a National Board which is chaired by a 
                                                 
 61 175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
 62 24 CFR § 570.200(j). 
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During the 1990s, new 
federal legislation created 
the possibility of even more 
extensive partnerships 
between government and 
FBOs. 
representative of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and 
composed of representatives from the American Red Cross, 
Catholic Charities, the National Council of Churches of Christ, the 
Salvation Army, United Jewish Charities, and United Way.  The 
National Board distributes appropriated funds to local boards – 
whose membership should mirror that of the National Board – 
which in turn award grants to local government and nonprofit 
programs that assist the homeless.63 
 
 The Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) presents a 
second, though far more controversial, example of partnership with 
FBOs.  Originally enacted in 1981, AFLA provides education for 
teenagers about sexual health and reproduction, and encourages the 
involvement of “family members, religious and charitable 
organizations,” and other groups in that educational effort.  The 
law, which also supports programs of care for pregnant teenagers, 
specifically prohibits expenditure of AFLA funds on programs that 
“advocate, promote, or encourage abortion.”64 In 1983, the 
American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit challenging AFLA 
grants to FBOs, alleging that such grants violated the 
Establishment Clause.  The case eventually reached the Supreme 
Court, and in Bowen v. Kendrick the Court held that the religious 
character of some AFLA grantees did not, in itself, represent a 
constitutional violation.  The case was returned to the district court 
for further developments of the facts; the parties subsequently 
reached a settlement in the case, which imposed a set of 
restrictions on FBOs that receive grants under AFLA 
(discussed in Part IV.B). 
 
 During the 1990s, new federal legislation 
created the possibility of even more extensive 
partnerships between government and FBOs.  The 
Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990 
(CCDBG) represents an important step in this 
development.  CCDBG requires states (the primary 
grantees under the program) to maximize eligible parents’ choices 
of child care providers, and includes sectarian institutions among 
the classes of eligible providers (see below for further details of 
this program). 
 
 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), enacted in 1996, effected 
the most significant legislative changes to the relationship between 
                                                 
 63 For more information, see the Emergency Food and Shelter Program website, www.efsp.unitedway.org.  
The EFSP legislation can be found at 42 USC § 11331 et. seq. 
 64 42 USC § 300z et. seq. 
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government and FBOs.  PRWORA’s sweeping reform of federal 
welfare programs contain the “Charitable Choice” provisions, 
which include the following:65 
 
• Non-Discrimination in Funding: 
 
If a state funds non-governmental entities to provide 
services financed under PRWORA, the state cannot 
exclude FBOs from participating as providers simply 
because of their religious character.  PRWORA does not 
require states to use non-governmental entities to provide 
services under the act, but if they choose to do so, states 
must allow FBOs to participate (or compete for grants) on 
equal terms.  Where state law forbids support for sectarian 
organizations, PRWORA requires that federal funds be 
placed in a separate account, and FBOs must be eligible to 
compete for or receive the segregated funds. 
 
• Providers’ Religious Identity Preserved: 
 
An FBO need not abandon its religious identity to receive 
government funds under the PRWORA.  The religious 
character of the FBO’s governance, including its mission 
statement and criteria for selecting officers and board 
members, may be maintained.  Nor may federal or state 
officials require an FBO to “remove religious art, icons, 
scripture, or other symbols” as a condition of receiving 
PRWORA funds.  In addition, FBOs funded through 
PRWORA programs retain their right, under section 702 of 
Title VII, to prefer co-religionists in employment decisions.  
PRWORA does not, however, expressly preempt state or 
local anti-discrimination laws, which may operate to limit 
FBOs’ right to prefer co-religionists. 
 
• Recipients’ Religious Liberty Protected: 
 
An individual who is eligible to receive benefits under a 
PRWORA-funded program, but who objects to receiving 
services from an FBO, has the right to receive such services 
from an alternative provider.  Providers financed through 
PRWORA may not discriminate against service recipients 
on grounds of religion, and may not condition delivery of 
services on recipients’ participation in religious activities. 
 
                                                 
 65 PRWORA’s Charitable Choice provisions are codified at 42 USC § 604a. 
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• Limited Audit: 
 
If an FBO providing services under a PRWORA program 
establishes a separate account for government funds 
received for such services, the required government audit 
will be limited to that separate account. 
 
• Religious Activities Proscribed: 
 
PRWORA specifies that “No funds provided directly to 
institutions or organizations to provide services and 
administer programs under [this Act] shall be expended for 
sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization.”  This 
limitation is important for two reasons.  First, it reflects the 
unquestioned minimum content of the Establishment 
Clause: the government may not directly finance these 
distinctively religious activities.  Second, the limitation 
applies only to “direct” funding under the PRWORA – 
grants or contracts to FBOs – not to indirect forms of 
financing such as vouchers or certificates. If an FBO 
receives only indirect government aid, the service provided 
by the FBO does not need to be segregated from worship, 
religious instruction, or proselytizing. 
 
 As originally enacted, the Charitable Choice provisions 
applied to the Temporary Aid for Needy Families program (TANF, 
created by PRWORA to replace Aid to Families with Dependant 
Children), along with the Food Stamps, Medicaid, and 
Supplemental Security Income programs.  Since 1996, Congress 
has added Charitable Choice provisions to a number of other 
federal programs.  In 1997, Charitable Choice provisions were 
applied to the Welfare-to-Work program; in 1998, to the 
Community Services Block Grant; and in 2000, to the Substance 
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant and Projects for 
Assistance in Transition from Homelessness, along with 
discretionary funding programs for substance abuse treatment 
administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA).  With minor exceptions,66 the CSBG 
                                                 
 66 The Charitable Choice provisions in PRWORA apply directly to the Welfare-to-Work program.  The 
Charitable Choice provisions in the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) differ from that in PRWORA in four 
respects: a) since CSBG programs operate only through grants or contracts, the references to vouchers and indirect 
funding in the PRWORA’s provision do not apply;  b) CSBG requires a specific, “tripartite” board for Community 
Action Agencies, and an FBO seeking to become a Community Action Agency under CSBG would be required to 
conform its governance structure to the statute’s specified form; c) entities receiving funds under CSBG are required 
to establish a separate account for such funds (PRWORA gives FBOs the option to create separate accounts); and d) 
the CSBG provisions omit the protections for the religious liberty of program beneficiaries.  The CSBG Charitable 
Choice provisions are found at 42 USC § 9920.  The Charitable Choice provisions covering programs under 
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Obstacles to greater FBO 
participation tend to be 
subtle, and include 
agencies’ failure to 
aggressively implement 
existing Charitable Choice 
provisions; ambiguous 
limitations on religious 
activity, which 
administrators may 
interpret in terms more 
restrictive than the 
Constitution requires; 
requirements of partnership 
with other organizations 
(which may not be willing to 
partner with FBOs); and the 
absence of specific 
encouragement for faith-
based and community 
organizations to apply for 
funding. 
and SAMHSA Charitable Choice provisions mirror those in 
PRWORA, while the Welfare-to-Work program directly adopts 
PRWORA’s Charitable Choice provisions. 
 
 In the past two years, the Bush administration has strongly 
supported efforts to improve and increase partnerships between 
government and faith-based providers of social services.  Soon 
after taking office, President Bush issued two executive orders, 
which created Offices of the Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives in the White House and the 
Departments of Education, Health & Human Services, 
Housing & Urban Development, Labor, and Justice.67  
The executive orders charged those  offices with two 
basic tasks: first, to search existing federal social 
welfare programs for barriers that prevent faith-based 
and community organizations from fully participating, 
and work to remove barriers that are inessential; and 
second, through outreach and education efforts, to 
encourage faith-based and community organizations to 
participate in government social welfare programs. 
 
 The White House and agency offices have made 
substantial progress on both tasks assigned by the 
executive orders.  With respect to the first task, the 
audit of barriers to FBO participation in federal 
programs, each agency office issued a report in the 
summer of 2001, detailing regulatory and other barriers 
found in that agency’s programs.  The White House 
office then released its report, “Unlevel Playing Field: 
Barriers to Participation by Faith-Based and 
Community Organizations in Federal Social Service 
Programs,” which summarizes and combines the 
findings in the five agency reports.  The White House 
and agency reports found relatively few examples of 
statutory or regulatory provisions that explicitly bar 
faith-based institutions from participating in federal 
programs.  The obstacles to greater FBO participation 
tend to be more subtle, and include agencies’ failure to 
aggressively implement existing Charitable Choice provisions; 
ambiguous limitations on religious activity, which administrators 
may interpret in terms more restrictive than the Constitution 
requires; requirements of partnership with other organizations 
                                                                                                                                                             
SAMHSA are found at 42 USC § 290kk; we discuss their differences with the PRWORA provisions which follow. 
 67 The agency offices of the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives are officially designated as Centers, 
except for the Justice Department’s, which is designated the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives Taskforce.  For 
purposes of simplicity, this report will refer to all as offices. 
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Notwithstanding a general 
direction of change which 
points toward greater 
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(which may not be willing to partner with FBOs); and the absence 
of specific encouragement for faith-based and community 
organizations to apply for funding.  In addition, the reports noted 
that federal programs often have complicated  applications and 
grant administration rules, which tend to discourage smaller and 
less established organizations from applying. 
 
 With respect to the second task, outreach and education, the 
offices have (to somewhat varied extent) developed websites that 
provide significant information about available programs to 
interested FBOs, and have publicized training sessions for grantees 
and prospective grantees in specific program areas.  
Within the last several months, the White House and 
agency offices have initiated a series of conferences to 
promote the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.  
The conferences include workshops with officials from 
the agency offices and representatives of faith-based 
and community organizations that have received federal 
funding, along with training sessions on applying for 
government grants. 
 
 The Faith-Based and Community Initiative has 
received little legislative support in the last two years.  
The most ambitious legislative proposal, the 
Community Solutions Act of 2001 (typically referred to 
as HR 7), would have extended the Charitable Choice 
provisions to all federal programs (and all state or local 
programs carried out with federal funds); after passing 
the House of Representatives, HR 7 did not pass the Senate, 
largely – though not exclusively – because of objections to the 
broad co-religionist hiring preference contained in the act.  The 
CARE Act of 2002, with more limited Charitable Choice 
provisions (and omitting the controversial co-religionist hiring 
preference) recently failed to come to a vote in the Senate.  
Congress did, however, appropriate a modest sum – $30 million – 
for the Compassion Capital Fund, which will support increased 
involvement of faith-based and community organizations in a 
broad range of government services, from aid to the homeless and 
at-risk children to substance abuse treatment and employment 
training.  (The Compassion Capital Fund are discussed in greater 
detail later.)  The Department of Labor has also awarded a series of 
grants, made under the Workforce Investment Act, for the specific 
purpose of linking faith-based and community organizations to 
local “One Stop” employment centers (these grants will also be 
discussed later in more detail). 
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The Child Care and 
Development Fund unites in 
one program the major 
federal funding streams for 
child care services. 
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the involvement of faith-
based child care providers, 
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between providers that 
receive direct grants and 
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receive only indirect 
financing through vouchers.
 This overview has stressed a general direction of change, 
which points toward greater involvement of FBOs in federal social 
welfare programs.  Notwithstanding that general trajectory, the 
specific legal contexts in which FBOs might provide government-
financed services remain, in many instances, complicated and 
sometimes uncertain.  To illuminate these contexts, we have 
selected six representative program areas. 
 
B. Specific Federal Programs 
 
  1. The Child Care and Development Fund 
 
 The Child Care and Development Fund 
(CCDF), created in PRWORA, unites in one program 
the major federal funding streams for child care 
services, including the Child Care and Development 
Block Grant program.  CCDF operates as a block grant 
program, under which the administering agency (HHS)  
transfers money – in an amount determined by a set 
formula – to a state, territorial, or tribal entity (a “lead 
agency”), which in turn funds and administers the child 
care program in its jurisdiction.  In addition, states may 
elect to transfer up to 30% of their funds received 
through the TANF Block Grant to their funds under 
CCDF. 
 
 Although states have significant discretion in 
designing programs under CCDF, the program’s 
underlying theme remains consistent – poor parents 
should be afforded a reasonable array of choices for 
child care services.  States may contract directly with a 
child care provider, such as paying for a block of spaces in a child 
care center.  Even if they choose to finance care providers directly, 
states are required to offer parents the option of payment vouchers 
that can be redeemed by a wide range of providers, including 
home-based caregivers, certain relatives, and child care centers run 
by secular and religious institutions. 
 
 CCDF directly contemplates the involvement of faith-based 
child care providers, and draws a bright line between providers that 
receive direct grants and contracts, and those that receive only 
indirect financing through vouchers.  While faith-based providers 
are eligible to enter direct contracts with states, such providers are 
then prohibited from using funds received through the program for 
religious purposes.  Indirect financing, however, carries no such 
restrictions. “Funds provided through child care certificates may be 
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The CCDF, limits the scope 
of faith-based providers’ 
exemptions.  The 
regulations specify that any 
provider receiving more 
than 80% of its operating 
budget from federal and 
state funds, whether 
through direct contracts or 
vouchers, loses its privilege 
to hire co-religionists for 
caregiver positions.  the 
80% threshold applies to 
providers financed either 
through direct or indirect 
sources. 
expended for sectarian purposes or activities, including sectarian 
worship or instruction when provided as part of the child care 
services.”68 
 
 In terms of financing, CCDF draws one distinction between 
faith-based and secular providers.  While CCDF funds can be used 
for “minor remodeling” of secular facilities, faith-based providers 
are only eligible for construction funding when repairs are 
“necessary to bring the facility into compliance” with applicable 
health and safety regulations.69 
 
 Although CCDF was created through PRWORA, its rules 
governing employment discrimination are more complicated than 
the Charitable Choice provisions.  The Charitable 
Choice provisions of PRWORA do not apply to CCDF; 
it is governed instead by the provisions originally 
enacted to cover the Child Care and Development 
Block Grant.  The CCDF employment discrimination 
rules permit a faith-based provider, financed through a 
CCDF contract or grant, to “require that employees 
adhere to the religious tenets and teachings of such 
organization”; the regulation does not impose a general 
nondiscrimination rule on providers financed by 
vouchers, so no exemption is needed for faith-based 
providers.  The CCDF, however, limits the scope of 
faith-based providers’ exemptions.  The regulations 
specify that any provider receiving more than 80% of 
its operating budget from federal and state funds, 
whether through direct contracts or vouchers, loses its 
privilege to hire co-religionists for caregiver 
positions.70 
 
 The rules on nondiscrimination in admission to 
child care function in a similar way.  If a provider is 
financed by direct contracts or grants, the provider may 
not discriminate in admissions on religious grounds.  If 
such a provider receives 80% or less of its operating budget from 
                                                 
 68 CCDF Regulations, 45 CFR §§ 98.30(c)(5), 98.54(d).  So long as beneficiaries have genuine choices 
among secular and religious options, this provision is consistent with the Establishment Clause as construed in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 
 69 45 CFR § 98.54(b) 
 70 45 CFR § 98.47(c).  The provision reads, in relevant part: “if 80 percent or more of the operating budget 
of a child care provider comes from Federal and State funds, including direct and indirect assistance under the 
CCDF, the Lead Agency shall assure that, before any further CCDF assistance is given to the provider, (1) The grant 
or contract relating to the assistance, or (2) The employment policies of the provider specifically provide that no 
person with responsibilities in the operation of the child care program will discriminate, on the basis of religion, in 
the employment of any individual as a caregiver.” 
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federal and state funds, the provider may – in allocating slots that 
are not funded by a government grant or contract – give preference 
to children whose families “participate on a regular basis in other 
activities” of the provider.  Thus, a congregation-based child care 
center could reserve spaces for the children of congregational 
members, but only so long as the center does not receive more than 
80% of its funding from federal and state sources.  Importantly, 
and parallel to the employment discrimination rule, the 80% 
threshold applies to providers financed either through direct or 
indirect sources.  Any child care provider that receives more than 
80% of its operating budget from federal or state funds may not 
discriminate on religious grounds in the allocation of any of its 
spaces, whether such spaces are government funded or not.71 
 
 CCDF does follow the Charitable Choice 
provisions in one important respect, however.  
Recognizing that some states’ constitutions and statutes 
may prohibit direct or indirect funding of religious 
organizations, CCDF provides that such restrictions 
should not be construed to limit the expenditure of 
federal funds under the program.  CCDF then specifies 
that where state restrictions would purport to limit 
expenditures under the program, federal and state funds 
should be segregated to ensure that the federal monies 
are available to meet the full range of the program’s 
purposes.72 
 
  2. Sexual Abstinence Education Projects 
 
 FBOs interested in participating in programs 
designed to encourage sexual abstinence among 
adolescents can look to three federal funding streams.  
The first, under the Adolescent Family Life 
Demonstration Program (AFL), dates from the early 
1980s.73  The other two, the Abstinence Education 
Grant Program and the Special Projects of Regional and National 
Significance - Community-Based Abstinence Education grants 
(SPRANS), were created under the 1996 welfare reform 
legislation.  The AFL and SPRANS programs consist of 
discretionary grants administered by HHS; the Abstinence 
Education Grant Program is a formula grant program distributed to 
                                                 
 71 45 CFR § 98.45 (the rule exempts “family child care providers,” defined as single individuals providing 
child care services in a home setting). 
 72 45 CFR § 98.3. 
 73 The AFL funds both prevention (abstinence education) and care for pregnant adolescents; since 1996 a 
significant majority of the funding has gone to education programs. 
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states (and other jurisdictions), which have a matching funds 
requirement.  In 2002, the AFL program made grants of $29 
million; the Abstinence Education block grant was authorized to 
distribute $50 million; and the SPRANS abstinence program was 
authorized to award $40 million in grants. 
 
 Since 1996, the three funding streams have shared a 
common definition of the content of abstinence education, as 
specified in section 912 of PRWORA (codified at 42 USC § 710): 
For purposes of this section, the term "abstinence education" 
means an educational or motivational program which –  
 
(A) has as its exclusive purpose, teaching the social, 
psychological, and health gains to be realized by abstaining 
from sexual activity; 
 
(B) teaches abstinence from sexual activity outside marriage as 
the expected standard for all school age children; 
 
(C) teaches that abstinence from sexual activity is the only 
certain way to avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancy, sexually 
transmitted diseases, and other associated health problems; 
 
(D) teaches that a mutually faithful monogamous relationship 
in context of marriage is the expected standard of human 
sexual activity; 
 
(E) teaches that sexual activity outside of the context of 
marriage is likely to have harmful psychological and 
physical effects; 
 
(F) teaches that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to 
have harmful consequences for the child, the child's 
parents, and society; 
 
(G) teaches young people how to reject sexual advances and 
how alcohol and drug use increases vulnerability to sexual 
advances; and 
 
(H) teaches the importance of attaining self-sufficiency before 
engaging in sexual activity. 
 
 The AFL specifically encouraged the involvement of faith-
based organizations in its prevention programs, and FBOs 
comprised a significant portion of the grantees and sub-grantees in 
the program’s early years.  The funding of FBOs – coupled with 
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the AFL’s promotion of family obligations and restrictions on 
information about abortion – led the American Civil Liberties 
Union to file suit against the program in 1983, alleging that the 
AFL promoted religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.  
In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Supreme Court held that the AFL, 
considered only on its face, did not promote religion; the Court 
then sent the case back to the district court to determine whether 
AFL funds had, in fact, been used by grantees or sub-grantees to 
promote religion. 
 
 In 1993, the government and AFL’s challengers reached a 
settlement in the lawsuit.  The settlement centers on an agreement 
by HHS to maintain certain constitutional safeguards in the 
administration of the AFL.  First, as specified by the Supreme 
Court’s decision, HHS agreed not to fund “pervasively sectarian” 
providers under AFL.  Second, HHS agreed to instruct grantees on 
specific restrictions related to religion, including limits on the 
presence of religious images or publications in space used for AFL 
programs.  Third, HHS agreed to a robust system of monitoring 
grantees under the AFL, including advance review of grantees’ 
curricula for education programs and site visits to ensure 
compliance. 
 
 Although the agreement expired in 1998, the same criteria 
continue to be used by the Office of Adolescent Pregnancy 
Programs (OAPP, the HHS office charged with administering the 
AFL).  Each grantee under AFL receives two memos that address 
the issue of FBO participation, AFL Policies Pertaining to Religion 
and Guidance to AFL Grantees.74  The Policies letter describes the 
Kendrick litigation and settlement, and identifies two core 
elements of the settlement that remain binding on AFL grantees: 
 
• The grantee will not teach or promote religion in the AFL 
Title XX program.  The program shall be designed so as to 
be, to the extent possible, accessible to the public generally. 
 
• The grantee shall submit all curricula and educational 
materials proposed for use in the AFL project, whether 
currently available or to be developed, to OAPP for review 
and approval prior to use in the AFL project, to ensure that 
these materials are medically accurate, do not teach or 
promote religion and are neutral on abortion. 
 
                                                 
 74 Available at http://opa.osophs.dhhs.gov/xxgrants/01march/care/afl_care_03-2001.html. 
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The instructions to remove 
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Grantees are expected to 
ensure that the services are 
“accessible to the public 
generally,” with special 
emphasis on avoiding 
settings or messages that 
would expose recipients to 
unwanted religious 
experience. 
The Guidance memo, which was developed to implement the 
Kendrick settlement, consists of a series of questions and answers 
concerning the involvement of religious institutions in AFL 
projects.  The memo strongly encourages grantees to limit service 
recipients’ exposure to religious messages, materials, or imagery 
where AFL services are provided, and to ensure that 
AFL services are clearly distinguished from specifically 
religious programs. 
 
 The Abstinence Education block grant and 
SPRANS programs were not involved in the Kendrick 
litigation or settlement, but HHS’ Maternal and Child 
Health Bureau (which administers these funds) 
provides grantees with the same instructions and 
guidance materials that OAPP uses in the AFL 
program.  Although these two programs were created 
through the PRWORA, the Charitable Choice 
provisions were not made applicable to these funding 
streams.  Thus, the instructions to remove religious 
imagery and influences, found in the AFL guidance 
materials, and the prohibition on funding “pervasively 
sectarian” institutions, which was at the heart of the 
Kendrick settlement, do not conflict with the legislation 
that created the Abstinence Education block grant or 
SPRANS program. 
 
 The AFL grant legislation contains no express 
nondiscrimination provisions, relating either to services 
or employment.  The Kendrick settlement (and 
continuing guidance), however, imposes a strong 
principle of nondiscrimination in the delivery of 
services.  AFL grantees are expected to ensure that the 
services are “accessible to the public generally,” with 
special emphasis on avoiding settings or messages that 
would expose recipients to unwanted religious 
experience. 
 
 As noted above, the Abstinence Education block grant and 
SPRANS programs have adopted the AFL guidance materials, 
including the concern about protecting recipients from unwanted 
exposure to religious materials or messages.  In addition, the 
legislation that created the Abstinence Education and SPRANS 
programs has a broad nondiscrimination rule: “No person shall on 
the ground of sex or religion be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any 
program or activity funded in whole or in part with funds made 
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available under this title.”75 The rule clearly prohibits 
discrimination in the delivery of services, but the language 
suggests a broader reach to the rule, a reach that seems to 
encompass employment discrimination.  Again, because the 
Charitable Choice provisions of the PRWORA do not apply to the 
Abstinence Education block grants or the SPRANS program, such 
a construction of the nondiscrimination rule is likely. 
 
  3. Substance Abuse Prevention & Treatment 
   Services 
 
 Late in 2000, Congress included Charitable 
Choice provisions in two authorization statutes for the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration.76  These provisions apply to all 
programs administered by SAMSHA, including both 
discretionary and block grant programs, that offer 
financial assistance to providers of substance abuse 
treatment or prevention services.  Thus, the Charitable 
Choice provisions cover the Substance Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Block Grant, Projects for 
Assistance in Transition from Homelessness (both of 
which are formula grants), and a variety of 
discretionary grant programs administered by 
SAMHSA. 
 
 The SAMHSA Charitable Choice provisions 
encompass all of the significant elements of the 
provisions found in the PRWORA.  Religious providers 
are entitled to equal treatment in the grant process; 
religious providers are permitted to retain their 
religious symbols and identity, and to retain their right 
to prefer co-religionists in employment decisions.  
Providers are also forbidden to discriminate against 
service recipients on the basis of religion, religious 
beliefs, or the recipient’s participation in religious 
activities.  As in the Community Service Block Grant’s 
Charitable Choice provisions, religious grantees are 
required to maintain government funds in a separate 
account, and that account alone may be audited by 
program officials. 
 
 Two elements of the SAMHSA rules go beyond 
those in the PRWORA.  First, the SAMHSA provisions formalize 
                                                 
 75 42 USC § 708. 
 76 The two provisions are codified at 42 USC § 290kk and 42 USC § 300x-65. 
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and make more concrete the protections for the religious liberty of 
service recipients.  Like the PRWORA rule, the SAMHSA 
provision specifies that service recipients have the right to object to 
receiving services from a faith-based provider, and that the 
government must offer an alternative provider that is 
both reasonably accessible to the recipient and offers 
services at least as valuable as those rejected by the 
recipient.  The SAMHSA rule goes further, and 
requires the government entity financing the services 
and the service provider to ensure that service 
recipients are given notice of their right to object to the 
services offered.77 
 
 Second, the SAMHSA provisions reflect a 
debate over the necessary qualifications for providing 
substance abuse prevention or treatment services, as well as more 
fundamental questions about the nature of such services.  In its 
audit of the SAMHSA programs, the HHS Center for the Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives concluded that repeated 
invocations of “science-based” treatment and “scientific and 
technical merit,” along with restrictive interpretations of 
professional credentials in the field, discouraged some faith-based 
service providers from applying for grants.  Congress had 
addressed at least some of these concerns in the SAMHSA 
Charitable Choice provisions.  The legislation incorporates a 
specific finding that “establishing unduly rigid or uniform 
educational qualification for counselors and other personnel in 
drug treatment programs may undermine the effectiveness of such 
programs.”78 Based on that finding, Congress added a rule to the 
SAMHSA Charitable Choice provisions which prohibits 
discrimination against individuals and programs because of the 
religious nature of their training in substance abuse treatment, so 
long as that training is “substantially equivalent” to nonreligious 
training that satisfies government requirements.  SAMHSA has not 
yet proposed any standards or guidance for determining what 
religious training should count as “substantially equivalent” to 
nonreligious education. 
 
4. Compassion Capital Fund 
 
                                                 
 77 The two SAMHSA Charitable Choice provisions differ in their assignment of this duty to provide notice.  
42 USC § 290kk-1 assigns the duty to service providers, entities that refer recipients for covered services, and the 
governmental entities that administer the program; 42 USC § 300x-65 places the duty on “the appropriate Federal, 
State, or local governmental entity.”  
 78 42 USC § 290kk-3. 
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 In October, 2000, HHS announced $30 million in 
discretionary grants made under the newly-created Compassion 
Capital Fund (CCF).  Congress appropriated the funds in order “to 
provide grants to charitable organizations to emulate model social 
service programs and to encourage research on the best practices of 
social service organizations.”79 Nearly $25 million of this fund was 
awarded to twenty-one “intermediary organizations,” which are 
charged with two basic tasks: to build the capacity of grassroots 
faith-based and community organizations that provide social 
welfare services; and to make subgrants to grassroots organizations 
that the grantees determine to be particularly promising.80 
 
 The first task seems relatively clear and raises 
few particular legal problems.  CCF grantees are 
expected to provide faith-based and community 
organizations with technical assistance, which may 
include training staff, providing information about 
government or private funding, helping the 
organizations to form partnerships with other 
organizations, and developing models of best practices.  
So long as grantees provide this assistance on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, legal concerns with the task of 
capacity building should be minimized. 
 
 The sub-grants to grassroots organizations, 
however, raise more serious questions.  The CCF 
program announcement for the fund contains the 
standard limitation on the use of public funds: 
“Compassion Capital Funds shall not be used to 
support religious practices such as religious instruction, worship or 
prayer.”  Apart from the ambiguity inherent in any operative 
definition of these practices, the program announcement does not 
specify that these limitations apply to sub-grants of government 
funds as well as to primary grants.  Indeed, the announcement 
seems to envision quite limited monitoring of sub-grantees’ 
activities, requiring little more than a general description of the 
funded activities and a proposed plan for measuring outcomes of 
the funding.  Further guidance from HHS to CCF grantees should 
                                                 
 79 Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 107 PL 116 (2002). 
 80 The authority to make subgrants under the Compassion Capital Fund has been called into question.  The 
scant legislative history of the fund would indicate that subgrants are not consistent with Congress’s intent in 
creating the program (the consensus of several senators discussing the fund is that “this fund is only for the 
development of model best practices”).  147 Cong. Rec. S 11546 (Nov. 7, 2001).  See OMB Watch, Comments on 
Guildelines for Compassion Capital Fund, March 29, 2002.  The statutory language, however, seems broader in that 
it authorizes funding not only for research on best practices, but for charitable organizations to “emulate” such 
practices, which could suggest funding for services. 
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make clear, at a minimum, that grantees are responsible for 
ensuring that sub-grantees comply with federal accounting 
standards for grant recipients, and that sub-grantees segregate 
government funds from resources used to support religious 
activities.81 
 
5. Workforce Investment Act 
 
 Created in 1998, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) is 
designed to combine and coordinate  federal programs that provide 
employment-related services.  The One-Stop service delivery 
system stands at the heart of the WIA’s reforms.  One-Stop 
centers, located across the country, draw together under one roof 
the wide variety of federal employment services, which range from 
unemployment insurance and employment counseling to job-
training and placement, along with assistance in transportation or 
child care.  Most of the money authorized under the WIA goes to 
states through formula grants, but the Department of Labor’s 
Employment and Training Administration does make some 
discretionary grants for demonstration and pilot projects. 
 
 WIA formula grants are administered through 
Statewide and Local Workforce Investment Boards 
(WIBs), entities established by the WIA to assess needs 
related to workforce development and develop plans for 
meeting those needs.  State WIBs allocate program 
resources to local WIBs, which in turn distribute WIA 
funds to the operators of One-Stop centers and other service 
providers that are partners in the One-Stop system.82  Local WIBs 
are generally barred from providing direct services under the WIA; 
instead, their role is to develop policy and select and monitor the 
performance of the One-Stop operators and partners. 
 
 FBOs are eligible to participate as operators or partners in 
the One-Stop system.  DOL’s Employment and Training 
Administration (ETA) has actively sought to involve faith-based 
and community organizations in workforce development 
programs.83  In the summer of 2002, DOL awarded $17.5 million 
                                                 
 81 The first requirement, on accountability, can be found in HHS’s Uniform Requirements for Awards and 
Subawards, 45 CFR § 74 (the HHS version of OMB Circular A-110).  The second requirement derives from 
Establishment Clause case law.  As demonstrated by Bowen v. Kendrick, sub-grants of government funds carry the 
same constitutional limits as grants of such funds. 
 82 The WIA specifies that providers of certain federally financed employment services are “required 
partners” in the One-Stop system, meaning that such providers must enter into cooperative relationships with the 
operators of One-Stop centers, ensuring that service beneficiaries can receive the full range of services to which they 
are entitled.  29 USC § 2841 (defining One-Stop system, identifying required and permitted partners). 
 83 DOL’s ETA has also solicited grant applications from community and faith-based organizations that 
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in WIA demonstration grants to states, intermediary organizations, 
and grassroots service providers for the purpose of linking 
community and faith-based organizations to the One-Stop 
system.84 
 
 The WIA, however, places restrictions on faith-based 
providers financed through its programs.  WIA programs carry a 
broad nondiscrimination rule which forbids discrimination on 
religion (among other grounds) and extends protection 
both to those who receive services and to those 
employed in providing the services.  The rule does not 
exempt FBOs from its reach, and ETA guidance 
materials clearly state that FBOs are covered by the 
nondiscrimination requirement.  The WIA’s 
nondiscrimination provisions apply to any “program or 
activity” that is “financially assisted by the WIA” or 
operated “as part of the One-Stop delivery system.”85  
Although the “financial assistance” prong seems 
relatively clear – any provider that receives WIA funds 
must comply with the Act’s nondiscrimination rule – 
the applicable regulations define “financial assistance” 
in expansive terms.  Such assistance includes both 
direct and indirect (voucher) financing; permission to 
use property purchased or leased with WIA funds, if the 
use is connected with One-Stop services; or use of personnel 
financed by the WIA.86  The nondiscrimination provisions apply 
only to the “program or activity” participating in the One-Stop 
system; they do not extend to all programs and activities of 
participating entities. 
 
 In addition, the WIA prohibits the use of program funds for 
“employment or training of participants in sectarian activities.”87 
DOL regulations define “sectarian activities” as “religious worship 
or ceremony, or sectarian instruction.”88 Thus, a WIA-supported 
activity could not use a faith-intensive curriculum as part of its 
                                                                                                                                                             
provide employment-related services to people with significant disabilities. SGA 02-22, 67 FR 50711 (August 5, 
2002). 
 84 These grants are described in the Employment and Training Administration’s Training and Education 
Guidance Letter 17-01, on April 17, 2002.  The grants were formally solicited in the DOL’s Solicitations for Grant 
Applications (SGA) 2-106, 2-107, and 2-108, published in the Federal Register at 67 FR 18938, 67 FR 18946, and 
67 FR 18030 respectively.  For a list of grants awarded, see 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/OPA2002370.htm. 
 85 29 CFR § 37.10. 
 86 29 CFR § 37.4.  This definition is highlighted in the ETA’s extremely useful document “Questions and 
Answers Relating to FBO/CBO Solicitations,” available through the DOL’s website at 
http://www.doleta.gov/usworkforce/documents/misc/fbo-cbo.asp#qanda. 
 87 20 USC § 9276(c); 20 CFR § 667.266, 29 CFR § 37.6(f). 
 88 29 CFR § 37.4. 
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employment readiness program.  The WIA’s restrictions on 
sectarian activities extend beyond worship and religious 
instruction; participants in WIA-supported programs cannot be 
“employed or trained in any way” to construct, operate, 
or maintain any facility that is “primarily or inherently 
devoted to sectarian instruction or religious worship.”89 
This restriction does not, however, bar FBOs as a class 
from employing WIA participants, even in the 
maintenance of FBO facilities – so long as the facility is 
not “primarily or inherently devoted to sectarian 
instruction or religious worship.”  This distinction 
reflects the constitutional interpretation expressed in 
ETA guidance materials: “the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
prohibits the government from directly funding 
religious activity.” 
 
  6. Welfare-to-Work 
 
 The Welfare-to-Work (WtW) program stands at 
the intersection of the TANF program, created in the 
1996 welfare reform law, and the Workforce 
Investment Act.  Enacted in 1997, WtW is designed to 
advance one of the major goals of TANF – moving 
people off of welfare and into permanent employment 
that permits them to be self-supporting.  As such, 
WtW’s services are targeted at those who are likely to 
face the greatest challenges in entering or remaining in 
the workforce.  WtW funds can be used for a wide variety of 
services for this target population, including wage subsidies for 
public or private sector employment; vocational training; 
mentoring; child care, transportation, or short-term housing 
assistance; and substance abuse treatment.90  DOL distributes 
three-quarters of WtW funds through formula grants to states, 
which in turn redistribute the funds to local WIBs.  Local WIBs 
then enter contracts or voucher financing arrangements with 
providers of WtW services; WIA regulations specify that WtW 
providers financed through formula grants are “required partners” 
in the One-Stop system.91  The other one-quarter of WtW funds are 
distributed by DOL through competitive grants.  Applicants for 
competitive grants must show that they have consulted with their 
local WIB and state governor, in order to ensure that  programs 
                                                 
 89 20 USC § 9276(c); 20 § CFR 667.266, 29 CFR § 37.6(f). 
 90 The full list of allowable activities can be found at 20 CFR § 645.220. 
 91 20 CFR § 663.620; 20 CFR § 645.430. 
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awarded competitive grants coordinate (and are consistent) with 
local WIB and WtW activities. 
 
 The WtW legislation incorporates the Charitable Choice 
provisions of the PRWORA.  Thus, FBOs are eligible to 
participate in the full range of WtW programs, whether through 
contracts or voucher arrangements with local WIBs or through 
discretionary grants from DOL.  DOL’s regulations for WtW do 
not mention the Charitable Choice provisions, which leads to some 
degree of confusion, especially given WtW’s close 
connection with WIA.  As noted above, WIA 
regulations impose a broad nondiscrimination rule on 
all service providers receiving financial assistance 
through that program.  WtW regulations specify that 
“recipients of WtW financial assistance who operate 
programs that are part of the One-Stop system” must 
comply with the requirements of 29 CFR part 37 – 
which include the prohibition on religion-based 
employment discrimination.92  Because of the 
requirement that WtW participants coordinate with – and, where 
possible, integrate their services with – the One-Stop system, a 
literal reading of this regulation would largely erase the exemption 
provided in WtW’s Charitable Choice provision.  Recognizing this 
conflict, ETA’s guidance on the WIA indicates that the Charitable 
Choice provision will govern.  While we believe this judgment is 
correct as a matter of statutory interpretation, ETA and the DOL’s 
Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives need to provide 
significantly greater guidance on the implementation of Charitable 
Choice in WtW-supported programs.93 
                                                 
 92 20 CFR § 645.430(d). 
 93 The lack of guidance is especially surprising given the extent of valuable information that ETA provides 
for WIA One-Stop participants (indeed, it is this WIA material – not WtW-specific guidance – that resolves the 
previously-mentioned conflict). 
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MAJOR FINDING: 
 
• With a few notable exceptions, the existing contracts 
between states and FBOs are conspicuously silent on the 
subject of the particular rights and responsibilities that 
attach to FBOs in such contracts. This contractual silence 
invites confusion and legal controversy, because FBOs are 
not provided contractual guidance with respect to 
constitutional and statutory limits on their use of 
government funds. 
 
 When the legal issues that arise from the faith-based 
initiative are viewed from Washington, D.C., federal constitutional 
law seems to dominate.  From the perspective of those 
who administer FBOs, however, the legal materials 
most pertinent to their daily circumstances are not so 
distant.  Rather, the contractual arrangements between 
providers and government financiers of social services 
are likely to be the most immediate source of guidance, 
attention, and control.  Of course, questions of 
constitutional law, or other legal concerns, are not 
irrelevant to those contracts – the answers to such 
questions may limit the contractual freedom of the 
parties.  Because the contents of such contracts are so 
likely to be the primary source of front-line guidance 
for FBOs and contract officers, we think that a close look at their 
contents is especially important as an element of our report. 
 
 As part of our research, we sought copies of standard social 
service contracts from all the states.  Thus far, we have 
successfully located such documents from approximately three-
fourths of them.  Therefore, we do not claim in this section to have 
exhaustively surveyed all relevant sources.  We are missing a 
number of states, many states may have more than one standard 
form contract, depending on the agency and service involved, and 
some of the contracts may have been altered since we began our 
work in early 2002.  Nevertheless, what we have seen suggests a 
pattern that deserves attention. 
 
 The question on which we focused in our examination of 
these contracts is whether they contain any FBO-specific 
provisions.  Do they address questions of the religious character of 
FBOs,  the permissible or impermissible religious content of its 
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service, its obligations to serve without religious coercion or 
discrimination, or its obligations to account separately for secular 
activities (for which government may pay) and religious activities 
(for which government may not pay in directly financed 
programs)?  Do they address the question of employment 
discrimination by FBOs?  Without this sort of guidance, FBOs and 
contracting officers alike may well be wary of entering into these 
contractual relationships.  Alternatively, contractual 
silence on such matters permits ambiguity and 
evasiveness, which may eventually lead FBOs and state 
agencies into legal trouble.94 
 
 Many of these contracts do have employment 
discrimination provisions.  At times, these provisions 
simply require compliance with existing state and 
federal law on the subject, but a number of these 
contracts go beyond that body of law and forbid 
religious discrimination without exempting FBOs.  It is 
no surprise to find a set of provisions on this subject in 
government contracts, and we would venture a guess 
that none of the state contracts have been drafted, or 
recently redrafted, with the concerns of FBOs in mind.  
Instead, provisions of this character generally assert the state or 
local policy with respect to employment discrimination by entities 
that engage in business with government.  These policies may, of 
course, present issues for FBOs, and it is important for contractual 
arrangements to be transparent concerning the relevant rules. 
 
 With respect to other, FBO-specific concerns, however, the 
pattern we have discovered is stark, and suggests a principal cause 
of difficulty and uncertainty for the faith-based initiative.  Very 
few of these contracts have any FBO-specific provisions.  Of the 
thirty-six states whose contract documents we have examined, the 
only such provisions we have found thus far appear in social 
service contracts in Oklahoma, Texas, and Wisconsin.  We have 
set forth in Appendix C the full text of the relevant provisions from 
those three states.  Here, we summarize them: 
 
• Oklahoma - Specifies that FBOs may compete on an equal 
basis with others; protects the religious character and 
appearance of FBOs; prohibits religious discrimination 
against, and religious coercion of, beneficiaries 
                                                 
 94 The McCallum and Foster decisions, discussed in Part IC above, suggest the hazards of nontransparent 
policies of this character.  
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(Department of Human Services, Solicitation for Faith-
Based Intermediary Services, section 6.3.3). 
 
• Texas - This is by far the most elaborate FBO-specific 
provision. It preserves employment discrimination 
exemptions; specifies that FBOs may compete on an equal 
basis with others; protects the religious character and 
appearance of FBOs; suggests segregation of public and 
private funds and limits audits to public funds; disclaims 
state endorsement of religious practices or expression; 
denies that state objectives include “the funding of 
sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization”; requires 
disclosure to “assisted individuals” of their right to be free 
of religious discrimination, and their right to choose a 
different provider if they object to a provider’s religious 
character (Department of Human Services, Contract for 
Community Care Program, Provider Agreement, Section 
H) 
 
• Wisconsin - In a section of its contract with field agencies 
that supervise workforce development services, a provision 
governing subcontracts with FBOs specifies that they may 
compete on an equal basis with others; forbids 
discrimination by the prime contractor against FBOs; 
protects the religious character and appearance of FBOs; 
prohibits religious discrimination against applicants for 
assistance; requires the prime contractor to provide “an 
alternate provider of the same services, worth the same 
value,” to participants who object to the religious character 
of a provider; and requires that FBO subcontractors be held 
to the same fiscal and accounting standards as any other 
provider. (Wisconsin Works and Related Program Contract, 
Department of Workforce Development, Par. 13.5-13.8). 
 
 All three of these states have made a good start, but none 
have provided clear and sufficient guidance on all of the questions 
of greatest concern to FBOs.  Moreover, the remainder of the state 
contracts we have examined say nothing at all about these subjects.  
The FBO-specific questions that such contracts might 
constructively address include: 
 
1. Preserving religious character of the FBO (symbols, icons, 
etc.).  One important feature of charitable choice legislation 
has been explicit recognition that FBOs may maintain their 
physical surroundings and their structure of governance.  It 
is important and worthwhile for contracts to spell out in 
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detail what aspects of religious character are to be left 
undisturbed, as well as to provide general assurances on 
issues of religious character.  It is essential, however, to 
maintain the distinction between the religious character of 
the institution and the religious content of the particular 
service provided under the contract.  While the contract 
may permit FBOs to maintain their religious character and 
setting, the Constitution prohibits FBOs from using public 
funds to provide services that include religious themes and 
messages – unless such services are financed through an 
appropriate voucher system. 
 
2. Selecting beneficiaries – The contract should be clear on 
the distinction between religious discrimination among 
beneficiaries (e.g., only Christians will be served) and 
religious coercion of beneficiaries (the provider will only 
serve those who are willing to participate in the program’s 
religious aspects).  If both discrimination and coercion are 
prohibited, the contract should so specify. 
 
3. Alerting beneficiaries to secular options – Beneficiary 
choice programs must include secular options, and 
Charitable Choice principles (and legislation) typically 
require that such options must be provided in directly 
financed programs as well.  The contract should explicitly 
allocate responsibility between the FBO and the 
government with respect to the obligation to disclose 
secular options and the scope of that disclosure.  
Ordinarily, the contract should oblige FBOs to inform 
clients of the existence of secular options, and should 
oblige the government agency to provide the details of 
those options and to warrant their adequacy. 
 
4. Specifying with particularity the religious activities for 
which the state is constitutionally forbidden to pay.  This is 
the most important FBO-specific provision in any contract 
for direct financing.  Such a provision must start with the 
basic prohibitions in the Charitable Choice legislation, 
which are that government money may not be spent on 
religious instruction, worship, or proselytizing.95  In a 
                                                 
 95 The standard contract prepared by the Texas Department of Human Services includes the following 
provision: “The purpose of this contract is the provision of social services; no State expenditures have as their 
objective the funding of sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization.”  By focusing on purposes and objectives, 
rather than the specific services provided, this provision inadequately states the appropriate Establishment Clause 
limitation on direct expenditure of government funds.  The constitutionality of such an expenditure is measured not 
only by its “secular purpose,” but is measured as well by the secularity of the means employed to deliver the 
government-financed service. 
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direct financing program, those restrictions are required by 
the Constitution, whether or not statutes or regulations also 
require them.  But, taken alone, those prohibitions do not 
exhaust the constitutional restrictions and so do not provide 
sufficient guidance.  A provision appropriate to this task is 
the most difficult one to draft; in order to facilitate the work 
of FBOs, such a provision must be exquisitely precise and 
restrict neither too little nor too much religiously inspired 
activity. 
 
Addressing this subject with sensitivity and good judgment 
is especially important in programs with goals that include 
personal transformation of beneficiaries.  In such programs, 
exemplified by those aimed at substance dependency and 
abuse, separating spiritual and secular components may be 
very difficult, or may undermine the coherence of program 
design.  Nevertheless, programs of this character are the 
most vulnerable to constitutional challenge if government 
is directly financing their therapeutic activities.96 
 
In the Model Provision in Appendix C, we have suggested 
one way – by no means the only correct way – of drafting a 
provision of this character.  The line between secular 
content and religious content can be a hard one to draw, but 
the viability of the faith-based initiative depends upon 
drawing it.  We are confident that attempts to do so, 
coupled with good faith compliance with those attempts, 
will go a tremendous distance toward eliminating 
constitutional challenges to social service programs by 
FBOs, and to defeating any such challenges when they 
arise. 
 
5. Segregating private support for religious activity from 
public support for secular service, and accounting properly 
for these segregated activities.  The concern described 
above in Paragraph 4 relates closely to issues of 
accountability, monitoring, and entanglement.  FBOs may 
continue to engage in religious activities with private 
support, but these activities must be financially segregated 
from the secular activities financed by government.97  
Government must monitor this segregation, but must do so 
                                                 
 96 For the reasons suggested in text, we strongly recommend that programs of this character be constructed 
as beneficiary choice programs.  The results in McCallum I and II, described in Part I above, strongly support this 
suggestion.   
 97 Physical segregation of government-financed activities from privately-supported religious activities is a 
salutary practice, but not a general constitutional requirement. 
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in ways that limit intrusion of government agents in 
sensitive judgments on the border between the religious and 
the secular.  This represents a complex undertaking, but 
here too a basic framework of mutual understanding is a 
necessary first step.  We have tried in the Model Provision 
in Appendix C to address the administrative and 
constitutional concerns raised by the state’s obligation to 
monitor its expenditures, but there are many ways of 
approaching this problem.  We welcome suggestions from 
those experienced in the field.
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APPENDIX A 
 
State Constitutional Provisions 
 
This appendix compiles the non-establishment provisions in each of the fifty state 
constitutions.  We have included the text of all constitutional provisions relating to the 
establishment of religion and the funding of religiously affiliated organizations.  Following each 
state’s provisions, we ask and answer the four questions noted below, and offer general 
comments. The comments contain a brief explanation of how the state attorneys general and high 
courts have interpreted their relevant constitutional provisions.  Citations for the cases or 
opinions mentioned are listed below each comment in the order in which they are discussed.  
These comments and associated citations are intended to be representative rather than 
exhaustive. 
 
Following are the four questions this appendix asks of each state’s constitutional 
provisions.  The table on the following page summarizes the answers to these questions with 
gray shading indicating positive responses. 
 
  
1) Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
• These clauses tend be very similar in both language and application to the 
Federal Constitution. 
• Ten states have a general non-establishment clause. 
 
 
2) Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
• Thirty-seven states have constitutional provisions that forbid expenditures that 
would benefit religiously affiliated organizations.  Some of these are narrowly 
focused on places of worship and ministries. 
 
 
3) Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
• Twenty nine states have provisions restricting appropriations to private 
schools, and/or private schools with religious affiliations. 
• Many of these provisions are the so-called Blaine Amendments. 
 
 
4) In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between 
direct and indirect funding? 
• Ten constitutions contain language that specifically details what sort of 
benefits may be bestowed upon religiously affiliated organizations.  Some 
forbid only direct benefits, while others forbid both direct and indirect 
benefits. 
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 Non-
Establishment 
General - No 
Funding 
Education - No 
Funding 
Direct / Indirect 
Distinction  
ALABAMA       
ALASKA        
ARIZONA       
ARKANSAS     
CALIFORNIA        
COLORADO       
CONNECTICUT     
DELAWARE      
FLORIDA        
GEORGIA       
HAWAII      
IDAHO       
ILLINOIS       
INDIANA      
IOWA      
KANSAS      
KENTUCKY      
LOUISIANA      
MAINE     
MARYLAND      
MASSACHUSETT
S 
     
MICHIGAN        
MINNESOTA       
MISSISSIPPI       
MISSOURI        
MONTANA         
NEBRASKA      
NEVADA      
NEW 
HAMPSHIRE 
     
NEW JERSEY     
NEW MEXICO       
NEW YORK       
NORTH 
CAROLINA 
    
NORTH DAKOTA      
OHIO      
OKLAHOMA       
OREGON      
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PENNSYLVANIA      
RHODE ISLAND     
SOUTH 
CAROLINA 
       
SOUTH DAKOTA       
TENNESSEE     
TEXAS       
UTAH        
VERMONT     
VIRGINIA       
WASHINGTON       
WEST VIRGINIA     
WISCONSIN      
WYOMING       
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ALABAMA 
 
 
Location: Alabama Const., Art. I, § 3  
Text:  That no religion shall be established by law ... nor to pay any tithes, taxes 
or other rate for building or repairing any place of worship, or for 
maintaining any minister or ministry .... 
 
Location: Alabama Const. Art XIV § 263 
Text:  No money raised for the support of the public schools shall be 
appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian or denominational 
school. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
Yes.   
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
Yes. However, it deals exclusively with monies “raised for the support of the schools,” 
rather than just a more general reference to “any funds.” 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
No. 
 
 
COMMENT:   
Alabama is a state likely to be hostile towards an educational voucher program.  
However, they may be more willing to allow funding in other non-educational areas.  The 
State Supreme Court has ruled that the general establishment clause of the Alabama 
Constitution is not to be read as more restrictive then the Federal Constitution.   
  
Opinion of The Justices, 291 Ala. 301, 280 So. 2d 547 (1973). 
 
Alabama Ed. Ass'n v. James, 373 So.2d 1076 (Ala.1979). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
ALASKA 
 
Location: Alaska Const. art. I, § 4   
  
The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 82 
Government Partnerships with Faith-Based Service Providers 
Text:  No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof 
 
Location: Alaska Const. art. XII, § 1   
Title:  Public Education. 
Text:  Schools and institutions so established shall be free from sectarian control. 
No money shall be paid from public funds for the direct benefit of any 
religious or other private educational institution. 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
Yes.   
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
Yes. The Alaska Constitution forbids only the expenditure of monies for the “direct” 
benefit of private schools.   
 
 
COMMENT:   
The Alaska courts would likely be hostile to a educational voucher program.  Notice no 
private school may receive direct benefit from the state, whether or not that school is 
sectarian in nature.  The Alaska Supreme Court has struck down school busing 
provisions, and educational grants for private colleges.  There may be more room for 
maneuvering when it comes to more general funding.  The Court did allow the funding a 
sectarian hospital. 
 
Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961). 
 
Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979). 
 
Lien v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963). 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
ARIZONA 
 
Location: A.R.S. Const. Art. 2, § 12   
Text:  No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise, or instruction 
 
Location: A.R.S. Const. Art. 2, § 12   
Text:  No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any 
church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
Yes. Funding is forbidden to both sectarian and non-sectarian private schools. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
No. 
 
 
COMMENT:   
Several Arizona Supreme Court opinions seem to soften the strong anti-funding language 
of the constitution.  They allowed a tuition tax credit program where funds were paid into 
“tuition organizations” to continue.  They also upheld a program in which sectarian 
organizations were being reimbursed for aid provided to families in need.  The Court held 
that the “true beneficiaries” of the program are the families, not the organizations.  
 
Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 972 P.2d 606 (1999). 
 
Community Council v. Jordan, 102 Ariz. 448, 432 P.2d 460 (Ariz.  1967) 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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ARKANSAS 
 
 
Location: Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 24  
Title:  Religious liberty 
Text:  All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can, of right, be 
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship; or to maintain 
any ministry against his consent. No human authority can, in any case or 
manner whatsoever, control or interfere with the right of conscience; and 
no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment, 
denomination or mode of worship above any other. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
No. 
 
 
COMMENT:  
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
CALIFORNIA 
 
Location: Cal Const, Art I § 4 
Title:  Religion 
Text:  The Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. 
 
Location: Cal Const Art IX § 8. 
Title:  Appropriation for sectarian schools; Instruction in denominational   
   doctrines 
Text:  No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of any 
sectarian or denominational school, or any school not under the exclusive 
control of the officers of the public schools; nor shall any sectarian or 
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denominational doctrine be taught, or instruction thereon be permitted, 
directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools of this State. 
 
Location: Cal Const Art XVI § 5. 
Title:  Public aid for sectarian purposes 
Text:  Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and county, township, school 
district, or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, 
or pay from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any 
religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose, or help to support or 
sustain any school, college, university, hospital, or other institution 
controlled by any religious creed, church, or sectarian denomination 
whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal property or real 
estate ever be made by the state, or any city, city and county, town, or 
other municipal corporation for any religious creed, church, or sectarian 
purpose whatever; provided, that nothing in this section shall prevent the 
Legislature granting aid pursuant to Section 3 of Article XVI.  
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
 
California courts appear to be generally hostile toward the aiding of religious institutions.  
A textbook loan program was held unconstitutional in 1981, and the court rejected the 
child benefit theory.  In an earlier case the Court did uphold a private school 
transportation program.  However, the reasoning in that case relied heavily on the states 
overwhelming interest in the safety of the children.   
 
Bowker v. Baker,  73 Cal.App.2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946). 
 
California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300, 632 P.2d 953 (1981). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
  
The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 86 
Government Partnerships with Faith-Based Service Providers 
 
 
COLORADO 
 
 
Location: Colo. Const. Art. V, Section 34   
Title:  Appropriations to private institutions forbidden 
Text:  No appropriation shall be made for charitable, industrial, educational or 
benevolent purposes to any person, corporation or community not under 
the absolute control of the state, nor to any denominational or sectarian 
institution or association. 
 
Location: Colo. Const. Art. IX, Section 7   
Title:  Aid to private schools, churches, sectarian purpose, forbidden   
Text:  Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school 
district or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation, or 
pay from any public fund or moneys whatever, anything in aid of any 
church or sectarian society, or for any sectarian purpose, or to help support 
or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university or other 
literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian 
denomination whatsoever; nor shall any grant or donation of land, money 
or other personal property, ever be made by the state, or any such public 
corporation to any church, or for any sectarian purpose. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
 
The Colorado Supreme court has ruled that a student incentive grant program did not 
violate the state Constitution.  They refused to invalidate the program unless a substantial 
portion of the functions of the institution are subsumed in the religious mission, or the aid 
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funds a specifically religious activity.  The Court has also ruled that the general no-
funding provision does not apply to municipalities. 
 
Americans United for Separation of Church State Fund, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 
1982). 
 
Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar,  533 P.2d 1129, 188 Colo. 216 (Colo. 1975) 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
CONNECTICUT 
 
 
Location: Conn. Const. Art. VII 
Title:  (No legal compulsion to join or support church. No preference in religion. 
Equal rights of all religious denominations.)   
Text:  … no person shall by law be compelled to join or support, nor be classed 
or associated with, any congregation, church or religious association. No 
preference shall be given by law to any religious society or denomination 
in the state. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No.  
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Connecticut Constitution contains no specific anti-funding language.  Additionally 
the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that busing students to private schools would not 
violate the Constitution as long as the funds do not come directly from the school fund.   
 
Snyder v. Newtown, 161 A.2d 770, 147 Conn. 374 (1960) 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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DELAWARE 
 
 
Location: Del. Const. art I, § 1  
Title:  Freedom of religion  
Text:  ... yet no person shall or ought to be compelled to attend any religious 
worship, to contribute to the erection or support of any place of worship, 
or to the maintenance of any ministry,  
 
Location: Del. Const. art X, § 3 (2001)  
Title:    
Text:  No portion of any fund now existing, or which may hereafter be 
appropriated, or raised by tax, for educational purposes, shall be 
appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of any sectarian, church or 
denominational school; provided, that all real or personal property used 
for school purposes, where the tuition is free, shall be exempt from 
taxation and assessment for public purposes. 
 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Delaware courts may be hostile to appropriations in an educational setting.  In 1934 
the Delaware court held that transportation of private school students would violate the 
state’s constitution.  
 
 
State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 A. 835 (1934). 
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FLORIDA 
 
 
Location: Fla. Const., Art. I § 3   
Title:  Religious freedom.   
Text:  There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or 
prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof. 
 
Location: Fla. Const., Art. I § 3  
Title:  Religious freedom.  
Text:  No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall 
ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any 
church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian 
institution. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 Yes.   
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Florida Supreme Court has stated that indirect aid to religious organizations may be 
permissible under some circumstances.  If the state action is to promote the general 
welfare of society, apart from any religious considerations, then it may be valid even 
though religious interests are indirectly benefited.  However, one of Florida’s lower 
courts has recently ruled against the State’s school voucher program. 
 
Nohrr v. Brevard County Educational Facilities Authority, 247 So.2d 304 (1971). 
 
Holmes v. Bush, Second Judicial Circuit, Leon Cty, Florida, No. CV 99-3370, Aug. 5, 2002.  
(holding that  this section prohibits implementation of a school voucher program in which 
sectarian schools are a majority of participating  private schools.)  
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GEORGIA 
 
 
Location: Ga. Const. Art. I, § II, Para. VII   
Title:  Religious opinions; freedom of religion  
Text:  No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or 
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or religious denomination or of 
any sectarian institution. 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 Yes.   
 
 
COMMENT: 
 
In 1922 the Georgia Supreme Court relied on this provision to strike down a program that 
reimbursed the Salvation Army for services rendered.  Several Attorney General 
Opinions also support the view that Georgia would be quite hostile to any form of state 
funding for religious organizations. 
 
Bennett v. City of La Grange, 112 S.E. 482 (Ga.1922) 
 
1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-136 (State funding of the YMCA likely to violate the constitution). 
 
1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 222 (Public transportation to private schools would violate the 
constitution). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
  
 The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 91
State of the Law
 
 
HAWAII 
 
Location: HRS Const. Art. I, § 4   
Title:   
Text:  No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of religion … 
 
Location: HRS Const. Art. X, § 1   
Title:   
Text:  ... nor shall public funds be appropriated for the support or benefit of any 
sectarian or private educational institution... 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
 
The Hawaii Supreme court has stated that, at least when it comes to establishment clause 
jurisprudence, the Hawaii Constitution has not been interpreted differently from then the 
Federal Constitution.  With regards to the education specific provision however, the 
Hawaii courts have been restrictive, ruling that transportation of students to private 
schools would violate the Hawaii Constitution. 
 
 
Cammack v. Waihee, 673 F. Supp. 1524 (Haw. 1987). 
 
Spears v. Honda, 51 Haw. 1, 449 P.2d 130 (1968). 
  
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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IDAHO 
 
Location: Idaho Const. Art. 9 § 5  
Title:  Education and School Lands 
Text:  Neither the legislature nor any county, city, town, township, school 
district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation,  or 
pay from any public fund or moneys whatever, anything in aid of any 
church or sectarian or religious society, or for any sectarian or religious 
purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, 
college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by 
any church, sectarian or religious denomination whatsoever; nor shall any 
grant or donation of land, money or other personal property ever be made 
by the state, or any such public corporation, to any church or for any 
sectarian or religious purpose 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
Yes. Both the general and education specific clauses are incorporated into the same 
section of the constitution. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
Idaho’s Supreme Court appears to strictly apply this section.  They have held that busing 
of students to private schools, tax credit funding of private schools, and the financing of a 
religious hospital all violate the Idaho State Constitution.  
 
 
Board of County Comm'rs v. Idaho Health Facilities Auth., 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 (1974). 
   
Epeldi v. Engelking, 94 Idaho 390, 488 P.2d 860 (1971). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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ILLINOIS 
 
 
Location: Illinois Const., Art. 10, § 3   
Title:  Public Funds for Sectarian Purposes Forbidden 
Text:  Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town, township, 
school district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any 
appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of 
any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, 
academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific 
institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; 
nor shall any grant or donation of land, money, or other personal property 
ever be made by the State, or any such public corporation, to any church, 
or for any sectarian purpose. 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Illinois Constitution has a single provision encompassing both general and 
education-specific prohibitions.  The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that this provision 
is no broader then the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  In 1973 the 
Illinois high court upheld a program that provided for the transportation of students to 
private schools at the public expense. 
 
Constitution of the United States. People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 56 Ill. 2d 1, 305 N.E.2d 129 
(1973). 
 
Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737 (1973). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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INDIANA 
 
 
Location: Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 4,6   
Title:  No preference to any creed  
Text:  Section 4. No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious 
society, or mode of worship; and no person shall be compelled to attend, 
erect, or support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, 
against his consent.  
 
Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the benefit of 
any religious or theological institution.  
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
Indiana is another state with very little case law on point.  Several Attorney General 
Opinions’ may still be helpful. 
 
Atty. Gen. Opn. 1934, p. 356.  (Division of Public Health may not contribute drugs to privately-
owned charitable institutions for treatment of certain infectious diseases without violating this 
provision.) 
 
Atty. Gen. Opn. 1967, No. 3, p. 9.  (The furnishing of free bus transportation of children to and 
from parochial schools on the same basis as that furnished children attending public schools does 
not violate this provision, any benefit to the sponsoring religious organization being incidental to 
the protection and education of the children.) 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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IOWA 
 
Location: Iowa Const., Art. I § 3  
Title:  Religion.  
Text:  The general assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall any person be 
compelled to attend any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates 
for building or repairing places of worship, or the maintenance of any 
minister, or ministry.  
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
There is little in the Iowa State Constitution would act as a barrier to “charitable choice” 
type legislation.  Iowa does have a general establishment clause, but there is no case law 
pertaining to this subject matter. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
KANSAS 
 
Location: Kan. Const. B. OF R. § 7   
Title:  Religious liberty; property qualification for public office.  
Text:  The right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience shall 
never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend or support 
any form of worship … nor any preference be given by law to any 
religious establishment or mode of worship…. 
 
Location: Kan. Const. Sec. 6 Art. 6 
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Title:  Finance. 
Text:  No religious sect or sects shall control any part of the public educational  
   funds. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
There is little to no case law on this topic in Kansas jurisprudence.  The Constitution does 
not contain a general no-funding provision and the education specific clause is worded 
differently then most other states.  Only funds that are part of the “public education 
funds” are proscribed from use by religiously affiliated groups.  
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
KENTUCKY 
 
 
Location: Ky. Const. § 5 189 
Title:  Right of religious freedom  
Text:  School money not to be used for church, sectarian, or denominational 
school. 
No portion of any fund or tax now existing, or that may hereafter be raised 
or levied for educational purposes, shall be appropriated to, or used by, or 
in aid of, any church, sectarian or denominational school.  
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
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Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Kentucky Constitution does not have any general anti-funding language.  However, 
Kentucky Courts appear to strictly enforce the educational no-funding provision.  The 
Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that both textbook loan and student transportation 
programs violate the State Constitution. 
 
Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983). 
 
Sherrard v. Jefferson, 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (1942). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
LOUISIANA 
 
 
Location: La. Const. Art. I, § 8  
Title:  Freedom of Religion  
Text:  No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.  
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
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In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
Until 1974 Louisiana’s Constitution had a provision barring both direct and indirect aid 
to sectarian organizations.  That provision was eliminated and now only the general non-
establishment clause could pose a barrier.  There has been no case law on the subject 
since the Constitutional change. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
MAINE 
 
 
Location:   M.R.S. Const. Art. 1, § 3  
Title:  Religious freedom; sects equal; religious tests prohibited; religious 
teachers  
Text:  ... and no subordination nor preference of any one sect or denomination to 
another shall ever be established by law 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The constitution of the State of Maine contains no provision that would act as a barrier to 
“charitable choice” type legislation. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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MARYLAND 
   
 
Location:   Md. Dec. of R. art. 36 
Title:  Religious freedom 
Text:  ... nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or 
contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any 
ministry; 
  
Nothing in this article shall constitute an establishment of religion.  
  
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has upheld student transportation programs, as well as 
state aid to private religious universities. 
 
Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 A. 628 (1938). 
 
Horace Mann League of United States of Am., Inc. v. Board of Pub. Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 
A.2d 51 (1966). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
MASSACHUSETTS 
 
 
Location: Mass. Const. Ann. Amend. Art. XVIII 
Title  Expenditure of Public Money for Certain Institutions Prohibited.  
Text:  No grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of 
credit shall be made or authorized by the Commonwealth or any political 
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subdivision thereof for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any 
infirmary, hospital, institution, primary or secondary school, or charitable 
or religious undertaking which is not publicly owned and under the 
exclusive control, order and supervision of public officers or public agents 
authorized by the Commonwealth or federal authority or both ... and no 
such grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of 
public credit shall be made or authorized for the purpose of founding, 
maintaining or aiding any church, religious denomination or society. 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the 
Commonwealth from making grants-in-aid to private higher educational 
institution or to students or parents or guardians of students attending such 
institutions. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
Yes. The Massachusetts provision forbids expenditure on any organization that is not 
under the “exclusive control” of the state, whether or not that institution is 
sectarian in nature.   
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The language of the Massachusetts proscribes all government funding of  private 
organizations regardless of religious affiliation.  The case law does not soften the State’s 
position on the issue.  The Justices of the State Supreme Judicial Court have stated that 
the substantial purpose of the provision was to prevent direct assistance to private or 
sectarian charitable institutions and to preclude expenditure of public funds or 
appropriations for them.  The Court struck down a textbook loan program as violative of 
this section. 
 
Opinion of the Justices 354 Mass 779, 236 NE2d 523 (1968). 
 
Opinion of Justices 357 Mass 846, 259 NE2d 564 (1970). 
 
Bloom v School Committee of Springfield, 379 N.E.2d 578 (Mass. 1978).  
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
MICHIGAN 
 
 
Location: MCLS Const. Art. I, § 4   
Title  Freedom of worship and religious belief; appropriations.  
Text:  ... to contribute to the erection or support of any place of religious 
worship, or to pay tithes, taxes or other rates for the support of any 
minister of the gospel or teacher of religion. No money shall be 
appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious 
sect or society, theological or religious seminary; nor shall property 
belonging to the state be appropriated for any such purpose.  
 
Location: MCLS Const. Art. VIII, § 2 
Title  Free public elementary and secondary schools; discrimination; prohibition 
against use of public monies or property for nonpublic schools; 
transportation of students. 
Text:  No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public 
credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or 
agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, 
denominational or other nonpublic, preelementary, elementary, or 
secondary school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or 
deductions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or 
property shall be provided, directly or indirectly, to support the attendance 
of any student or the employment of any person at any such nonpublic 
school or at any location or institution where instruction is offered in 
whole or in part to such nonpublic school students. The legislature may 
provide for the transportation of students to and from any school. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 Yes.   
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COMMENT: 
The Michigan Constitution contains some of the most restrictive language in any of the 
fifty state constitutions.  The Michigan Supreme Court has held that voucher type 
programs are unconstitutional.  They have also held that providing ancillary services such 
as textbooks and transportation are unconstitutional. 
 
Traverse City Sch. Dist. v. Attorney General, 384 Mich. 390, 185 N.W.2d 9 (1971). 
 
In re Advisory Opinion the Const. of 1974 PA 242, 394 Mich. 41, 228 N.W. 2d. 772 (1975). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
MINNESOTA 
 
 
Location: Minn. Const., Art. I, § 16  
Title:  Freedom of conscience; no preference to be given to any religious 
establishment or mode of worship  
Text:  ... or any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or 
mode of worship ... nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for 
the benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.  
 
 
Location: Minn. Const., Art. XIII, § 2 
Title:  Prohibition as to aiding sectarian school  
Text:  In no case shall any public money or property be appropriated or used for 
the support of schools wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of 
any particular Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or taught.  
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
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COMMENT: 
In Minnesota most of the case law in this area, like many other states, is focused on 
education.  Minnesota courts upheld a student busing provision in 1970, but stated that 
the decision represented the outer limits of constitutionality in the State.  The State 
Supreme Court struck down a tax credit provision that allowed parents to send their 
children to non-public schools. In that case, however, they relied solely on the Federal 
Constitution. 
 
Americans United Inc. As Protestants, etc. v. Ind. School Dist., 288 Minn. 196, 179 N.W.2d 155 
(1970). 
 
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, 302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344 (1974). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
MISSISSIPPI 
 
 
Location: Miss. Const. Ann. Art. 3, § 18   
Title:  Freedom of religion  
Text:  ... and no preference shall be given by law to any religious sect or mode of 
worship; but the free enjoyment of all religious sentiments and the 
different modes of worship shall be held sacred. 
 
Location: Miss. Const. Ann. Art. 4, § 66   
Title:  Law granting donation or gratuity 
Text:  No law granting a donation or gratuity in favor of any person or object 
shall be enacted except by the concurrence of two-thirds of the members 
elect of each branch of the legislature, nor by any vote for a sectarian 
purpose or use.  
 
Location: Miss. Const. Ann. Art. 8, § 208   
Title:  Control of funds by religious sect; certain appropriations prohibited 
Text:  No religious or other sect or sects shall ever control any part of the school 
or other educational funds of this state; nor shall any funds be appropriated 
toward the support of any sectarian school, or to any school that at the 
time of receiving such appropriation is not conducted as a free school. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
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Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has upheld a textbook loan program.  It held that the 
program did not constitute a direct or indirect aid to the respective schools which the 
pupils attended.  The reasoning in the case, which interpreted Mississippi’s general no-
funding provision, would seem to indicate that Mississippi may be more open to 
“charitable choice” type programs then a literal reading of the constitution may otherwise 
indicate. 
 
Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Rating & Purchasing Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 
(1941). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
MISSOURI 
 
 
Location: Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 7   
Title:  Public aid for religious purposes--preferences and discriminations on 
religious grounds 
Text:  That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or 
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid 
of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no 
preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any 
church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship. 
 
Location: Mo. Const. Art. 9, § 8   
Title:  Prohibition of public aid for religious purposes and institutions 
Text:  Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school 
district or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation or 
pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed, 
church or sectarian purpose, or to help to support or sustain any private or 
public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution 
of learning controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian 
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denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal 
property or real estate ever be made by the state, or any county, city, town, 
or other municipal corporation, for any religious creed, church, or 
sectarian purpose whatever. 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
Yes. The general “no funding” provision forbids both direct and indirect aid to 
religious organizations.  The education specific provision makes no such 
distinction. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
There is no case law in Missouri focused on the general no-funding provision.  The cases 
dealing with the education specific clause tend to be fairly restrictive in their enforcement 
of the provision.  The Missouri Supreme Court has held that textbook loan programs and 
student transportation programs violate the section.  
 
McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953). 
 
Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
MONTANA 
 
 
Location: Mont. Const., Art. II § 5 (2001)  
Title:  Freedom of religion. 
Text:  The state shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 
 
Location: Mont. Const., Art. X § 6 
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Title:  Aid prohibited to sectarian schools.  
Text:  The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public 
corporations shall not make any direct or indirect appropriation or 
payment from any public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other 
property for any sectarian purpose or to aid any church, school, academy, 
seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, 
controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination. 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
Yes. Both “no-funding” provisions are included within the same section.  The 
provision forbids direct and indirect funding for both educational and other 
purposes. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Montana Supreme Court has held that payment of public funds to persons providing 
medical, hospitalization, and foster home care to indigents who have sought or received 
assistance from private rather than public adoptive agencies does not violate the State 
Constitution. 
 
Welfare Bd. v. Lutheran Social Serv., 156 M 381, 480 P2d 181 (1971).  
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
NEBRASKA 
 
 
Location: Ne. Const. Art. 7, § 11   
Title:  Appropriation of public funds 
Text:  Notwithstanding any other provision in the Constitution, appropriation of 
public funds shall not be made to any school or institution of learning not 
owned or exclusively controlled by the state or a political subdivision 
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thereof; Provided, that the Legislature may provide that the state or any 
political subdivision thereof may contract with institutions not wholly 
owned or controlled by the state or any political subdivision to provide for 
educational or other services for the benefit of children under the age of 
twenty-one years who are handicapped, as that term is from time to time 
defined by the Legislature, if such services are nonsectarian in nature 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
Yes. The Nebraska Constitution forbids any appropriation of public funds to private 
schools, regardless of there religious affiliation.  
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Nebraska Constitution contains no general anti-funding language, but the State 
courts appear to strictly enforce the education provision.  The Court has ruled that text 
book loan programs violate the State Constitution.  The Attorney General of Nebraska 
has recently opined that grants, even competitive grants, to private religiously affiliated 
schools would violate the State Constitution. 
 
Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 220 N.W.2d 550 (1974). 
 
1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 18. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
NEVADA 
 
 
Location: Nev. Const. art. 11, § 10   
Title:  No public money to be used for sectarian purposes 
Text:  No public funds of any kind or character whatever, State, County or 
Municipal, shall be used for sectarian purpose. 
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Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
There is no recent case law on the Nevada no-funding provision.  The Nevada Attorney 
General, in a sixty year old opinion, stated that monies could be granted to a sectarian 
hospital for crippled children so long as no religious instruction occurred.  In a slightly 
more recent opinion the Nevada AG opined that private school students could not attend 
classes at public schools without violating this provision.   
 
AGO B-40 (2-11-1941).  
 
AGO 278 (11-15-1965). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
 
 
Location: RSA Const. Pt. 2, Art. 83  
Title:  [Encouragement of Literature, etc.; Control of Corporations, Monopolies,  
   etc] 
Text:  Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by taxation shall ever be 
granted or applied for the use of the schools or institutions of any religious 
sect or denomination. 
 
 
Location: RSA Const. Pt. 1, Art. 5   
Title:  Religious Freedom Recognized 
Text:  Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject 
shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for 
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worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates 
of his own conscience; or for his religious profession, sentiments, or 
persuasion; provided he doth not disturb the public peace or disturb others 
in their religious worship. 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The New Hampshire Constitution does not have a general no-funding provision, and 
there is little to no case law on the education specific provision.  A recent opinion 
statement by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire approves as constitutional a program 
which allows school districts to pay a portion of private school tuition so long as 
adequate safeguards are in place to insure that the monies do not directly benefit any 
religious activities. 
 
Opinion of the Justices, 136 N.H. 357, 616 A.2d 478 (1992). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
NEW JERSEY 
 
 
Location: N.J. Const., Art. 1, Para. 3 
Title:  
Text:  … nor shall any person be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for 
building or repairing any church or churches, place or places of worship, 
or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he 
believes to be right or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform.  
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Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
 
 
Everson v. Board of Education, 133 N.J.L. 350 (1945). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
NEW MEXICO 
 
 
Location: N.M. Const. art. XII, § 3   
Title: 
Text:  The schools, colleges, universities and other educational institutions 
provided for by this constitution shall forever remain under the exclusive 
control of the state, and no part of the proceeds arising from the sale or 
disposal of any lands granted to the state by congress, or any other funds 
appropriated, levied or collected for educational purposes, shall be used 
for the support of any sectarian, denominational or private school, college 
or university.  
 
Location: N.M. Const. art. IX, § 14  (2001)  
Title:   Aid to private enterprise 
Text:  Neither the state nor any county, school district or municipality, except as 
otherwise provided in this constitution, shall directly or indirectly lend or 
pledge its credit or make any donation to or in aid of any person, 
association or public or private corporation or in aid of any private 
enterprise for the construction of any railroad 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
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Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
No. However, The New Mexico Constitution does forbid aid to any “private” 
organization, regardless of religious affiliation. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 Yes. Both direct and indirect funding of any private entity are forbidden. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
There is not an abundance of case law in this area of New Mexico law.  The Attorney 
General has written several opinions that seem to indicate that New Mexico may be more 
open to government / religious organization partnerships then the plain language of the 
Constitution would otherwise seem to indicate. 
 
1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-7.  (Grants to students to attend private religiously affiliated colleges 
may not violate this provision so long as the grants go to the students rather than to the schools.) 
 
1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-6.  (A school voucher program would benefit the children, not the 
schools, and thus would likely be valid under the New Mexico constitution.) 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
NEW YORK 
 
 
Location: NY CLS Const Art XI, § 3 
Title:    
Text:  Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its property or 
credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used, 
directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or 
inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under 
the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any 
denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but the legislature may provide 
for the transportation of children to and from any school or institution of 
learning. 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
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 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
Yes. The education specific clause forbids expenditures that are directly or indirectly in 
aid of sectarian schools.  
 
 
COMMENT: 
The New York Constitution does not contain any general anti-funding language.  The 
education specific provision does prohibit both direct and indirect aid to religiously 
affiliated schools.  The New York Supreme Court has upheld a textbook loan program as 
not violating this provision.  However, in another case the Court held that a loan program 
that involved other school equipment did violate this section. 
 
Board of Education v Allen, 228 N.E.2d 791 (New York 1967). 
 
Meek v Pittenger, 421 US 349, 44 L Ed 2d 217, 95 S Ct 1753 (1975). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
NORTH CAROLINA 
 
Location:  N.C. Const. art. I, § 13   
Title:   Religious liberty 
Text:  All persons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no human authority 
shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of 
conscience. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
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Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
North Carolina’s constitution does not have any language that would appear to bar 
funding to sectarian organizations. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
NORTH DAKOTA 
 
 
Location: N.D. Const. Art. 8, § 5 
Title: 
Text:  No money raised for the support of the public schools of the state shall be 
appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school.  
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
There is no relevant case law in North Dakota on this issue.  The education specific 
provision only places restrictions on funds that are “raised for the support of public 
schools.” 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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OHIO 
 
Location: OH Const I § 7  
Title:     
Text:  No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of 
worship, or maintain any form of worship, against his consent; and no 
preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any 
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted. 
 
Location: OH Const VI § 2  
Title:   School funds.  
Text:  The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or 
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will 
secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the 
state; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive 
right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.  
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes.  
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Ohio Supreme Court has very recently ruled that a school choice program did not 
violate the education no-funding provision of the Ohio Constitution.  The Court has also 
allowed transportation of students to private schools and textbook loan programs.  The 
Court upheld State construction of a hospital to be run by a sectarian organization, so 
long as patients of all religions are admitted.  
 
Simmons-Harris et al. v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999). 
 
Lazarus v. Board of Commissioners, 217 NE2d 883 (Ohio 1966). 
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Honohan v. Holt, 244 NE2d 537 (Ohio 1968).   
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
OKLAHOMA 
 
 
Location: Okl. Const. Art. I, § 5 
Title:  Public schools 
Text:  Provisions shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of a 
system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the 
state and free from sectarian control; and said schools shall always be 
conducted in English: Provided, that nothing herein shall preclude the 
teaching of other languages in said public schools.  
 
Location: Okl. Const. Art. II, § 5   
Title:  Public money or property--Use for sectarian purposes 
Text:  No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, 
or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, 
church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or 
support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or 
dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.  
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 Yes. Both direct and indirect aid is forbidden. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court is fairly restrictive in its enforcement of these provisions.  
They have held that the State is not permitted to give State funds to the YMCA/YWCA 
due to their religious affiliation.  They have also held that transporting students to private 
schools would be in violation of this section. 
  
The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 116 
Government Partnerships with Faith-Based Service Providers 
 
Gurney et al. v. Ferguson, 190 Okl. 254, 122 P.2d 1002. 
 
Connell v. Gray, 33 Okl. 591, 127 P. 417. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
OREGON 
 
 
Location: Ore. Const. Art. I, § 5   
Title:  No money to be appropriated for religion  
Text:  No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any 
religeous (sic), or theological institution, nor shall any money be 
appropriated for the payment of any religeous (sic) services in either house 
of the Legislative Assembly 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Oregon Constitution does have a general no-funding provision.  However, there is 
little case law to illuminate the Constitution’s language.  The Oregon Supreme Court did 
strike down a textbook loan program as violative of this provision. 
 
Dickman v. Sch. Dist. 62C, 232 Or. 238, 366 P2d 533 (1961). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
PENNSYLVANIA 
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Location: Pa. Const. Art. 3, § 15 
Title:  Public school money not available to sectarian schools 
Text:  No money raised for the support of the public schools of the 
Commonwealth shall be appropriated to or used for the support of any 
sectarian school.  
 
Location: Pa. Const. Art. 3, § 29 
Title:  Appropriations for public assistance 
Text:  No appropriation shall be made for charitable, educational or benevolent 
purposes to any person or community nor to any denominational and 
sectarian institution, corporation or association: Provided, That 
appropriations may be made for pensions or gratuities for military service 
and to blind persons twenty-one years of age and upwards and for 
assistance to mothers having dependent children and to aged persons 
without adequate means of support and in the form of scholarship grants 
or loans for higher educational purposes to residents of the 
Commonwealth enrolled in institutions of higher learning except that no 
scholarship, grants or loans for higher educational purposes shall be given 
to persons enrolled in a theological seminary or school of theology.  
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that funds appropriated to an institution for the 
support, care, and maintenance of delinquent, neglected, or dependent children placed in 
sectarian or denominational homes did not violate the State Constitution.  The Court has 
also held that transportation of students to private sectarian schools is not in violation of 
these sections. 
 
Schade v. Allegheny County Institution District, 126 A.2d 911 (Penn. 1956). 
 
Rhoades v. Abington Township School District, 226 A.2d 53 (Penn. 1967). 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
RHODE ISLAND 
 
Location: R.I. Const. Art. I, § 3   
Title:  Freedom of religion  
Text:  ... we, therefore, declare that no person shall be compelled to frequent or 
to support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatever 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has ruled that the state constitution should not be read 
as more restrictive then the federal Constitution on this issue.   
 
Bowerman v. O'Connor, 247 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1968). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
 
Location: S.C. Const. Ann. Art. I, § 2 
Title:  Religious freedom 
Text:  The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof... 
 
 
Location: S.C. Const. Ann. Art. XI, § 4  
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Title:  Direct aid to religious or other private educational institutions prohibited. 
Text:  No money shall be paid from public funds nor shall the credit of the State 
or any of its political subdivisions be used for the direct benefit of any 
religious or other private educational institution. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
Yes. Only funds that are used for the direct benefit of sectarian, or other private 
schools, are forbidden. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The South Carolina Supreme Court has shown some flexibility in its application of these 
provisions.  It has upheld a tuition assistance program that allowed students to attend 
private colleges which are religiously affiliated.  It has also upheld grant funding to 
religiously affiliated hospitals. 
 
Durham v. McLeod, 259 S.C. 409, 192 S.E.2d 202 (S.C. 1972). 
 
Gilbert v. Bath, 267 S.C. 171, 227 S.E.2d 177 (S.C. 1976). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
 
Location: S.D. Const. Article VI, § 3   
Title:  Freedom of religion -- Support of religion prohibited  
Text:  No person shall be compelled to attend or support any ministry or place of 
worship against his consent nor shall any preference be given by law to 
any religious establishment or mode of worship. No money or property of 
the state shall be given or appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or 
religious society or institution. 
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Location: S.D. Const. Article VIII, § 16 
Title:  Public support of sectarian instruction prohibited 
Text:  No appropriation of lands, money or other property or credits to aid any 
sectarian school shall ever be made by the state, or any county or 
municipality within the state, nor shall the state or any county or 
municipality within the state accept any grant, conveyance, gift or bequest 
of lands, money or other property to be used for sectarian purposes, and no 
sectarian instruction shall be allowed in any school or institution aided or 
supported by the state. 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The South Dakota Supreme Court appears to strictly enforce these constitutional 
provisions.  They have held that textbook loan programs violate the State Constitution.  
They have also specifically rejected the “child benefit theory.”  The South Dakota 
constitution will likely present a significant bar to providing funds to religiously affiliated 
institutions. 
 
Elbe v. Yankton Indep. Sch. Dist., 372 NW 2d 113 (1985). 
 
McDonald v. School Board of Yankton Independent School Dist., 90 SD 599, 246 NW 2d 93 
(1976). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
TENNESSEE 
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Location: Tenn. Const. art. I, § 3   
Title:  Freedom of worship  
Text:  ... that no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any 
place of worship, or to maintain any minister against his consent;  
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that the Tennessee constitution is no broader 
than the First Amendment to the Federal constitution on this issue. 
 
Fort Sanders Presbyterian hosp. v. Health & Educ. Facilities Bd., 224 Tenn. 240, 254, 453 
S.W.2d 771, 777 (1970).  
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
TEXAS 
 
 
Location: Tex. Const. Art. I § 6  
Title:  Freedom of worship  
Text:  ... No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of 
worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent  
 
Location: Tex. Const. Art. I § 7 
Title:  Appropriations for sectarian purposes 
Text:  No money shall be appropriated, or drawn from the Treasury for the 
benefit of any sect, or religious society, theological or religious seminary; 
nor shall property belonging to the State be appropriated for any such 
purposes. 
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Location: Tex. Const. Art. VII § 5 
Title:  Permanent school fund; available school fund; use of funds 
Text:  ... nor shall the same, or any part thereof ever be appropriated to or used 
for the support of any sectarian school… 
 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
There is no case law on point in Texas.  Several Attorney General Opinions’ may be 
illustrative, even if contradictory. 
 
Op.Atty.Gen.1946, No. 0-7128.  (The State may not transport students to private schools without 
running afoul of this provision.) 
 
Op.Atty.Gen. 1940, No. 0-2412.  (A state run rehabilitation program may not pay the tuition of 
participants who chose to attend classes at sectarian institutions.) 
 
Op.Atty.Gen. 1971, No. M-861.  (Tuition grants for college students attending private sectarian 
colleges do not violate the Texas Constitution.)   
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
UTAH 
 
 
Location: Utah Const. Art. I, § 4 
Title:  Religious liberty 
Text:  The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
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Location: Utah Const. Art. I, § 4 
Title:  Religious liberty 
Text:  No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any 
ecclesiastical establishment. 
 
Location: Utah Const. Art. X, § 9 
Title:  Public aid to church schools forbidden. 
Text:  Neither the state of Utah nor its political subdivisions may make any 
appropriation for the direct support of any school or educational institution 
controlled by any religious organization. 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Utah Constitution has strong no-funding language, both general and education 
specific.  However, the Utah Supreme Court has recently softened the bite of these two 
provisions.  In 1973 the Court upheld a grant program which helped to build a religiously 
affiliated  hospital.  In 1993 the Court held that funds that indirectly benefited a religious 
organization are permissible so long as the money or property is equally available to all. 
 
Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). 
 
Manning v. Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d 305, 517 P.2d 549 (1973). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
VERMONT 
 
Location: V.S.A. Const. Art. 3   
Title: 
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Text:  .... or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any minister, 
contrary to the dictates of conscience 
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No.  
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Supreme Court of Vermont has construed the “dictates of conscience” clause to 
invalidate a beneficiary choice program under which students in rural areas were free to 
attend religious schools at state expense.  Chittenden Town School District v. Vermont 
Dept. of Education, 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
VIRGINIA 
 
 
Location: Va. Const. Art. I, § 16   
Title:  Free exercise of religion; no establishment of religion  
Text:  No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, 
place, or ministry whatsoever ... or the people of any district within this 
Commonwealth, to levy on themselves or others, any tax for the erection 
or repair of any house of public worship, or for the support of any church 
or ministry 
 
Location: Va. Const. Art. IV, § 16   
Title:  Appropriations to religious or charitable bodies 
Text:  The General Assembly shall not make any appropriation of public funds, 
personal property, or real estate to any church or sectarian society, or any 
association or institution of any kind whatever which is entirely or partly, 
directly or indirectly, controlled by any church or sectarian society. Nor 
shall the General Assembly make any like appropriation to any charitable 
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institution which is not owned or controlled by the Commonwealth; the 
General Assembly may, however, make appropriations to nonsectarian 
institutions for the reform of youthful criminals and may also authorize 
counties, cities, or towns to make such appropriations to any charitable 
institution or association.  
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
An older Virginia Supreme Court case indicates that payment of tuition and other 
expenses for children attending sectarian school violates the State Constitution.  In a 
recent opinion, however, the Attorney General has opined that a program granting funds 
to groups offering enhanced faith-based services to the state’s prison inmates would not 
violate the constitution. 
 
Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955). 
 
2002 Op.Atty.Gen., January 29, 2002. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
WASHINGTON 
 
Location: Wash. Const., Art. I, § 11 
Title:  Religious freedom  
Text:  No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious 
establishment:  
 
Location: Wash. Const., Art. IX, § 4 
Title:  Sectarian control or influence prohibited 
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Text:  All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds 
shall be forever free from sectarian 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Washington Supreme Court has been fairly restrictive when enforcing these 
provisions, at least when dealing with issues of education.  They have struck down 
student transportation programs and aid to non-public school students.  However, in a 
1998 opinion the Court held that the use of public funds to support the secular purpose of 
drug counseling at a religious institution did not violate the State Constitution. 
 
Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wash.2d 199, 509 P.2d 973 (1973). 
 
Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989). 
 
Saucier v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 954 P.2d 285 (Wash. 1998). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
WEST VIRGINIA 
 
 
Location: W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 15 
Title:  Religious Freedom Guaranteed  
Text:  No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, 
place or ministry whatsoever ... or confer any peculiar privileges or 
advantages on any sect or denomination, or pass any law requiring or 
authorizing any religious society, or the people of any district within this 
State, to levy on themselves, or others, any tax for the erection or repair of 
any house for public worship, or for the support of any church or ministry 
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Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The State Supreme Court has held that denying religious school children transportation 
would violate their rights to free exercise under the both the Federal and State 
Constitutions.  This raises the possibility that other programs in West Virginia which 
exclude religious organizations from participation will be held in violation as well. 
 
State ex rel.Hughes v. Board of Ed. of Kanawha County, 174 S.E.2d 711, 154 W.Va. 107 (1970). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
WISCONSIN 
 
 
Location: Wis. Const. Art. I, § 18  
Title:  Equality; inherent rights.  
Text:  ... nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place 
of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any 
control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or 
any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes 
of worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit 
of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.  
 
 
Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
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Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 No. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No 
 
 
COMMENT: 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently upheld a school choice funding program 
against all constitutional challenges.  They have also allowed funding of private 
religiously affiliated hospitals.  Wisconsin would likely be open to other “charitable 
choice” type programs. 
 
State ex rel. Wis. Health Fac. Auth. v. Lindner, 91 Wis. 2d 145, 280 N.W.2d 773 (1979). 
 
Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 218 Wis.2d 835 (1998). 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
WYOMING 
 
 
Location: Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 19   
Title:  Appropriations for sectarian or religious societies or institutions prohibited 
Text:  No money of the state shall ever be given or appropriated to any sectarian 
or religious society or institution.  
 
Location: Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 36   
Title:  Prohibited appropriations  
Text:  No appropriation shall be made for charitable, industrial, educational or 
benevolent purposes to any person, corporation or community not under 
the absolute control of the state, nor to any denominational or sectarian 
institution or association.  
 
Location: Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 8   
Title:  Distribution of school funds 
Text:  ... nor shall any portion of any public school fund ever be used to support 
or assist any private school, or any school, academy, seminary, college or 
other institution of learning controlled by any church or sectarian 
organization or religious denomination whatsoever. 
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Does the constitution have a general non-establishment clause? 
 No. 
 
Does the constitution have a “no-funding” clause that prohibits funding of religious 
organizations? 
 Yes. 
 
Does the constitution have an education-specific “no-funding” clause? 
 Yes. Aid to any private school, regardless or religious association, is forbidden. 
 
In its prohibitions on spending, does the constitution make a distinction between direct and 
indirect funding? 
 No. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
 There is little to no case law in Wyoming on this topic. 
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 APPENDIX B 
 
 State-by-State Summary of Religious Exemption Statutes 
 
 ALABAMA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
 http://www.legislature.state.al.us/ALISHome.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Ala. Code §29-4-3 (2002) - the Legislature is not allowed to discriminate on the basis of 
sex, race, creed, or color 
 
Who is covered? 
Only the Legislature is covered by anti-discrimination statute. 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Not applicable - statute covers only the Legislature 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Not applicable - statute covers only the Legislature 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
None found 
 
 
 ALASKA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/folhome.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Alaska Stat. §18.80.220(a) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, religion, color, national origin, age, physical or mental disability, sex, 
marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, or parenthood 
 
Who is covered? 
Alaska Stat. §18.80.300(4) (2001) - any person who employs 1 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Alaska Stat. §18.80.300(4) (2001) - non-profit religious organizations are not included in 
the definition of employer 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
No provision 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
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None found 
 
 
ARIZONA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/ars/ars.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41-1463(B) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, handicap, or national origin 
 
Who is covered? 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41-1461(2) (2001) - anyone who employs 15 or more people for 
20 or more weeks in the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41-1463(F)(1) (2001) - it is not unlawful to discriminate on the 
basis of religion where religion is a bona fide occupational qualification 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41-1463(F)(2) (2001) - it is not unlawful for religiously affiliated 
educational institutions to discriminate on the basis of religion 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41-1462 (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate on the 
basis of religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41-3751 (2001) - exemption is not affected by receipt of 
government funds; religious organization may still discriminate on the basis of religion 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
None found 
 
 Phoenix, AZ 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://livepublish.municode.com/LivePublish/newonlinecodes.asp?infobase=13485 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
Phoenix Code §18-4(2) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or marital status. 
 
Who is covered? 
Phoenix Code §18-3(6) - any person who employs 1 or more people for each working 
day for 20 weeks of the preceding or current calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Phoenix Code §18-4(7)(b) - religiously affiliated schools may discriminate on the basis of 
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religion, so long as the position at issue is one whose purpose is to further the 
propagation of that religion 
Phoenix Code §18-4(8) - prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
or marital status do not apply to bona fide religious organizations; religious organization 
may discriminate on the basis of religion in order to promote its religious principles 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city  government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
ARKANSAS 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.state.ar.us/government.php 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Ark. Code Ann. §16-123-107 (2001) - employers shall not discriminate race, religion, 
national origin, gender, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability 
 
Who is covered? 
Ark. Code Ann. §16-123-102(5) (2001) - any person who employs 9 or more people for 
20 weeks of the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Ark. Code Ann. §16-123-103(a) (2001) - the prohibition on discrimination does not apply 
to religious entities 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 CALIFORNIA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/calaw.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Cal. Gov. Code §12940 (2002) - employers may not discriminate on the basis of race, 
religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, 
medical condition, marital status, sex, or sexual orientation 
Who is covered? 
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Cal. Gov. Code §12940(j)(4)(A) (2002) - any person who employs 5 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Cal. Gov. Code §12926(d) (2002) - the prohibition on discrimination does not apply to 
non-profit religious entities 
Cal. Gov. Code §12926.2(c) (2002) - religiously affiliated health care providers may not 
discriminate, except for positions that involve religious duties 
Cal. Gov. Code §12926.2(f)(1) (2002) - religiously affiliate schools may discriminate on 
any basis 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Cal. Const. Art. XVI §5 - the state may not give money to religious organizations 
Cal. Gov. Code §12990(c) (2002) - every contract must include a clause prohibiting 
discrimination by the contractor or any subcontractor 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes??? 
 • Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation, 27 Cal. 4th 1097 (2002) - religiously affiliated 
hospital fired employee for objectionable religious speech; hospital claimed statutory 
exemption for religious entity. Employee argued that such an exemption violated the 
public policy banning discrimination.  The court allowed the hospital to fire the 
employee, saying that the hospital fit under exemption, that public policy was not 
offended, and that religious entities must have the latitude to define their own religious 
goals 
 • Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 22 Cal. 4th 1108 (2000) - employee of religiously 
affiliated hospital sued alleging impermissible age discrimination and claiming violation 
of public policy (employee did not sue under California’s Fair Education and Housing 
Act (FEHA) but claimed a violation of the public policy expressed in FEHA and that 
hospital should not be exempt because it was engaged in secular activities).  The hospital 
argued that since only FEHA proscribes age discrimination and hospital was exempt from 
FEHA, no public policy was at issue.  The court read FEHA broadly and said that plain 
language exempts religious employers from all discrimination prohibitions, and 
exemption is not limited to situations where the religious faith of the employee is a 
legitimate requirement of the job.  The fact that the hospital engaged in secular activities 
was deemed irrelevant because it was still religious and the drafters of FEHA clearly 
intended for this to be included by using the word allowing non-profit religious 
“corporations” to be included 
 • McKeon v. Mercy Healthcare Sacramento, 19 Cal. 4th 321 (1998) - employee of 
religiously affiliated hospital sued claiming race and gender discrimination.  Employee 
claimed that hospital could not claim exemption from FEHA because hospital was 
organized under the Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law rather than the Nonprofit 
Religious Corporation Law.  The court ruled that in order to claim the exemption, 
hospital had only to be in fact a nonprofit religious entity, and it did not matter which law 
it was organized under. 
                                                 
98 All of these decisions precede the enactment of Cal. Gov. Code § 12926.2(c) which includes religiously affiliated 
hospitals in the definition of employer in FEHA for the purposes of discrimination involving employees performing 
non-religious duties 
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 Los Angeles, CA 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
 http://www.ci.la.ca.us/lacity102.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
LA Administrative Code §4.400 - city not allowed to discriminate on the basis of race, 
color, national origin, ancestry, religion/creed, sex, disability, age, medical conditions 
(cancer), marital status, sexual orientation, retaliation for filing a claim of discrimination, 
or being afflicted or perceived as afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) or the Human Immunovirus (HIV) 
 
Who is covered? 
Only the City is covered by the anti-discrimination statutes. 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
No exemption found 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
LA Administrative Code §10.8.2  - all contracts with the city must contain a clause 
prohibiting the contractor and any subcontractor from discriminating on the basis of race, 
religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, marital status, 
domestic partner status, or medical condition.  The provision does not exempt religious 
organizations that contract with the city. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 San Francisco, CA 
 
Where can city ordinances by found online? 
http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/government/index.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
San Francisco Police Code §3303(a) - employers may not discriminate on the basis of 
race, religion, color, ancestry, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, 
place of birth, weight, height, association with members of protected classes, or in 
retaliation for opposition to any forbidden practices. 
 
Who is covered? 
San Francisco Police Code §3303(c)(2) - any person who employs 6 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
No exemption found 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
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San Francisco Administrative Code §12B.2 - all contracts with the city must contain a 
clause prohibiting the contractor and any subcontractor from discriminating on the basis 
of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, domestic partner status, marital status, disability, weight, height, AIDS/HIV 
status, or association with members of protected classes, or in retaliation for opposition to 
any forbidden practices.  The provision does not exempt religious organizations that 
contract with the city. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
COLORADO 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://64.78.178.12/stat01/index.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §24-34-402(1) (2001) - employers may not discriminate on the 
basis of disability, race, creed, color, sex, age, national origin, or ancestry 
 
Who is covered? 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §24-34-401(3) (2001) - any person who employs any other person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §24-34-401(3) (2001) - the prohibition on discrimination does not 
apply to religious entities 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §24-34-401(3) (2001) - if a religious organization receive 
government funds, they cannot claim an exemption, and must follow the prohibition on 
discrimination 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 Denver, CO 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://www.denvergov.org/docudex/ordinances.asp 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
Denver Municipal Code §28-93(a) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, gender, age, sexual orientation, gender 
variance, marital status, military status or physical or mental disability 
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Who is covered? 
Denver Municipal Code §29-92 - anyone who has a written contract with 20 or more 
employees for each day of 20 or more weeks of the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Denver Municipal Code §28-93(c)(4) - anti-discrimination laws do not apply to religious 
organizations 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
According to the Mayor’s Office of Contract Compliance, all contracts must include a 
non-discrimination clause. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 CONNECTICUT 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.cga.state.ct.us/lco/Statute_Web_Site_LCO.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-60 (2001) - employers may not discriminate on the basis of race, 
color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past 
history of mental disorder, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-81c (2001) - employers may not discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation 
 
Who is covered? 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-51(10) (2001) - any person employing 3 or more persons 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-81p (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §4a-60a (2001) - all contracts with the state must contain a clause 
prohibiting the contractor, as well as any subcontractor, from discriminating on the basis 
of sexual orientation 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 DELAWARE 
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Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.delcode.state.de.us/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19 §711(a) (2001) - employers may not discriminate on the basis of 
race, marital status, genetic information, color, age, religion, sex or national origin 
 
Who is covered? 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19 §710(3) (2001) - any person employing 4 or more persons 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19 §710(3) (2001) - religious organizations are only prohibited from 
discriminating on the basis of race, color, age, and national origin 
Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19 §711(f)(2) (2001) - religiously affiliated educational institutions 
may discriminate on the basis of race 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19 §710(3) (2001) - religious organizations receiving governmental 
funding are prohibited from discriminating on any basis 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
 http://dccode.westgroup.com/home/dccodes/default.wl 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
D.C. Code Ann. §2-1402.11(a) (2002) - employers may not discriminate on the basis of 
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual 
orientation, family responsibilities, disability, matriculation, or political affiliation 
 
Who is covered? 
D.C. Code Ann. §2-1402.02(10) (2002) - any person who employs 1 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
D.C. Code Ann. §2-1401.03(b) (2002) - religious organizations may discriminate on the 
basis of religion and political persuasion in order to further their religious or political 
principles 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the government? 
D.C. Code Ann. §2-1401.03(a) (2002) - all contracts with the government must contain a 
clause prohibiting the contractor, as well as any subcontractor, from discriminating on 
any basis 
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Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 FLORIDA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://taxonomy.myflorida.com/Taxonomy/Government/Legislative%20Branch 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Fla. Stat. §760-10(1) (2001) - employers may not discriminate on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status 
 
Who is covered? 
Fla. Stat. §760.02(7) (2001) - any person who employs 15 or more people each working 
day for 20 weeks of the preceding or current calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Fla. Stat. §760.10(9) (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate on the basis of 
religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 Miami, FL 
 
Where can city ordinances  be found online? 
 http://www.ci.miami.fl.us/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
Miami Code §2-692(a) - the city may not discriminate on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, age, national origin, place of birth, marital status or physical or mental 
handicap 
 
Who is covered? 
Only the city is covered by the anti-discrimination statute 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Not applicable - religious organizations are not covered 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
Miami Charter §28(c) requires the Chief of Procurement to ensure that no city contractors 
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discriminate on any basis; no exemption provided for religious organizations that contract 
with the city. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 GEORGIA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.ganet.org/services/ocode/ocgsearch.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Ga. Code Ann. §45-19-29 (2001) - employers may not discriminate on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex, disability, or age 
 
Who is covered? 
Ga. Code Ann. §45-19-22(5) (2001) - employer means only public employers (any 
department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other agency of the state) which 
employs 15 or more employees within the state for each working day in each of 20 or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Ga. Code Ann. §45-19-34 (2001) - religious organizations are not exempted as such, but 
any employer may discriminate on the basis of religion, if religion is a bona fide 
occupational qualification 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 Atlanta, GA 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://www.ci.atlanta.ga.us/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
Atlanta Code of Ordinances §94-112(a) - employers may not discriminate on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion, sex, domestic relationship status, parental status, familial 
status, sexual orientation, national origin, gender identity, age, or disability 
 
Who is covered? 
Atlanta Code of Ordinances §94-111 - anyone who employs 10 or more people 
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How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Atlanta Code of Ordinances §94-114(2) - religiously affiliated schools may discriminate 
on the basis of religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
According to the City Attorney, the city would not interfere with hiring decisions even if 
city funds were received; however, the exemption only applies to education institutions, 
which would not be given city funds. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 HAWAII 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.ehawaiigov.org/government/html/hilaws.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Haw. Rev. Stat. §378-2(1) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry, disability, marital 
status, or arrest and court record 
 
Who is covered? 
Haw. Rev. Stat. §378-1 (2001) - anyone who employs any other person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Haw. Rev. Stat. §378-3(5) (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate on the basis 
of religion to promote their religious principles 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the government? 
According to the Deputy Attorney General of Hawaii, the exemption would be affected 
as a result of state funding. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 IDAHO 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www3.state.id.us/idstat/TOC/idstTOC.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Idaho Code §67-5909 (2000) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, age, or disability 
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Who is covered? 
Idaho Code §67-5902(6) (2000) - anyone who employs five or more people each day for 
20 or more weeks in the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Idaho Code §67-5910(1) (2000) - religious organizations may discriminate on the basis of 
religion to promote its religious activities 
Idaho Code §67-5910(2)(c) (2000) - religious affiliated schools may discriminate on the 
basis of religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the government? 
 No provision 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 ILLINOIS 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.legis.state.il.us/ilcs/chapterlist.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
775 ILCS 5/1-102(A) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, physical or 
mental handicap, military status, or unfavorable discharge from military service 
 
Who is covered? 
775 ILCS 5/2-101(B)(1)(a) (2001) - anyone who employs 15 or more people within the 
state for 20 or more weeks of the calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
775 ILCS 5/2-101(B)(2) (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate on the basis of 
religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
44 Ill. Admin. Code §750.10 (2002) - all contracts must include a clause requiring that 
contractor not discriminate 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 Chicago, IL 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
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http://www.municode.com/Resources/online_codes.asp 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
Chicago: Code of Ordinances §2-160-030 - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
on the basis of race, color, sex, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual 
orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge status or source of income 
 
Who is covered? 
No definition of employer is given 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Chicago: Code of Ordinances §2-160-080 - religious organizations may discriminate in 
the interests of advancing their religious principles 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
The exemption is not affected by receiving city funding 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 INDIANA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Ind. Code Ann. §22-9-1-3(l) (2001) - it is unlawful for employers to discriminate on the 
basis of race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry 
 
Who is covered? 
Ind. Code Ann. §22-9-1-3(h) (2001) - anyone who employs 6 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Ind. Code Ann. §22-9-1-3(h) (2001) - the prohibition on discrimination does not apply to 
religious organizations 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Ind. Code Ann. §22-9-1-10 (2001) - all contracts must include clause that contractors and 
subcontractors may not discriminate on any basis 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 • Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Salvation Army Adult Rehab. Center, 685 
N.E.2d 487 (Ind. App. 1997) - religious organization retains the exemption even if it is 
engaged in a commercial endeavor 
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 IOWA 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.legis.state.ia.us 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Iowa Code §216.6(1) (2002) - it is unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of 
age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion, or disability 
 
Who is covered? 
Iowa Code §216.6(6)(a) (2002) - anyone who regularly employs 4 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Iowa Code §216.6(6)(d) (2002) - religious organizations may discriminate on the basis of 
religion where religion is a bona fide occupational qualification 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Iowa Admin. Code §441-152.2(234)(4) (2002) - all contractors must comply with the 
state’s civil rights laws 
Iowa Code Ann. §19B.7(1)(a)(3) (2002) - Department of Management is responsible for 
ensuring that no contractor discriminates 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 KANSAS 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.accesskansas.org/government/laws-legal.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Kan. Stat. Ann. §44-1009 (2000) - it is unlawful for employers to discriminate on the 
basis of race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin or ancestry 
 
Who is covered? 
Kan. Stat. Ann. §44-1002(b) (2000) - anyone who employs 4 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Kan. Stat. Ann. §44-1002(b) (2000) - anti-discrimination laws do not apply to religious 
organizations 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
According to the Human Resources Department, the Kansas Human Rights Act is 
incorporated into every contract made with the state. 
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Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 • Zion Lutheran Church v. Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights, 16 Kan. App. 2d 237 
(1991) - sectarian corporations are excluded from anti-discrimination laws and Kansas 
Commission on Civil Rights has no jurisdiction over discrimination complaints involving 
religious organizations 
 
 
 KENTUCKY 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/legresou/legres2.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §344.040 (2001) - it is unlawful for employers to discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age forty and over, or disability 
 
Who is covered? 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §344.030(2) (2001) - anyone who employs 8 or more people within 
the state for 20 or more weeks of the preceding or current calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §344.090(2) (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate on the 
basis of religion for the purpose of carrying on their religious activities 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the government? 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45.570(2) (2001) - all contractors with the state must agree not to 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 LOUISIANA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.legis.state.la.us/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
La. Stat. Ann. §23:332(A) (2001) - it is unlawful for any employer to intentionally 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
 
Who is covered? 
La. Stat. Ann. §23:302(2) (2001) - anyone who employs 20 or more people for 20 or 
more weeks of the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
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La. Stat. Ann. §23:332(H)(2) (2001) - religiously affiliated educational institutions may 
discriminate on the basis of religion 
La. Stat. Ann. §23:302(2)(b) (2001) - religious organizations are not covered by the anti-
discrimination laws 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
All contracts are required to have clause prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
religion and requires all contractors to adhere to provisions of Title VII. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 New Orleans, LA 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://www.new-orleans.la.us/home/cityCouncil/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
According to the Human Relations Committee, the city does not have its own anti-
discrimination provisions, but rather follows federal law in that area. 
 
Who is covered? 
See above – follows federal law 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
See above – follows federal law 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
See above – follows federal law 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 MAINE 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.maine.gov/portal/government/law.html#laws 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §4572(1) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race or color, sex, physical or mental disability, religion, age, ancestry or 
national origin 
 
Who is covered? 
5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §4553(4) (2001) - any person who employs any other person 
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How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §4553(4) (2001) - non-profit religious organizations may 
discriminate in favor of people of that religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §784(2) (2001) - all contracts and sub-contracts must include non-
discrimination clause 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 MARYLAND 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://198.187.128.12/maryland/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=fs-main.htm&2.0 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Md. Ann. Code Art. 49B, §16(a) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, 
genetic information, or disability unrelated in nature and extent so as to reasonably 
preclude the performance of the employment, or because of the individual's refusal to 
submit to a genetic test or make available the results of a genetic test 
 
Who is covered? 
Md. Ann. Code Art. 49B, §15(b) (2001) - anyone who has 15 or more employs for each 
day of 20 or more weeks in the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Md. Ann. Code Art. 49B, §16(g)(3) (2001) - religiously affiliated educational institutions 
may discriminate on the basis of religion 
Md. Ann. Code Art. 49B, §18(2) (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate on the 
basis of religion or sexual orientation 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Md. State Fin. and Proc. §12-219 (2001) - discrimination by state contractors is 
prohibited 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 • Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565 (2001) - religious 
organizations may discriminate on the basis of religion 
 
 Baltimore, MD 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
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Not online; call Baltimore City Department of Legislative Reference at (410) 396-4370 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
Baltimore City Code §3-1 - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of 
race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age, physical or mental capability, 
marital status, or sexual orientation 
 
Who is covered? 
Baltimore City Code §1-1(i)(1) - anyone who employs 15 or more people at least 15 days 
in the preceding 12 months 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Baltimore City Code §1-1(f)(2) - religious organizations may discriminate on the basis of 
religion to promote its religious organization 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 MASSACHUSETTS 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.state.ma.us/legis/laws/mgl/index.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 151B, §4 (2002) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, which 
shall not include persons whose sexual orientation involves minor children as the sex 
object, genetic information, or ancestry 
 
Who is covered? 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, §1(5) (2002) - anyone who employs 6 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, §1(5) (2002) - religious organizations may discriminate in 
favor of members of their religion to promote their religious principles 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, §4(18) (2002) - religious organizations may discriminate in 
favor of members of their religion to promote their religious principles 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Commonwealth Terms and Conditions, included in every contract, require contractors to 
comply with all state and federal laws regarding discrimination; contractors are 
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of religion or sexual orientation 
  
 The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 149
State of the Law
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 • Piatti v. Jewish Community Centers of Greater Boston, 1993 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 328 (1993) - although Jewish Community Center was not able to claim exemption 
from employment discrimination laws, court found that religion was a bona fide 
occupational qualification as used in the exemption statute 
 
 Boston, MA 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://www.amlegal.com/boston_ma/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
City of Boston Municipal Code §12-9.3 - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
on the basis of race, color, sex, age, religious creed, disability, national origin, ancestry, 
sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, ex-offender status, prior psychiatric 
treatment, military status, or source of income 
 
Who is covered? 
City of Boston Municipal Code §12-9.2 - anyone who employs 7 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
City of Boston Municipal Code §12-9.2 - non-profit religious organizations are not 
included in the anti-discrimination ordinance 
City of Boston Municipal Code §12-9.3 - religious organizations may discriminate in 
favor of members of the same religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 MICHIGAN 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.michiganlegislature.org/law/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Mich. Stat. Ann. §37.2202(1) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status 
 
Who is covered? 
Mich. Stat. Ann. §37.2201 (2001) - anyone who employs any other person 
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How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Mich. Stat. Ann. §37.2208 (2002) - employers may apply for an exemption based on 
theory that discrimination on the basis of any of the prohibited classifications is a bona 
fide occupational qualification 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Mich Stat. Ann. §37.2209 (2002) - all contracts and subcontracts shall include non-
discrimination clause 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 • Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 209 Mich. App. 630 (1995) - 
analyzed under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (which the U.S. Supreme Court 
later held unconstitutional as applied to states), the court decided that the state had no 
interest in prohibiting religious discrimination in the employment of teachers in church-
operated schools, and that such regulation would substantially burden the mission of 
function of such schools (however, the court added that the burden was recognized by the 
US Congress, but not the Michigan Legislature) 
 
 
 MINNESOTA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.leg.state.mn.us/leg/statutes.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Minn. Stat. §363.03 (2000) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public 
assistance, disability, sexual orientation, or age 
 
Who is covered? 
Minn. Stat. §363.01(17) (2000) - anyone who employs any other person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Minn. Stat. §363.02(2) (2000) - religious organizations may discriminate on the basis of 
religion or sexual orientation where religion or sexual orientation is a bona fide 
occupational qualification 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 • Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. App. 1995) - in sex discrimination 
claim, religious employer could not claim exemption because religion was not a bona fide 
occupational qualification (nor did employer allege that it was, but rather that a male 
worker had better qualifications).  However, court found that inquiry into sex 
discrimination claim would violate church’s free exercise rights (church membership was 
  
 The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 151
State of the Law
a prerequisite to employment, and church fired her after her membership was revoked). 
The court declined to examine whether the revocation was a pretext for discrimination. 
 • State by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (1985) - the 
court held that even if employment practices were mandated by owner/operators’ deeply 
held religious beliefs, this was not enough to bring them under the statutory exemption 
when business was not a religious corporation (in this case, it was an exercise club). 
 
 
 MISSISSIPPI 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://198.187.128.12/mississippi/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=fs-main.htm&2.0 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Miss. Code Ann. §25-9-149 (2001) - legislative intent that there be no discriminatory 
hiring practices by the state 
 
Who is covered? 
Only applies to the state 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Not applicable - statute applies only to the state 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 No provision 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 Unknown 
 
 
 MISSOURI 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.moga.state.mo.us/homestat.asp 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §213.055(1) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability 
 
Who is covered? 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §213.010(7) (2001) - anyone who employs 6 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §213.010(7) (2001) - religious organizations are not included in the anti-
discrimination law 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §290.145 (2001) - religiously affiliated health-care organizations are not 
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included in the anti-discrimination 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 St. Louis, MO 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://www.slpl.lib.mo.us/cco/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
St. Louis City Ordinance 62710 §9(B)(1) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
on the basis of race, color, age, religion, sex, familial status, disability, sexual orientation, 
national origin or ancestry 
 
Who is covered? 
St. Louis City Ordinance 62710 §2(7) - any person who employs 6 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
St. Louis City Ordinance 62710 §9(B)(8) - religiously affiliated educational institutions 
may discriminate on the basis of religion when hiring for a teaching or counseling 
position, a professorship, or a position involving supervision of teachers, counselors or 
professors 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 MONTANA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://data.opi.state.mt.us/bills/mca_toc/index.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Mont. Code Ann. §49-2-303(1) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race, creed, religion, color, or national origin or because of age, physical or 
mental disability, marital status, or sex when the reasonable demands of the position do 
not require an age, physical or mental disability, marital status, or sex distinction 
 
Who is covered? 
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Mont. Code Ann. §49-2-101(11) (2001) - anyone who employs any other person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Mont. Code Ann. §49-2-101(11) (2001) - non-profit religious organizations are not 
included in the anti-discrimination laws 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Mont. Admin. Rules §24.9.604(3)(e) (2002) - it is unlawful for an employer participating 
in a contract of any kind to discriminate in employment 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 NEBRASKA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
 http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/laws/index.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §48-1101 (2001) - policy of the state is not to allow discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, disability, or national origin 
 
Who is covered? 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §48-1102(2) (2001) - any person who employs 15 or more people for 
each day of 20 or more weeks in the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §48-1108(2) (2001) - religiously affiliated educational institutions may 
discriminate on the basis of religion 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §48-1103(1) (2002) - religious organizations may discriminate on the 
basis of religion to further their religious principles 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
According to the state Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the exemption does 
not change as a result of receiving state funds. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 NEVADA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/law1.cfm 
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What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §613.330 (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability or national origin 
 
Who is covered? 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §613.310(2) (2001) - anyone who employs 15 or more people for 20 
more weeks of the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §613.320(1)(b) (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate on 
the basis of religion in furtherance of their religious activities 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §613.350(4) (2001) - religiously affiliated educational institutions 
may discriminate on the basis of religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 NEW HAMPSHIRE 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/indexes/default.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §354-A:7 (2000) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of age, sex, race, color, marital status, physical or mental disability, religious 
creed, or national origin 
 
Who is covered? 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §354-A:2(VII) (2000) - anyone who employs 6 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §354-A:2(VII) (2000) - non-profit religious organizations are not 
included in the anti-discrimination laws 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 No provision 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 NEW JERSEY 
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Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §10:5-12 (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or 
sexual orientation, genetic information, sex or atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait of 
any individual, or because of the liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United 
States or the nationality of any individual, or because of the refusal to submit to a genetic 
test or make available the results of a genetic test to an employer 
 
Who is covered? 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §10:5-5(e) (2001) - anyone who employs any other person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §10:5-12(a) (2002) - religious organizations may discriminate on the basis 
of religion to further their religious purposes 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §10:5-33(a) and (b) (2002) - all contracts must include non-discrimination 
language 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 • Gallo v. Salesian Soc’y, 290 N.J. Super 616 (1996) - that inquiry into sex and 
age discrimination claim did not impermissibly burden religious school’s First 
Amendment rights nor was it an impermissible entanglement of government with 
religion, in light of compelling state interest against such discrimination 
 
 
 NEW MEXICO 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://198.187.128.12/newmexico/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=fs-main.htm&2.0 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §28-1-7 (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
issue of race, age, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, physical or mental 
handicap or serious medical condition 
 
Who is covered? 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §28-1-2(B) (2001) - anyone who employs 4 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §28-1-9(B) (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate in favor of 
members of the same religion to further their religious principles 
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What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 Albuquerque, NM 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://www.amlegal.com/albuquerque_nm/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Albuquerque Code of Ordinances §11-3-7 - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or ancestry, age or physical 
handicap 
 
Who is covered? 
Albuquerque Code of Ordinances §11-3-3 - anyone who employs any person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Albuquerque Code of Ordinances §11-3-12 - religious organizations may discriminate in 
favor of members of their religion to further their religious principles, so long as 
membership in the religious organization is not limited on the basis of race, color, sex, 
national origin, ancestry, age, or physical handicap 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the government? 
 No provision 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?sl=0 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
N.Y. CLS Exec. Ch. 18, Art. 15 §296(1) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate on the basis of age,  race, creed,  color,  national origin, sex, disability, 
genetic predisposition or carrier status, or marital status 
 
Who is covered? 
N.Y. CLS Exec. Ch. 18, Art. 15 §292 (2001) - any person who employs 5 or more people 
 
  
 The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 157
State of the Law
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
N.Y. CLS Exec. Ch. 18 Art. 15 §296(11) (2001) - religious organizations may 
discriminate on the basis of religion to further their religious purposes 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Standard Clause for all NY State Contracts §5 (2000) - all state contracts must include 
clause referencing non-discrimination laws, which include the exemption for religious 
entities 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 • Scheiber v. St. John's Univ., 600 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1993) - religious university was 
exempt from prohibition on religious discrimination even though it was not incorporated 
under the Religious Corporations Law 
 
 New York, NY 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
not online; call the Municipal Reference Library at 212-788-8590 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
NYC Code §8-107(1) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of age, 
race, creed, color, national origin, gender, disability, marital status, sexual orientation or 
alienage or citizenship status 
 
Who is covered? 
NYC Code §8-102(5) - anyone who employs 5 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
NYC Code §8-107(12) - religious organizations may discriminate in favor of members of 
their religion to further their religious principles 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
NYC Procurement Policy Board Rules §1-03(c) - prohibits discrimination on basis of 
creed and sexual orientation by government contractors or subcontractors 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 NORTH CAROLINA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/Statutes/statutestoc.pl 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
According the State’s Attorney General, the state follows federal law. 
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Who is covered? 
The state follows federal law. 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
The state follows federal law. 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
The state follows federal law. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 NORTH DAKOTA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.state.nd.us/lr/information/statutes/cent-code.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
N.D. Cent. Code §14-02.4-03 (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or mental disability, 
status with respect to marriage or public assistance, or participation in lawful activity off 
the employer’s premises during non-working hours which is not in direct conflict with 
the essential business-related interests of the employer 
 
Who is covered? 
N.C. Cent. Code §14-02.4-02 (2001) - anyone who employs any other person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
According to the State’s Attorney General, there is no exemption, but absent evidence of 
legislative intent to the contrary they would probably follow federal example. 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 No provision 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 OHIO 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://onlinedocs.andersonpublishing.com/revisedcode/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
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Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4112.02 (2001) - it is unlawful for any employer to discriminate 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry 
Who is covered? 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4112.01(2) (2001) - any person who employs 4 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
There is no statutory exemption for religious organizations, however, according to the 
State Equal Opportunity Department, the Civil Rights Comm. would take into account 
“factors that could violate or infringe upon the First Amendment protection of freedom of 
religion” when evaluating a discrimination claim. 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
There is no exemption, regardless of the source of funding 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
  • Ward v. Hengle, 124 Ohio App. 3d 396 (1997) - where no exemption exists for 
religious entities, and legislature has had numerous opportunities to create one, court will 
not infer one based on interpretation of Title VII exemption and even if religious entity 
were exempt under federal law, when suit is brought under state anti-discrimination law, 
no exemption 
 
 
 OKLAHOMA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
25 Okla. Stat. §1302(A) (2000) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap 
 
Who is covered? 
25 Okla. Stat. §1301(1) (2000) - any person who employs 15 or more people for 20 or 
more weeks of the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
25 Okla. Stat. §1307 (2000) - religious organizations may discriminate in favor of 
members of their religion to further their religious activities 
25 Okla. Stat. §1308(2) (2000) - religiously affiliated schools may discriminate on the 
basis of religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Cent. Purch. Rules Tit. 280:15-4-14(e) (2001) - upon certification by State Human Rights 
Commission that supplies is discriminating, Purchasing Director can terminate all 
contracts and suspend the supplier 
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Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 Unknown 
 
 OREGON 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.leg.state.or.us/ors/home.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Or. Rev. Stat. §659A.030(1) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, marital status or age 
 
Who is covered? 
Or. Rev. Stat. §659A.001(4) - anyone who employs any other person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Or. Rev. Stat. §659A.006(2) (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate in favor of 
members of their religion to further their religious purposes, where the position involved 
is closely connected with or related to the primary purposes of the church or institution 
and is not connected with a commercial or business activity which has no necessary 
relationship to the church or institution, or to its primary purposes 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Or. Admin. Rules §125-020-0400(4) (2002) - contract must specify that it is subject to all 
applicable requirements of federal and state civil rights statutes, rules, and regulations 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 Portland, OR 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://municipalcodes.lexisnexis.com/codes/portland/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
Portland City Code §23.01.050 - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, marital status, age if the individual is 18 
years of age or older, or disability 
 
Who is covered? 
Portland City Code §23.01.030(D) incorporates by reference Or. Rev. Stat. §659 (1999) - 
anyone who employs any other person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
No exemption found 
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What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
There is no exemption, and Portland City Code §3.100.005 prohibits discrimination on 
basis of creed and sexual orientation by government contractors. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
Not available online 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
43 Pa. Consol. Stat. §955(a) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin or non-job related 
handicap or disability 
 
Who is covered? 
43 Pa. Consol. Stat. §954(b) (2001) - anyone who employs 4 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
43 Pa. Consol. Stat. §954(b) (2001) - religious organizations specifically not allowed to 
discriminate on any basis other than religion 
43 Pa. Consol. Stat. §955(h)(10) (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate in 
favor of members of their religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
43 Pa. Consol. Stat. §954(b) (2001) - any religious organization receiving state money 
may not discriminate on any basis 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 Philadelphia, PA 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://www.amlegal.com/philadelphia_pa/ 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
Philadelphia City Code §9-1103(A) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, sex, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, ancestry, age 
handicap, or marital status 
 
Who is covered? 
Philadelphia City Code §9-1103(f) - anyone who employs any other person 
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How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Philadelphia City Code §9-1103(f) - religious organizations are not included in the anti-
discrimination ordinance 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
Terms and Conditions of Bidding and Contracting Paragraph 18 specify that in 
accordance with the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, contractors shall not discriminate. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 RHODE ISLAND 
 
Where can state statutes be found online?  
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/Statutes.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
R.I. Gen. Laws. §28-5-7(1) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of race or color, religion, sex, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity or 
expression, or country of ancestral origin 
 
Who is covered? 
R.I. Gen. Laws §28-5-6(7)(i) (2001) - anyone who employs 4 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
R.I. Gen. Laws §28-5-6-(7)(ii) (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate in favor 
of members of their religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.scstatehouse.net/research.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
S.C. Code Ann. §1-13-80(A) (2000) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race, religion, color, sex, age, national origin, or disability 
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Who is covered? 
S.C. Code Ann. §1-13-30(e) (2000) - anyone who has 15 or more employees for 20 or 
more weeks of the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
S.C. Code Ann. §1-13-80(I)(5) (2000) - religious organizations may discriminate on the 
basis of religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
According to the Human Affairs Commission, there is no provision regarding the source 
of funding and a religious organization’s exemption. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/index.cfm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
S.D. Codified Laws §20-13-10 (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin 
 
Who is covered? 
S.D. Codified Laws §20-13-1(7) (2001) - anyone who employs any other person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
S.D. Codified Laws §20-13-18 (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate on the 
basis of religion to further their religious purposes 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
The Vendor’s Manual includes a Non-Discrimination Statement which says that by 
signing a bid proposal, a bidder certifies that they do not discriminate in their 
employment practices. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 TENNESSEE 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://198.187.128.12/tennessee/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=fs-main.htm&2.0 
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What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Tenn. Code Ann. §4-21-401(a) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin 
 
Who is covered? 
Tenn. Code Ann. §4-21-102 (2001) - anyone who employs 8 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Tenn. Code Ann. §4-21-405 (2001) - religious organizations may discriminate on the 
basis of religion to further their religious activities 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. §0620-3-3-.05(6) (2002) - nondiscrimination clause must be 
included in all contract subject to the rule 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 TEXAS 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/statutes.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §21.051 (2000) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age 
 
Who is covered? 
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §21.002 (2000) - anyone who employs 15 or more people for each 
day of 20 or more weeks of the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §21.109 (2000) - religious organizations may discriminate in favor 
of members of their religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
40 Tex. Admin. Code §49.27 (2002) - status as a contractor with DHS does not alter 
religious entity’s independent basis, and shall not be interpreted to require the entity to 
alter its internal governance 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 Austin, TX 
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Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/development/ldc1.htm 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
Austin City Code §7-3-4(A) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, age or physical disability 
 
Who is covered? 
Austin City Code §7-3-2 - any person who employs 15 or more people for each working 
day of 20 more weeks of the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Austin City Code §7-3-10(B) - religiously affiliated schools may discriminate on the 
basis of religion 
Austin City Code §7-3-10(C) - religious organizations may discriminate on the basis of 
religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
Austin City Code §7-4-2 - contractors with the government may not discriminate 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 UTAH 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/Documents/code_const.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-106(a) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, 
if the individual is 40 years of age or older, religion, national origin, or disability 
 
Who is covered? 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-102(8)(a)(iv) (2001) - anyone who employs 15 or more people 
for each working day of 20 or more weeks in the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-102(8)(b) (2001) - religious organizations are not covered by 
the anti-discrimination laws 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-106(3)(a)(ii) (2001) - religiously affiliated schools may 
discriminate on the basis of religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 Unknown 
 
  
The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy 166 
Government Partnerships with Faith-Based Service Providers 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 • Larsen v. Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960 (Utah 1980) - Utah’s Anti-Discrimination 
Act, which exempts religious organizations and their wholly-owned subsidiaries from the 
definition of employer, and exempts religious schools from the prohibition on religious 
discrimination, is not in conflict with Title VII 
 
 
 VERMONT 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/statutes2.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §495(a) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, ancestry, place of 
birth, age, or physical or mental condition 
 
Who is covered? 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §494 (2001) - any person who employs any other person within the 
state 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §495(e) - the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation do not bar a religious organization from giving preference to members of their 
religion 
 
What happens to the exemption is a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
According to the State’s Attorney General, there has no instance in which a state-funded 
organization has sought to use this provision to avoid hiring anyone and there is no way 
to know what would happen under such circumstances 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 VIRGINIA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.vipnet.org/cmsportal/government_881/virginia_1048/index.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Va. Code Ann. §2.2-3901 (2001) - it is unlawful to discriminate on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, 
age, marital status, or disability 
 
Who is covered? 
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No definition found, although the Virginia Human Rights Act is construed in accordance 
with federal antidiscrimination law. 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
There is no exemption provided, although the Virginia Human Rights Act is construed in 
accordance with federal antidiscrimination law. 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Va. Code Ann. §2.2-4201 - contractors may not discriminate on any basis; the provision 
does permit discrimination where religion is a bona fide occupational qualification. 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.leg.wa.gov/rcw/index.cfm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Wash. Rev. Code §49.60.180 (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of 
any sensory, mental, or physical disability 
 
Who is covered? 
Wash. Rev. Code §49.60.040(3) (2001) - anyone who employs 8 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Wash. Rev. Code §29.60.040(3) (2001) - religious organizations are not included in the 
anti-discrimination laws 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 None found 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statute? 
 • Hazen v. Catholic Credit Union, 681 P.2d 856 (Wash. App. 1984) - Catholic 
Credit Union is not a religious organization because it lacks sufficient ties to the church 
and has no religious qualities; therefore it is not entitled to exemption and so is subject to 
sexual harassment claims 
 
 Seattle, WA 
 
Where can city ordinances be found online? 
http://www.cityofseattle.net/council/legdb.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination ordinances and what do they cover? 
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Seattle Municipal Code §§14.04.030(F) and 14.04.040 - it is unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, political ideology, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin 
 
Who is covered? 
Seattle Municipal Code §14.04.030(H) - anyone who employs any person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
No exemption found 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the city government? 
Seattle Municipal Code §20.44.020(A) - Director of Finance is to assist all contracting 
authorities in preparing anti-discrimination provisions for contracts 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption ordinances? 
 None found 
 
 
 WEST VIRGINIA 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/State_Code/finishedData/toc2.html 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
W.Va. Code §§5-11-3(h) (2001) and W.Va. Code §5-11-9(2) (2001) - it is unlawful for 
an employer to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, 
sex, age, blindness, disability or familial status and includes to separate or segregate 
 
Who is covered? 
W.Va. Code §5-11-3(d) (2001) - anyone who employs 12 or more people for 20 or more 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
No exemption 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
There is no exemption 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
 
 
 WISCONSIN 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/rsb/stats.html 
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What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Wis. Stat. § 111.321 (2000) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis 
of age, race, creed, color, disability, marital status, sex, national origin, ancestry, arrest 
record, conviction record, membership in the national guard, state defense force or any 
reserve component of the military forces of the United States or this state or use or 
nonuse of lawful products off the employer's premises during nonworking hours 
 
Who is covered? 
Wis. Stat. §111.32(6)(a) (2000) - any person who employs any other person 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
Wis. Stat. §111.337(2) (2000) - non-profit religious organizations may discriminate on 
the basis of religion 
 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
Wis. Stat. §46.027(5) (2000) - religious exemption under 42 USC §2000e not affected by 
receipt of funds administered by department of social services 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 • Jocz v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 196 Wis. 2d 273 (1995) - exemption 
only applies to religious discrimination; claim of sex discrimination could not be defeated 
through exemption.  Although Dept. of Industry, Labor, and Human Relations is not 
categorically denied jurisdiction over discrimination claims in religious entities, WI 
Constitution Art. 1 §18 precludes investigation where the position at issue is ministerial 
in nature (as the Director of Field Placement was in this case). 
 • Sacred Heart Sch. Bd. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 157 Wis. 2d 638 
(1990) - narrow statutory co-religionist exemption does not preclude investigative agency 
from investigation to see if religious motivation for firing was pretext for age 
discrimination.  The entity’s Free Exercise rights are not compromised by such an 
investigation. 
 
 
 WYOMING 
 
Where can state statutes be found online? 
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/titles/statutes.htm 
 
What are the employment discrimination statutes and what do they cover? 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §27-9-105(a) (2001) - it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of age, sex, race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry 
 
Who is covered? 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §27-9-102(b) (2001) - anyone who employs 2 or more people 
 
How are religious organizations exempted, if at all? 
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Wyo. Stat. Ann. §27-9-102(b) (2001) - religious organizations are not included in the 
anti-discrimination statute 
What happens to the exemption if a religious organization contracts with the state government? 
 Unknown 
 
Are there any court cases that interpret the exemption statutes? 
 None found 
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 APPENDIX C 
 
 PROPOSED MODEL PROVISIONS 
 
 
RELIGIOUS IDENTITY PROTECTED.  Providers that are faith-based organizations are 
eligible to compete for contracts with the State of _____ on the same basis as any other provider.  
Such providers shall not be required to alter their forms of internal governance or their religious 
character, or to remove religious art, icons, scripture or other symbols.  Such providers 
understand and acknowledge that their right to maintain their religious character does not include 
the right to include religious messages or materials in programs financed under this contract.  
 
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED.  Providers may not discriminate against 
clients served under this contract on the basis of their religious affiliation or religious beliefs.  
 
RELIGIOUS COERCION PROHIBITED.  Providers may not require clients, as a condition of 
service under this contract, to participate in religious activities of any kind, even if those 
religious activities are funded entirely from private sources.  Providers must clearly inform 
clients of their rights under this section.   
 
SECULAR OPTIONS.  Providers must inform clients that they are not obliged to accept service 
from a provider that has a religious character, even if the service itself is entirely secular.  Clients 
who object to receiving service from a provider that has a religious character must be referred by 
such providers to [NAME APPROPRIATE STATE AGENCY].  The [AGENCY] must make 
available within a reasonable time an alternative provider of the same services, reasonably 
accessible to the client, and worth the same value, to any client who objects to the religious 
character of the organization or institution from which the client would receive or is receiving 
services or assistance. 
 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION. [SET OUT CLEARLY AND IN APPROPRIATE 
DETAIL THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RULES AS FEDERAL, STATE, AND 
LOCAL LAW REQUIRE] 
 
PROHIBITED RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES.  The materials, curriculum, service, and instruction 
provided under this contract shall be entirely secular.  The provider understands and agrees that it 
may not engage in the expression of religious themes or messages as part of the delivery of 
service under this contract.  This prohibition includes activities commonly understood as 
religious worship, instruction, or proselytizing, but it also includes expressly religious methods 
of any other sort, regardless of the extent to which such methods are integrated into the delivery 
of service.99   
Nothing in this provision shall prohibit the provider from making opportunities for religious 
expression or worship available to clients, so long as 1) clients are informed that such 
opportunities are entirely voluntary, and are not a condition of service; and 2) no funds derived 
                                                 
 99 We recommend that state agencies append to such contracts a list of examples, perhaps in the question 
and answer format currently provided on the website for the Department of Labor Center for Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives, of religious activities forbidden under the contract.   
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from this contract are used to pay for materials, salaries, fringe benefits, construction or 
maintenance of space set aside for worship, or any other costs associated with providing such 
opportunities for religious expression.  The [AGENCY] will use its best efforts to provide 
guidance to the provider about the scope of this section, and to answer questions that may arise 
under it.  The provider understands and acknowledges that violation of this section may be 
grounds for nonrenewal or termination of the contract.  Persistent, intentional, and flagrant 
violations may be grounds for [AGENCY] recovery of the cost of prohibited expenditures under 
the contract, as well as immediate termination of the contract. 
 
PROVIDER REPORTS AND ATTESTATIONS REGARDING RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES. 
Providers will transmit to the [AGENCY] written reports of activities, and statements of 
financial account, with respect to the funds provided under this contract.  The [AGENCY] will 
make available to providers the forms on which such reports and statements are to be made, and 
will specify the frequency [quarterly, etc.] with which they are to be made.  In the statements of 
financial accounts, the provider must segregate the funds provided under this contract and 
account for their separate use. The provider must meet the same fiscal and accounting standards, 
and generally accepted accounting principles as any other private provider.  With respect to each 
such report and statement of account, the provider will include the following attestation:  “I 
certify that [during this reporting period] no activity, event, or material created or supported in 
whole or in part with funds provided under this contract has included religious themes, messages, 
or content, and that funds provided under this contract have not supported any religious worship, 
instruction, or proselytizing.”  
 
MONITORING.  The [AGENCY] and the provider acknowledge and understand that the 
AGENCY has authority over this contract and funds provided under it.  The AGENCY will 
evaluate reports and accounts filed by the provider, and is under a legal duty to assure that the 
provider is not engaging in prohibited religious activities under this contract.  The AGENCY and 
the provider also acknowledge and understand that the AGENCY does NOT have authority over 
the activities and character of the provider with respect to matters not supported by funds from 
this contract and outside the scope of this contract.  With respect to matters outside the scope of 
the contract, the AGENCY will not audit provider expenditures or in any other way attempt to 
monitor or control the content, religious or otherwise, of provider activities.  
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 SAMPLE STATE PROVISIONS 
 
 
1 Oklahoma Department of Human Services: Solicitation for Faith-Based Intermediary 
 Services 
 
 6.3.3 Charitable Choice Providers 
 
Providers who are members of the faith community are eligible to compete for contracts 
with the State of Oklahoma on the same basis as any other provider.  Such providers shall 
not be required to alter their forms of internal governance, their religious character or 
remove religious art, icons, scripture or other symbols.  Such providers may not, 
however, discriminate against clients on the basis of their religion, religious beliefs or 
clients’ refusal to participate in religious practices. 
 
2 Texas Department of Human Services 
 
 H. 
 
To comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Public Law 88-352), Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-112), The Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336), and all amendments to each, and all 
requirements imposed by the regulations issued pursuant to these acts.  In addition, the 
Provider Agency agrees to comply with Title 40, Chapter 73, of the Texas Administrative 
Code.  These provide, in part, that no persons in the United States shall, on the grounds of 
race, color, national origin, age, sex, disability, political beliefs or religion be excluded 
from participation in, or denied, any aid, care, services or other benefits provided by 
federal and/or state funding, or otherwise be subjected to any discrimination. 
 
The Provider Agency agrees to comply with Health and Safety Code Section 85.113 
(relating to workplace and confidentiality guidelines regarding AIDS and HIV). 
 
A religious organization that contracts with the Department does not by contracting with 
the Department lose exemption provided under Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act (42 
U.S.C. §2000E-1(a)) regarding employment practices.  A religious or charitable 
organization is eligible to be a Provider Agency on the same basis as any other private 
organization.  The Provider Agency retains its independence from State and local 
governments, including the Provider Agency’s control over the definition, development, 
practice, and expression of its charitable or religious beliefs.  Except as provided by 
federal law, the Department shall not interpret this contract to require a charitable or 
religious organization to alter its form of internal governance or remove religious art, 
icons, scripture, or other symbols.  Furthermore if a religious or charitable organization 
segregates the government funds provided under the contract, then only the financial 
assistance provided by these funds will be subject to audit.  However, neither the 
Department’s selection of a charitable or faith-based Provider Agency of social services 
nor the expenditure of funds under this contract is an endorsement of the Provider 
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Agency’s charitable or religious character, practices, or expression.  The purpose of this 
contract is the provision of social services; no State expenditures have as their objective 
the funding of sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization.  A charitable or faith-
based provider of social services under this contract shall reasonably apprise all assisted 
individuals of the following: “Neither the Department’s selection of a charitable or faith-
based provider of social services nor the expenditure of funds under this contract is an 
endorsement of the provider’s charitable or religious character, practices, or expressions.  
No provider of social services may discriminate against you on the basis of religion, a 
religious belief, or your refusal to actively participate in a religious practice.  If you 
object to a particular provider agency because of its religious character, you may request 
assignment to a different provider agency.  If you believe that your rights have been 
violated, please discuss the complaint with your provider agency or notify your 
appropriate case manger.” 
 
Section 104 of The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, 42 U.S.C. §604a, sets forth certain additional rights and responsibilities for 
charitable and faith-based providers of social services, certain additional rights of assisted 
individuals, and certain additional responsibilities of the Department to these providers 
and assisted individuals.  This contract is subject to those additional rights and 
responsibilities. 
 
3 Wisconsin Works (W-2) and Related Programs Contract 
 
 13.5 Faith-based 
 
The W-2 agency may subcontract with, or award grants to charitable, private or faith-
based organizations to provide case management services or assistance to W-2 and 
Related Programs participants or applicants on the same basis as any other private 
organization. 
 
 13.6 Non-discrimination Against an Organization 
 
The W-2 agency shall not discriminate against an organization that is or applies to be a 
subcontractor on the basis that the organization has a religious character.  The W-2 
agency shall not require the faith-based organization to alter its definition, development, 
practice or expression of its religious beliefs, nor shall it require the organization to alter 
its internal governance or remove religious art or any other expression of its religious 
belief in order to enter into a subcontract with or be awarded a grant from the W-2 
agency. 
 
 13.7 Non-discrimination Against an Applicant or Participant 
 
The W-2 agency shall not discriminate against any W-2 or Related Programs applicant or 
participant on the basis of religious or lack of religious belief.  Therefore, if the W-2 
agency subcontracts with a faith-based organization to provide case management services 
or assistance to W-2 and Related Programs participants, it must make available within a 
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reasonable time an alternative provider of the same services, worth the same value, to any 
participant who objects to the religious character of the organization or institution from 
which the participant would receive or is receiving case management services or 
assistance. 
 
 13.8 Fiscal and Accounting Standards 
 
The W-2 agency shall require any faith-based organization that it subcontracts with or 
awards a grant to, to meet the same fiscal and accounting standards, and generally 
accepted accounting principles as any other private provider.
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